LITERAL MEANING (book) by Recanati, François
LITERAL MEANING (book)
Franc¸ois Recanati
To cite this version:
Franc¸ois Recanati. LITERAL MEANING (book). 2002. <ijn 00000290>
HAL Id: ijn 00000290
https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn 00000290
Submitted on 8 Nov 2002
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1 
 
 
 
Literal Meaning 
 
François Recanati 
Institut Jean-Nicod 
1bis, avenue de Lowendal, 75007 Paris, France 
recanati@ehess.fr 
 2 
 
Contents 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 1: Two approaches to 'what is said' 
1.1 The basic triad 
1.2 Minimalism 
1.3 Literal truth-conditions vs actual truth-conditions 
1.4 A problem for Minimalism 
1.5 The availability of what is said 
1.6 The availability-based approach 
1.7 'Saying' as a pragmatic notion 
1.8 Availability vs Minimalism 
 
Chapter 2: Primary pragmatic processes 
2.1 Enrichment, loosening, and transfer 
2.2 Rejecting the Gricean picture 
2.3 Accessibility 
2.4 Objections and responses 
2.5 Interactive processing 
2.6 The role of schemata 
 
Chapter 3: Relevance-theoretic objections 
3.1 One or two systems? 
3.2 Personal and sub-personal inferences 
3.3 Implicature or enrichment? 
3.4 Mutual adjustment of explicature and implicature 
3.5 Implicated premisses 
 
Chapter 4: The Syncretic View 
4.1 Four levels? 
4.2 Semantics and pragmatics: the standard picture 
4.3 Semantic underdeterminacy 
 3 
4.4 The minimal proposition as 'common denominator' 
4.5 Interaction between saturation and optional pragmatic processes 
4.6 Taking stock 
4.7 Minimal or reflexive? 
 
Chapter 5: Nonliteral uses 
5.1 Nonliteral uses as nonminimal departures from literal meaning 
5.2 Nonliteral uses and secondary meaning 
5.3 Nonminimal departures without secondariness 
5.4 The transparency condition 
5.5 Varieties of nonliteral meaning 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 6: From Literalism to Contextualism 
6.1 Five positions 
6.2 Indexicalism 
6.3 Contextualism 
6.4 Literalist responses to the contextualist challenge 
6.5 Where Indexicalism and Contextualism meet 
 
Chapter 7: Indexicalism and the Binding Fallacy 
7.1 Mandatory v. Optional 
7.2 Two criteria 
7.3 The indexicalist challenge 
7.4 Is the Binding Criterion reliable? 
7.5 Variadic functions 
7.6 The Binding Fallacy 
7.7 Conclusion: the failure of Indexicalism 
 
Chapter 8: Circumstances of evaluation 
8.1 Modality 
8.2 Time and tense 
8.3 Situations 
8.4 Saturation or enrichment? 
 4 
8.5 Sub-sentential circumstances 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 9: Contextualism: How far can we go? 
9.1 The modulation of sense 
9.2 The semantic relevance of modulation 
9.3 Four approaches 
9.4 Truth-conditional unstability: from Waismann's 'open texture' to Searle's 
'background' 
9.5 Ostensive definitions 
9.6 Meaning Eliminativism 
9.7 Conclusion
 5 
 
Introduction 
 
Around the middle of the twentieth century, there were two opposing camps within 
the analytic philosophy of language. The first camp — IDEAL LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY, 
as it was then called — was that of the pioneers, Frege, Russell, Carnap, Tarski, etc. 
They were, first and foremost, logicians studying formal languages and, through 
them, ―language‖ in general. They were not originally concerned with natural 
language, which they thought defective in various ways;1 yet, in the sixties, some of 
their disciples established the relevance of their methods to the detailed study of 
natural language (Montague 1974; Davidson 1984). Their efforts gave rise to 
contemporary FORMAL SEMANTICS, a very active discipline whose stunning 
developments in the last quarter of the twentieth century changed the face of 
linguistics. 
 The other camp was that of so-called ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHERS, who 
thought important features of natural language were not revealed but hidden by the 
logical approach initiated by Frege and Russell. They advocated a more descriptive 
approach and emphasized the pragmatic nature of natural language as opposed to, 
say, the formal language of Principia Mathematica. Their own work2 gave rise to 
contemporary pragmatics, a discipline which, like formal semantics, developed 
successfully within linguistics in the past forty years. 
 Central in the ideal language tradition had been the equation of, or at least the 
close connection between, the meaning of a (declarative) sentence and its truth 
conditions. This truth-conditional approach to meaning is perpetuated, to a large 
extent, in contemporary formal semantics. A language is viewed as a system of rules 
or conventions, in virtue of which certain assemblages of symbols count as well-
                                            
1 There are a few exceptions. The most important one is Reichenbach, whose insightful 
―Analysis of conversational language‖ was published in 1947 as a chapter — the longest — in 
his Elements of Symbolic Logic. 
2 The most influential authors were Austin, Strawson, Grice, and the later Wittgenstein. Grice 
is a special case, for he thought the two approaches were not incompatible but 
complementary. 
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formed, meaningful sentences. The meaning of a sentence (or of any complex 
symbol) is determined by the meanings of its parts and the way they are put together. 
Meaning itself is patterned after reference. The meaning of a simple symbol is the 
conventional assignment of a worldly entity to that symbol: for example, names are 
assigned objects, monadic predicates are assigned properties or sets of objects, etc. 
The meaning of a declarative sentence, determined by the meanings of its 
constituents and the way they are put together, is equated with its truth conditions. 
For example, the subject-predicate construction is associated with a semantic rule for 
determining the truth conditions of a subject-predicate sentence on the basis of the 
meaning assigned to the subject and that assigned to the predicate.3 On this picture, 
knowing a language is like knowing a ‗theory‘ by means of which one can deductively 
establish the truth conditions of any sentence of that language. 
 This truth-conditional approach to meaning is one of the things which ordinary 
language philosophers found quite unpalatable. According to them, reference and 
truth cannot be ascribed to linguistic expressions in abstraction from their use. In 
vacuo, words do not refer and sentences do not have truth conditions. Words-world 
relations are established through, and indissociable from, the use of language. It is 
therefore misleading to construe the meaning of a word as some worldly entity that it 
represents or, more generally, as its truth-conditional contribution. The meaning of a 
word, insofar as there is such a thing, should rather be equated with its use-potential 
or its use-conditions. In any case, what must be studied primarily is speech: the 
activity of saying things. Then we will be in a position to understand language, the 
instrument we use in speech. Austin‘s theory of speech acts and Grice‘s theory of 
speaker‘s meaning were both meant to provide the foundation for a theory of 
language, or at least for a theory of linguistic meaning. 
 Despite the early antagonism I have just described, semantics (the formal 
study of meaning and truth conditions) and pragmatics (the study of language in use) 
are now conceived of as complementary disciplines, shedding light on different 
aspects of language. The heated arguments between ideal language philosophers 
and ordinary language philosophers are almost forgotten. There are two main 
reasons for the new situation. On the one hand semanticists, in moving from artificial 
                                            
3  The rule might go as follows: ―A sentence of the form ‗a is F‘ is true if and only if the 
entity denoted by ‗a‘ belongs to the set of entities denoted by ‗F‘.‖ 
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to natural languages, have given up Carnap‘s idea that the semantic relation 
between words and the world can be studied in abstraction from the context of use. 
That the Carnapian abstraction is illegitimate given the pervasiveness of context-
sensitivity in natural language is fully acknowledged by those working in formal 
semantics. On the other hand those working in pragmatics no longer hold that 
‗meaning is use‘. Instructed by Grice, they systematically draw a distinction between 
what a given expression means, and what its use means or conveys, in a particular 
context (or even in general). 
Still, the ongoing debate about the best delimitation of the respective territories 
of semantics and pragmatics betrays the persistence of two recognizable currents or 
approaches within contemporary theorizing. According to the dominant position, 
which I call ‗Literalism‘, we may legitimately ascribe truth-conditional content to 
natural language sentences, quite independent of what the speaker who utters this 
sentence means. Literalism contrasts with another view, reminiscent of that held by 
ordinary language philosophers half a century ago. That other view, which I call 
‗Contextualism‘, holds that speech acts are the primary bearers of content. Only in 
the context of a speech act does a sentence express a determinate content. 
I say that Literalism is the dominant position because I believe most 
philosophers of language and linguists would accept the following description of the 
division of labour between semantics and pragmatics : 
 
Semantics deals with the literal meaning of words and sentences as 
determined by the rules of the language, while pragmatics deals with what 
users of the language mean by their utterances of words or sentences. To 
determine 'what the speaker means' is to answer questions such as: Was 
John's utterance intended as a piece of advice or as a threat? By saying that it 
was late, did Mary mean that I should have left earlier? Notions such as that of 
illocutionary force (Austin) and conversational implicature (Grice) thus turn out 
to be the central pragmatic notions. In contrast, the central semantic notions 
turn out to be reference and truth. It is in terms of these notions that one can 
make explicit what the conventional significance of most words and 
expressions consists in. 
The meaning of an expression may be insufficient to determine its 
referential content: that is so whenever the expression is indexical or 
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otherwise context-dependent. In such cases, the meaning of the expression 
provides a rule which, given a context, enables the interpreter to determine the 
content of the expression in that context. The content thus determined in 
context by the conventional meanings of words is their literal content. The 
literal content of a complete declarative utterance is 'what is said', or the 
proposition expressed, by that utterance. 
 As Grice emphasized, speaker's meaning is not a matter of rules but a 
matter of intentions: what someone means is what he or she overtly intends 
(or, as Grice says, 'M-intends') to get across through his or her utterance. 
Communication succeeds when the M-intentions of the speaker are 
recognized by the hearer. Part of the evidence used by the hearer in figuring 
out what the speaker means is provided by the literal content of the uttered 
sentence, to which the hearer has independent access via his knowledge of 
the language. In ideal cases of linguistic communication, the speaker means 
exactly what she says, and no more is required to understand the speech act 
than a correct understanding of the sentence uttered in performing it. In real 
life, however, what the speaker means typically goes beyond, or otherwise 
diverges from, what the uttered sentence literally says. In such cases the 
hearer must rely on background knowledge to determine what the speaker 
means — what her communicative intentions are. 
 
There is much that is correct in this description, but there also is something 
which I think must be rejected, namely the contrast between literal truth-conditions 
and speaker‘s meaning. That contrast commits us to Literalism, and in this book I 
want to argue for Contextualism. According to Contextualism, the contrast between 
what the speaker means and what she literally says is illusory, and the notion of 
‗what the sentence says‘ incoherent. What is said (the truth-conditional content of the 
utterance) is nothing but an aspect of speaker‘s meaning. That is not to deny that 
there is a legitimate contrast to be drawn between what the speaker says and what 
he or she merely implies. Both, however, belong to the realm of ‗speaker‘s meaning‘ 
and are pragmatic through and through. 
I will not only criticize Literalism, and argue for Contextualism, in the following 
chapters. I will discuss all sorts of intermediate positions corresponding to views 
actually held in the current debate about the semantics/pragmatics interface. 
 9 
Whether or not one accepts my arguments, I hope the survey of logical space which I 
provide will be useful to those interested in the debate, and will contribute to shaping 
it in the years to come. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Two approaches to 'what is said' 
 
 
 
1.1. The basic triad 
 
Anyone who has reflected on the sentence meaning/speaker's meaning distinction 
knows that a simple distinction is in fact insufficient. Two equally important 
distinctions must be made. First, there is the distinction between the linguistic 
meaning of a sentence-type, and what is said (the proposition expressed) by an 
utterance of the sentence. For example, the English sentence 'I am French' has a 
certain meaning which, qua meaning of a sentence-type, is not affected by changes 
in the context of utterance. This context-independent meaning contrasts with the 
context-dependent propositions which the sentence expresses with respect to 
particular contexts. Thus 'I am French', said by me, expresses the proposition that I 
am French; if you utter the sentence, it expresses a different proposition, even 
though its linguistic meaning remains the same across contexts of use.  
 Second, there is a no less important distinction between what is actually said 
and what is merely 'conveyed' by the utterance. My utterance of 'I am French' 
expresses the proposition that I am French, but there are contexts in which it conveys 
much more. Suppose that, having been asked whether I can cook, I reply: 'I am 
French'. Clearly my utterance (in this context) provides an affirmative answer to the 
question. The meaning of the utterance in such a case includes more than what is 
literally said; it also includes what the utterance 'implicates'.4 
                                            
4 See Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 24: « I 
wish to introduce, as terms of art, the verb implicate and the related nouns implicature (cf 
implying) and implicatum (cf what is implied). The point of this maneuver is to avoid having, 
on each occasion, to choose beween this or that member of the family of verbs for which 
implicate is to do general duty. » 
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 'What is said' being a term common to both distinctions, we end up with a 
triad: 
 
sentence meaning 
vs 
what is said 
vs 
what is implicated 
 
The distinguishing characteristic of sentence meaning (the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence type) is that it is conventional and context-independent. Moreover, in 
general at least, it falls short of constituting a complete proposition, i.e. something 
truth-evaluable. In contrast, both 'what is said' and 'what is implicated' are context-
dependent and propositional. The difference between 'what is said' and 'what is 
implicated' is that the former is constrained by sentence meaning in a way in which 
the implicatures aren't. What is said results from fleshing out the meaning of the 
sentence (which is like a semantic 'skeleton') so as to make it propositional. The 
propositions one can arrive at through this process of contextual enrichment or 
'fleshing out' are constrained by the skeleton which serves as input to the process. 
Thus 'I am French' can express an indefinite number of propositions, but the 
propositions in question all have to be compatible with the semantic potential of the 
sentence; this is why the English sentence 'I am French' cannot express the 
proposition that kangaroos have tails. There is no such constraint on the propositions 
which an utterance of the sentence can communicate through the mechanism of 
implicature. Given enough background, an utterance of 'I am French' might implicate 
that kangaroos have tails. What's implicated is implicated by virtue of an inference, 
and the inference chain can (in principle) be as long and involve as many 
background assumptions as one wishes.  
 The basic triad can be mapped back onto the simple sentence 
meaning/speaker's meaning distinction by grouping together two of the three levels. 
There are two ways to do it, corresponding to two interpretations for the triad. The 
'minimalist' interpretation stresses the close connection between sentence meaning 
and what is said; together, sentence meaning and what is said constitute the literal 
meaning of the utterance as opposed to what the speaker means: 
 
 
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    sentence meaning 
literal meaning  
    what is said 
 
  vs 
 
speaker's meaning 
 
The other, 'non-minimalist' interpretation of the triad stresses the commonality 
between what is said and what is implicated, both of which are taken to be 
pragmatically determined: 
 
sentence meaning 
 
 vs 
    what is said 
speaker's meaning 
    what is implicated 
 
Essential to this interpretation is the claim that 'what is said', though constrained by 
the meaning of the sentence, is not as tightly constrained as is traditionally thought 
and, in particular, does not obey what I will refer to as the 'minimalist' constraint. 
 
1.2. Minimalism 
 
As I said above, what distinguishes 'what is said' from the implicatures is the fact that 
the former must be « closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the 
sentence) [one] has uttered » (Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, p. 25). However, 
this constraint — which I call the 'closeness-to-linguistic-meaning' constraint, or CLM 
— can be construed more or less strictly. The two interpretations of the basic triad to 
be discussed below differ in how strictly they construe the CLM. What I call 
'Minimalism' construes the constraint very strictly; 'what is said', in the minimalist 
framework, departs from the conventional meaning of the sentence (and incorporates 
contextual elements) only when this is necessary to 'complete' the meaning of the 
sentence and make it propositional. In other words, the distance between sentence 
meaning and what is said is kept to a minimum (hence the name 'Minimalism'). 
 The crucial notion here is that of 'saturation'. Saturation is the process 
whereby the meaning of the sentence is completed and made propositional through 

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the contextual assignment of semantic values to the constituents of the sentence 
whose interpretation is context-dependent (and, possibly, through the contextual 
provision of 'unarticulated' propositional constituents, if one assumes, as some 
philosophers do, that such constituents are sometimes needed to make the sentence 
fully propositional). This process takes place whenever the meaning of the sentence 
includes something like a 'slot' requiring completion or a 'free variable' requiring 
contextual instantiation. 5 Thus an indexical sentence like 'He is tall' does not 
express a complete proposition unless a referent has been contextually assigned to 
the demonstrative pronoun 'he', which acts like a free variable in need of contextual 
instantiation. Genitives provide another well-known example: an utterance including 
the phrase 'John's book' does not express a complete proposition unless a particular 
relation has been identified as holding between the book and John. Nominal 
compounds work the same way: 'burglar nightmare' means something like 'a 
nightmare that bears a certain relation R to burglars', which relation must be 
contextually identified. Other well-known examples of saturation include parametric 
predicates ('small', 'on the left'), definite null instantiation (i.e. the case where one of 
the arguments in the semantic structure of a lexeme, typically a verb, is not 
syntactically realized and must be contextually identified, as when someone says: 'I 
heard' or 'I noticed'), and so on and so forth. 
 Whenever saturation is in order, appeal to the context is necessary for the 
utterance to express a complete proposition: from a semantic point of view, 
saturation is a mandatory contextual process. Other contextual processes — e.g. the 
inference process generating implicatures — are semantically optional in the sense 
that the aspects of meaning they generate are dispensable; the utterance would still 
express a complete proposition without them. According to Minimalism, those extra 
constituents of meaning which are not necessary for propositionality are external to 
what is said. The only justification for including some pragmatically determined 
                                            
5 Even when saturation consists in contextually providing a constituent that is unarticulated 
in surface syntax (as the implicit argument in 'I noticed'), it is something in the sentence (here 
the predicate 'notice', which arguably denotes a two-place relation) which triggers the search 
for the contextual element and makes it obligatory. See my ‗Unarticulated Constituents‘, in 
Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (2002), pp. 308-13. 
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constituent of meaning into what is said (as opposed to what is merely conveyed) is 
the indispensability of such a constituent - the fact that the utterance would not 
express a complete proposition if the context did not provide such a constituent.  
 
1.3. Literal truth-conditions vs. actual truth-conditions 
 
Consider examples (1)-(6), often discussed in the literature: 
 
(1)  I've had breakfast 
(2)  You are not going to die 
(3)  It's raining 
(4)  The table is covered with books 
(5)  Everybody went to Paris 
(6)  John has two children 
 
In all such cases, as we shall see, the Minimalist constraint implies that what the 
utterance literally says is not what intuitively seems to be said. 
From a minimalist point of view, the first sentence, 'I've had breakfast' 
expresses the proposition that S (the speaker) has had breakfast before t* (the time 
of utterance). Strictly speaking this proposition would be true if the speaker had had 
breakfast twenty years ago and never since. This is clearly not what the speaker 
means (when she answers to the question 'Do you want something to eat' and replies 
'I've had breakfast'); she means something much more specific, namely that she's 
had breakfast on that very day (i.e. the day which includes t*). This aspect of 
speaker's meaning, however, has to be construed as external to what is said and as 
being merely conveyed, in the same way in which the utterer of 'I am French' implies, 
but does not say, that he is a good cook. That is so because the 'minimal' 
interpretation, to the effect that the speaker's life was not entirely breafkastless, is 
sufficient to make the utterance propositional. Nothing in the sentence itself forces us 
to bring in the implicit reference to a particular time span. Indeed we can easily 
imagine contexts in which a speaker would use the same sentence to assert the 
minimal proposition and nothing more. 
 The same thing holds even more clearly for the second example. Kent Bach, 
to whom it is due, imagines a child crying because of a minor cut and her mother 
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uttering (2) in response (Bach 1994b: 134). What is meant is: 'You're not going to die 
from that cut'. But literally the utterance expresses the proposition that the kid will not 
die tout court — as if he or she was immortal. The extra element contextually 
provided (the implicit reference to the cut) does not correspond to anything in the 
sentence itself; nor is it an unarticulated constituent whose contextual provision is 
necessary to make the utterance fully propositional. Again, we can easily imagine a 
context in which the same sentence would be used to communicate the minimal 
proposition and nothing more. 
What about (3)? John Perry and many others after him have argued as follows 
(Perry 1986). Even though nothing in the sentence 'It's raining' stands for a place, 
nevertheless it does not express a complete proposition unless a place is 
contextually provided. The verb ‗to rain‘, Perry says, denotes a dyadic relation — a 
relation between times and places. In a given place, it doesn‘t just rain or not, it rains 
at some times while not raining at others; similarly, at a given time, it rains in some 
places while not raining in others. To evaluate a statement of rain as true or false, 
Perry says, we need both a time and a place. Since the statement ‗It is raining‘ 
explicitly gives us only the two-place relation (supplied by the verb) and the temporal 
argument (indexically supplied by the present tense), the relevant locational 
argument must be contextually supplied for the utterance to express a complete 
proposition. If Perry is right, the contextual provision of the place concerned by the 
rain is an instance of saturation, like the assignment of a contextual value to the 
present tense: both the place and the time are constituents of what is said, even 
though, unlike the time, the place remains unarticulated in surface syntax. 
But is Perry right? If really the contextual provision of a place was mandatory, 
hence an instance of saturation, every token of 'Its raining' would be unevaluable 
unless a place were contextually specified. Yet I have no difficulty imagining a 
counterexample, i.e. a context in which ‗It is raining‘ is evaluable even though no 
particular place is contextually singled out. In 'Unarticulated constituents' (p. 317) I 
depicted an imaginary situation in which 
 
rain has become extremely rare and important, and rain detectors have 
been disposed all over the territory (whatever the territory — possibly 
the whole Earth). In the imagined scenario, each detector triggers an 
alarm bell in the Monitoring Room when it detects rain. There is a single 
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bell; the location of the triggering detector is indicated by a light on a 
board in the Monitoring Room. After weeks of total drought, the bell 
eventually rings in the Monitoring Room. Hearing it, the weatherman on 
duty in the adjacent room shouts: ‗It‘s raining!‘ His utterance is true, iff it 
is raining (at the time of utterance) in some place or other. 
 
The fact that one can imagine an utterance of ‗It‘s raining‘ that is true iff it is raining 
(at the time of utterance) in some place or other arguably establishes the pragmatic 
nature of the felt necessity to single out a particular place, in the contexts in which 
such a necessity is indeed felt. When a particular place is contextually provided as 
relevant to the evaluation of the utterance, it is for pragmatic reasons, not because it 
is linguistically required. (Again, if it were linguistically required, in virtue of semantic 
properties of the sentence type, it would be required in every context.) If this is right, 
then the contextual provision of a place is not an instance of saturation after all: it's 
not something that's mandatory. It follows (by minimalist standards) that the place is 
not a constituent of what is strictly and literally said: when I say 'It is raining' (rather 
than something more specific like 'It's raining in Paris' or 'It's raining here'), what I 
literally say is true iff it's raining somewhere or other.6 That is obviously not what I 
mean, since what I mean involves a particular place. Appearances notwithstanding, 
the situation is similar to the case of 'I've had breakfast', where a restricted time-
interval is contextually provided for pragmatic reasons, without being linguistically 
mandated. 
 Examples (4) and (5) are amenable to the same sort of treatment. According 
to standard Russellian analysis, a definite description conveys an implication of 
uniqueness: hence 'The table is covered with books' is true iff there is one and only 
table and it is covered with books. To make sense of this, we need either to focus on 
a restricted situation in which there is indeed a single table, or to expand the 
predicate 'table' and enrich it into, say 'table of the living-room' in order to satisfy the 
uniqueness constraint. Either way, the form of enrichment through which we make 
sense of the utterance is not linguistically mandated: it is only pragmatically required. 
If we don't enrich, what we get is an already complete proposition (albeit one that is 
pretty absurd): the proposition that the only existing table is covered with books. 
                                            
6 See Borg 2002 for a defense of that claim. 
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Similarly with example (5): without enrichment the utterance expresses a proposition 
that is true iff every existing person went to Paris. Such a proposition is unlikely to be 
true, but that does not make it incomplete. The enrichment process through which, in 
context, we reach the proposition actually communicated (to the effect that everybody 
in such and such group went to Paris) is not linguistically but pragmatically required; 
hence it is not an instance of saturation, but an optional process of 'free enrichment'. 
It follows that, in those examples as much as in the previous ones, the proposition 
literally expressed is different from, and more general than, the proposition actually 
communicated. 
 
1.4. A problem for Minimalism 
 
In general, the literal truth-conditions posited as part of the Minimalist analysis turn 
out to be very different from the intuitive truth-conditions which untutored 
conversational participants would ascribe to the utterance. This divergence between 
the intuitive truth-conditions of an utterance and the literal truth-conditions postulated 
by the theorist is particularly striking in connection with examples like (6). According 
to a fairly standard view (Horn 1972), the proposition literally expressed by (6) is the 
proposition that John has at least three children, i.e., no less than three but possibly 
more. In certain contexts this corresponds to what the speaker actually means (as 
when I say, 'If John has three children he can benefit from lower rates on public 
transportation') but in other contexts what the speaker means is quite different. 
Suppose for example that I am asked how many children John has and that I reply by 
uttering (6). Clearly, in this context, I mean that John has (exactly) three children — 
no more and no less. This is standardly accounted for by saying that the proposition 
literally expressed, to the effect that John has at least three children, combines with 
the 'implicature' that John has no more than three children (a generalized implicature 
that is accounted for in terms of the maxim of quantity);7 as a result of this 
                                            
7 As Grice puts in one of his early papers, "one should not make a weaker statement rather 
than a stronger one unless there is a good reason for so doing" (Grice 1961: 132). Since the 
statement that John has (at least) three children is weaker than the statement that John has n 
children (for n > 3), the maxim is obeyed only if John has no more than three children. (If 
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combination, what is globally communicated — and what I actually mean — is the 
proposition that John has exactly three children. Now this is the only proposition I am 
conscious of expressing by my utterance; in particular, I am unaware of having 
expressed the 'minimal' proposition that John has at least three children. To account 
for this obvious fact, the minimalist claims that we are aware only of what is globally 
conveyed or 'communicated' by the utterance. Analysing this into 'what is literally 
said' and 'what is implied' is the linguist's task, not something that is incumbent upon 
the normal language user. Figure 1.1 illustrates this widespread conception. 
 
[Figure 1.1 about here] 
 
 The problem with this conception is that it lacks generality. Recall the example 
I gave earlier — the utterance 'I am French' used to convey that I am a good cook. In 
the relevant situation of utterance, both the speaker and the listener are aware that 
the speaker says he is French, and thereby implies he is a good cook. This typical 
case of implicature is very different from a case like (6) in which the speaker is not 
only (like the hearer) unaware of the proposition literally expressed, but would 
strongly deny having said what the minimalist claims was actually said. 
 It turns out that there are two sorts of case. On the one hand there are 
prototypical cases of implied meaning, in which the participants in the speech 
situation are aware both of what is said and of what is implied, and also of the 
inferential connection between them. On the other hand, there are the cases 
illustrated by (1)-(6). Given his willingness to treat certain aspects of the intuitive 
meaning of (1)-(6) as conversational implicatures external to what is literally said, the 
minimalist must explain why those implicatures, unlike the prototypical cases (e.g. the 
French/cook example), do not have the property of conscious 'availability'.  
 The only explanation I have come across in the literature makes use of Grice's 
distinction between 'generalized' and 'particularized' conversational implicatures, i.e. 
between implicatures which arise 'by default', without any particular context or special 
scenario being necessary, and those which require such specific contexts. In contrast 
                                                                                                                                        
John has more than three children, the speaker should have made a stronger statement.) The 
statement 'John has three children' therefore implicates that John has no more than three 
children. 
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to the latter, the former are 'hard to distinguish from the semantic content of linguistic 
expressions, because such implicatures [are] routinely associated with linguistic 
expressions in all ordinary contexts' (Levinson 1983: 127). Generalized implicatures 
are unconsciously and automatically generated and interpreted. They belong to the 
'micropragmatic' rather than to the 'macropragmatic' level, in Robin Campbell's 
typology: 
 
A macropragmatic process is one constituted by a sequence of explicit 
inferences governed by principles of rational cooperation. A micropragmatic 
process develops as a cryptic [= unconscious] and heuristic procedure which 
partially replaces some macropragmatic process and which defaults to it in the 
event of breakdown. (Campbell 1981: 101) 
 
 But there are problems with this explanation. According to Horn (1992), the 
generalized nature of an implicature does not entail its conscious unavailability — its 
'cryptic' character. In other words, it is possible for an implicature to be both 
'generalized' and intuitively accessible as an implicature distinct from what is said. 
Thus Horn insists that the generalized scalar implicature from 'some' to 'not all' is 
consciously available (in contrast to that from 'three' to 'exactly three'). A speaker 
saying 'Some students came to the meeting' normally implies that not all students 
came, and when this is so there is no tendency on the part of the interpreter to 
conflate the implicature with what is said. This is actually debatable, for the 
'implicature' at issue can arise at sub-sentential level (e.g. 'He believes some 
students came'), and in such cases there are reasons to doubt that the availability 
condition is satisfied. Be that as it may, the 'generalization' of an implicature does not 
seem to be necessary for its unconscious character. Many particularized 'bridging' 
inferences are automatic and unconscious. To take an example from Robyn Carston, 
'He went to the cliff and jumped' is readily interpreted as saying that the person 
referred to jumped over the cliff, even though this is only contextually suggested. 
 
1.5. The availability of what is said 
 
In earlier writings (Recanati 1989, 1993) I put forward a conception diametrically 
opposed to that illustrated by Figure 1.1 above. 'What is said', I held, is consciously 
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available to the participants in the speech situation (Figure 1.2).  
 
[Figure 1.2 about here] 
 
In this framework 'what is communicated' is not a distinct level where 'what is said' 
and 'what is implied' have been merged and integrated into a unified whole; it is 
merely a name for the level at which we find both what is said and what is implied, 
which level is characterized by conscious accessibility. On this picture, there are only 
two basic levels: the bottom level in which we find both the meaning of the sentence 
and the contextual factors which combine with it to yield what is said; and the top 
level at which we find both what is said and what is implied, both being consciously 
accessible (and accessible as distinct). 
The availability of what is said follows from Grice's idea that saying itself is a 
variety of nonnatural meaning. One of the distinguishing characteristics of nonnatural 
meaning, on Grice's analysis, is its essential overtness. Nonnatural meaning works 
by openly letting the addressee recognize one's primary intention (e.g. the intention 
to impart a certain piece of information, or the intention to have the addressee 
behave in a certain way), that is, by (openly) expressing that intention so as to make 
it graspable. This can be done in all sorts of ways, verbal or nonverbal. Even if we 
restrict ourselves to verbal communication, there are many ways in which we can 
mean things by uttering words. Saying is one way ; implying is another. 
The view that 'saying' is a variety of nonnatural meaning entails that what is 
said (like what is meant in general, including what is implied) must be available — it 
must be open to public view. That is so because nonnatural meaning is essentially a 
matter of intention-recognition. On this view what is said by uttering a sentence 
depends upon, and can hardly be severed from, the speaker's publicly recognizable 
intentions. Hence my 'Availability Principle' (Recanati 1993: 248), according to which 
'what is said' must be analysed in conformity to the intuitions shared by those who 
fully understand the utterance — typically the speaker and the hearer, in a normal 
conversational setting. 
I take the conversational participants' intuitions concerning what is said to be 
revealed by their views concerning the utterance's truth-conditions. I assume that 
whoever fully understands a declarative utterance knows which state of affairs would 
possibly constitute a truth-maker for that utterance, i.e. knows in what sort of 
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circumstance it would be true. The ability to pair an utterance with a type of situation 
in this way is more basic than, and in any case does not presuppose, the ability to 
report what is said by using indirect speech; it does not even presuppose mastery of 
the notion of 'saying'. Thus the proper way to elicit such intuitions is not to ask the 
subjects 'What do you think is said (as opposed to implied or whatever) by this 
sentence as uttered in that situation'?8 I therefore agree with Bach's criticism of the 
experiments through which Gibbs and Moise (1997) attempted to support the 
availability-based approach.9 However, Bach himself uses what he calls the 'IQ test' 
to determine what is said, that is, he ties what is said to indirect speech reports of 
what is said (Bach 1994a: 278, 1999, 2001). I find this procedure most objectionable, 
and that is not what I mean when I claim that what is said should be individuated 
according to the intuitions of normal interpreters. Thus I strongly disagree with 
Cappelen and Lepore's surprising statement: 
 
We ourselves don't see how to elicit intuitions about what-is-said by an 
utterance of a sentence without appealing to intuitions about the accuracy of 
indirect reports of the form 'He said that...' or 'What he said is that...' or even 
'What was said is that...' (Cappelen and Lepore, 'On an alleged connection 
between indirect speech and the theory of meaning', Mind and Language 12: 
                                            
8  Michael Thau notes that speakers 
almost never explicitly think about the distinction between what they‘ve said and what 
they‘ve implicated. So the question of what a speaker takes himself to have said by 
some utterance will have to depend upon the answer he would give if he were asked. 
And it‘s very likely that in many circumstances there won‘t be a single answer, that 
the answer will differ depending on how the question is put. It‘s also very likely that 
the answer will vary from circumstance to circumstance. (Consciousness and 
Cognition, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 148) 
Contrary to what Thau thinks, however, this does not speak against the availability-based 
approach. The speaker‘s intuitions concerning what is said need not involve the very notion of 
what is said. 
9 K. Bach, 'You don't say', Synthèse 128: 15-44, 2001, p. 43. 
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278-296, 1997, p.280) 
 
I find this statement surprising, because there obviously is another way of eliciting 
truth-conditional intuitions. One has simply to provide subjects with scenarios 
describing situations, or, even better, with — possibly animated — pictures of 
situations, and to ask them to evaluate the target utterance as true or false with 
respect to the situations in question. That procedure has been used by several 
researchers to test speaker's intuitions about e.g. the truth-conditions of donkey 
sentences. Thus Bart Geurts describes his experimental set-up (inspired from earlier 
work by Yoon) as follows: 
 
Twenty native speakers of Dutch were asked to judge whether or not donkey 
sentences correctly described pictured situations. Instructions urged subjects 
to answer either true or false, but they were also given the option of leaving 
the matter open in case they couldn't make up their minds. (B. Geurts, 'Donkey 
Business', Linguistics and Philosophy 25: 129-156, 2002, p. 135) 
 
This procedure presupposes that normal interpreters have intuitions concerning the 
truth-conditional content of utterances. On my view, those intuitions correspond to a 
certain 'level' in the comprehension process — a level that a proper theory of 
language understanding must capture. That is the level of 'what is said' (as opposed 
to e.g. what is implied). 
 
1.6. The availability-based approach 
 
From a psychological point of view, we can draw a helpful parallel between 
understanding what one is told and understanding what one sees. In vision, the 
retinal stimuli undergo a complex (multistage) train of processing which ultimately 
outputs a conscious perception, with the dual character noted by Brentano: the 
subject is aware both of what he sees, and of the fact that he is seeing it. Although 
more complex in certain respects, the situation with language is similar. The auditory 
signal undergoes a multistage train of processing which ultimately outputs a 
conceptual experience: the subject understands what is said. This is very much like 
(high-level) perception. If I am told that it is four o'clock, I hear that it is four o'clock, 
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just as, when I look at my watch, I see that it is four o'clock. Like the visual 
experience, the locutionary experience possesses a dual character: we are aware 
both of what is said, and of the fact that the speaker is saying it. 
 In calling understanding an experience, like perception, I want to stress its 
conscious character. Understanding what is said involves entertaining a mental 
representation of the subject-matter of the utterance that is both determinate enough 
(truth-evaluable) and consciously available to the subject. This suggests a criterion, 
distinct from the Minimalist criterion, for demarcating what is said. Instead of looking 
at things from the linguistic side and equating 'what is said' with the minimal 
proposition one arrives at through saturation, we can take a more psychological 
stance and equate what is said with (the semantic content of) the conscious output of 
the complex train of processing which underlies comprehension.10 
To be sure, that output itself is subject to further processing through e.g. 
inferential exploitation. Consider, once again, vision. Seeing John's car, I can infer 
that he is around. Similarly, hearing that John has had breafkast, I can infer that he is 
not hungry and does not need to be fed. Just as what is seen corresponds to the 
primary conscious output of visual processing, not to what can be secondarily derived 
from it, 'what is said' corresponds to the primary truth-evaluable representation made 
available to the subject (at the personal level) as a result of processing the sentence. 
It is therefore minimal in a certain sense, though not (as we shall see) in the sense of 
Minimalism. 
Accordingly, I distinguish between two sorts of pragmatic process. The 
contextual processes which, like saturation, are (subpersonally) involved in the 
determination of what is said I call primary pragmatic processes. In contrast, 
secondary pragmatic processes are ordinary inferential processes taking us from 
what is said, or rather from the speaker's saying of what is said, to something that 
(under standard assumptions of rationality and cooperativeness) follows from the fact 
that the speaker has said what she has said. To the extent that the speaker overtly 
intends the hearer to recognize such consequences as following from her speech act, 
they form an integral part of what the speaker means by her utterance. That is, 
                                            
10  As Ian Rumfitt once put it, "what is said in the course of an utterance is nothing other 
than what somebody who understands the utterance understands to be said" ("Content and 
Context: the Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised", Mind 102: 429-453, at p. 439). 
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roughly, Grice's theory of 'conversational implicature'. An essential aspect of that 
theory is that the hearer must be able to recognize what is said and to work out the 
inferential connection between what is said and what is implied by saying it. Again, it 
follows that what is said must be consciously available to the interpreter. It must 
satisfy what I call the Availability constraint. 
 In this framework we solve the difficulty raised in section 1.5. We no longer 
have two sorts of case of implicature — the prototypical cases where the interlocutors 
are aware of what is said, aware of what is implied, and aware of the inferential 
connection between them, and the cases in which there is no such awareness. 
Conscious awareness is now a built-in feature of both what is said and the 
implicatures. That is so because what is said is the conscious output of linguistic-
cum-pragmatic processing, and the implicatures correspond to further conscious 
representations inferentially derived, at the personal rather than sub-personal level, 
from what is said (or, rather, from the speaker's saying what is said). The alleged 
cases in which the speech participants themselves are not distinctly aware of what is 
said and of what is implied are reclassified: they are no longer treated as cases of 
'implicature', strictly speaking, but as cases in which a primary pragmatic process 
operates in the (sub-personal) determination of what is said. 
 
1.7. 'Saying' as a pragmatic notion 
 
So far I have followed Grice, who construes saying as a variety of meaning. But this 
pragmatic approach to 'saying' is controversial. Most philosophers use the notion of 
'what is said' (or 'the proposition expressed') in such a way that it is not a 'pragmatic' 
notion — having to do with what the speaker means or with what the hearer 
understands. What is said is supposed to be a property of the sentence (with respect 
to the context at hand) — a property which it has in virtue of the rules of the 
language. 
Minimalism is closely associated with such a nonpragmatic way of looking at 
what is said. In the minimalist framework, saturation is the only contextual process 
allowed to affect 'what is said', because it alone is a bottom-up process, i.e. a 
process triggered (and made obligatory) by a linguistic expression in the sentence 
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itself.11 All other contextual processes determine aspects of meaning external and 
additional to what is said. Take, for example, 'free enrichment' — the process 
responsible for making the interpretation of an utterance more specific than its literal 
interpretation (as when 'jumped' is contextually understood as 'jumped over the cliff'). 
That form of enrichment is 'free' in the sense of not being linguistically controlled. 
Thus what triggers the contextual provision of the relevant temporal restriction in 
example (1) is not something in the sentence but simply the fact that the utterance is 
meant as an answer to a question about the speaker's present state of hunger (which 
state can be causally affected only by a breakfast taken on the same day). While 
saturation is a bottom-up, linguistically controlled pragmatic process, free enrichment 
is a top-down, pragmatically controlled pragmatic process. Insofar as it is 
pragmatically rather than linguistically controlled, free enrichment is taken to be 
irrelevant to 'what is said', on the nonpragmatic construal of what is said. 
I will discuss the nonpragmatic construal of what is said in Chapter 4. For the 
time being, I'm interested in the pragmatic construal, based on Grice's idea, and the 
reasons it provides for rejecting the Minimalist constraint (§1.8). Before turning to that 
issue, however, I want to rebut a couple of objections to the pragmatic construal. 
The first objection is this. If, following Grice, we construe saying as a variety of 
meaning, we will be prevented from acknowledging an important class of cases in 
which the speaker does not mean what he says. Irony is a good example of that 
class of cases. If I say 'John is a fine friend' ironically, in a context in which it is 
obvious to everybody that I think just the opposite, it is clear that I do not mean what I 
say: I mean the opposite. Still, I say that John is a fine friend. Grice's construal of 
saying as a variety of meaning prevents him from acknowledging that fact. According 
to Grice, when I say 'John is a fine friend' in the mentioned situation, I do not really 
say that John is a fine friend — I pretend to be saying it. The pragmatic construal of 
saying forces Grice to draw a distinction between 'saying' and 'making as if to say'. 
As far as I am concerned, I find Grice's distinction (between genuine saying 
and making as if to say) perfectly legitimate, but I can understand the worries of 
those who feel that the notion of 'saying' he uses is too much on the pragmatic side. 
We certainly need a notion of 'what is said' which captures the objective content of an 
                                            
11 As I pointed out in footnote 2, that is true even when saturation consists in providing a so-
called 'unarticulated constituent'. 
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utterance irrespective of its pragmatic force as a serious assertion or as an ironical 
utterance. Still, I find the objection superficial, for it is quite easy to actually construct 
the desired notion within Grice's own framework. Grice uses 'say' in a strict sense. In 
that sense whatever is said must be meant. But we can easily define a broader sense 
for 'say': 
 
S says that p, in the broad sense, iff he either says that p (in the strict sense) 
or makes as if to say that p (again, in the strict sense of 'say'). 
 
I will henceforth use 'say' in that broad sense, which remains within the confines of 
the pragmatic construal. 
Another objection to the pragmatic construal focusses on the loss of objectivity 
that allegedly goes with it. What is said is objective in the sense that it is possible 
both for the speaker to make a mistake and say something other than what he 
means, and for the hearer to misunderstand what the speaker is saying. Those 
mistakes are possible, the objector will argue, because what is said is an objective 
property of the sentence (in context). But on the pragmatic construal, it is not clear 
that this objectivity can be captured. Imagine the following situation: the speaker 
wants to say that Paul is tall, and, mistaking Tim for Paul, says 'He is tall' while 
pointing to Tim. The speaker thus inadvertenly says that Tim is tall. Now imagine that 
the hearer also mistakes Tim for Paul. Thanks to this lucky mistake, he grasps what 
the speaker means, thinking that this is what he has said. The speaker and the 
hearer therefore converge on a certain interpretation, which is not objectively what 
was said, but which they both (mistakenly) think is what was said. How, in the 
framework I have sketched, will it be possible to dissociate what is actually said from 
the protagonists' mistaken apprehension of what is said? Have we not equated what 
is said with their understanding of what is said? 
We have not. We have equated what is said with what a normal interpreter 
would understand as being said, in the context at hand. A normal interpreter knows 
which sentence was uttered, knows the meaning of that sentence, knows the relevant 
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contextual facts (who is being pointed to, etc.).12 Ordinary users of the language are 
normal interpreters, in most situations. They know the relevant facts and have the 
relevant abilities. But there are situations (as in the above example) where the actual 
users make mistakes and are not normal interpreters. In such situations their 
interpretations do not fix what is said. To determine what is said, we need to look at 
the interpretation that a normal interpreter would give. This is objective enough, yet 
remains within the confines of the pragmatic construal. 
 
1.8. Availability vs. Minimalism 
 
In the framework I have sketched, there is a basic constraint on what is said: 
 
Availability : 
What is said must be intuitively accessible to the conversational participants 
(unless something goes wrong and they do not count as 'normal interpreters'). 
 
This constraint leads us to give up Minimalism. That is the price to pay if we want 
Availability to be satisfied. 
The reason why Availability is incompatible with Minimalism is simple enough. 
The aspects of the meaning of (1)-(6) which the minimalist construes as 
conversational implicatures are, one may admit, contextual ingredients in the overall 
meaning of the utterance. They do not belong to the conventional meaning of the 
sentence. The minimalist claims that they do not belong to 'what is said' either, 
because they are optional: those contextual aspects of the meaning of the utterance 
are not necessary for the latter to express a complete proposition. But the Availability 
Constraint pulls in the other direction. The very fact that the minimal propositions 
allegedly expressed are not consciously available shows that it would be a mistake to 
equate them with what is said; rather, the Availability Constraint dictates that the 
aspects of meaning which Minimalism construes as external to what is said (e.g. the 
implicit reference to a place in (3), or to the cut in (2), or to a time-interval in (1)) are 
actually constitutive of what is said, because when we substract them from the 
                                            
12   This is all tacit knowledge, not the sort of 'conscious awareness' I talk about in 
connection with secondary pragmatic processes. 
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intuitive meaning of the utterance the proposition which results is no longer 
something accessible to the participants in the speech situation. Thus we have two 
quite distinct phenomena: examples like 'I am French'/'I am a good cook' involve 
something which is said and whose saying implies something else; examples like (1)-
(6), in contrast, do not involve the distinction between what is said and what is 
implied but a different distinction between the literal meaning of the sentence and 
contextual ingredients entering into the determination of what is said. If we maintain 
that those ingredients are indeed 'optional' rather than necessary for propositionality, 
this implies that we must give up the minimalist criterion according to which the 
context contributes to what is said only when this is necessary for some proposition 
to be expressed. 
 According to the view we arrive at, truth-conditional interpretation is pragmatic 
to a large extent. Various pragmatic processes come into play in the very 
determination of what is said; not merely saturation — the contextual assignment of 
values to indexicals and free variables in the logical form of the utterance — but also 
free enrichment and other processes which are not linguistically triggered but are 
pragmatic through and through. Figure 1.3 summarizes the contrast between the two 
conceptions (Minimalism, and the Availability-based approach). 
 
[Figure 1.3 about here] 
 
According to the Availability-based approach, the crucial distinction is not 
between mandatory and optional contextual processes, but between those that are 
'primary' and those that are 'secondary'. Primary pragmatic processes include not 
only saturation, but also 'optional' processes such as free enrichment. Independent 
evidence for their inclusion in this category is provided by the fact that, in general,  
the notion of 'what is said' we need to capture the input to secondary, inferential 
processes already incorporates contextual elements of the optional variety. Consider 
examples (1)-(6) once again. In each case we may suppose that the speaker implies 
various things by saying what she does. Thus, by saying that she's had breafkast, the 
speaker implies that she is not hungry and does not want to be fed. By saying that 
the child is not going to die, the mother implies that the cut is not serious; and so 
forth. Now those implicatures can be worked out only if the speaker is recognized as 
expressing the (nonminimal) proposition that she's had breakfast that morning, or 
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that the child won't die from that cut. Clearly, if the speaker had had breafkast twenty 
years ago (rather than that very morning), nothing would follow concerning the 
speaker's present state of hunger and her willingness or unwillingness to eat 
something. The implicature could not be derived, if what the speaker says was not 
given the richer, temporally restricted interpretation. If therefore we accept the 
Gricean picture, according to which 'what is said' serves as input to the secondary 
process of implicature-generation, we must, pace Grice himself, acknowledge the 
non-minimal character of what is said. This provides some support to the Availability-
based approach, as against Minimalism. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Primary pragmatic processes 
 
 
2.1. Enrichment, loosening, and transfer 
 
Secondary pragmatic processes are 'postpropositional'. They cannot take place 
unless some proposition p is considered as having been expressed, for they proceed 
by inferentially deriving some further proposition q (the implicature) from the fact that 
p has been expressed. In contrast, primary pragmatic processes are 'pre-
propositional': they do not presuppose the prior identification of some proposition 
serving as input to the process. Another difference is the fact that secondary 
pragmatic processes are conscious in the sense that normal interpreters are aware 
both of what is said and of what is implied and are capable of working out the 
inferential connection between them. Primary pragmatic processes are not conscious 
in that sense. Normal interpreters need not be aware of the context-independent 
meanings of the expressions used, nor of the processes through which those 
meanings are enriched or otherwise adjusted to fit the situation of use. Unless they 
are linguists or would-be linguists, they are aware only of the output of the primary 
processes involved in contextual adjustment. 
 Saturation is a primary pragmatic process. If the uttered sentence is 'She is 
smaller than John's sister', then in order to figure out what is said I must (at least) 
determine whom the speaker refers to by the pronoun 'she' and what the relevant 
relation is between John and the mentioned sister. Were saturation a secondary 
pragmatic process, I would have to proceed in reverse order, that is, to identify what 
is said in order to determine those things. 
 Beside saturation, which is linguistically mandated (bottom-up), there are, I 
claim, other primary pragmatic processes that are optional and context-driven (top-
down). The paradigm case is free enrichment, illustrated by example (1): 
 
(1) Mary took out her key and opened the door 
 
In virtue of a ‗bridging inference‘, we naturally understand the second conjunct as 
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meaning that Mary opened the door with the key mentioned in the first conjunct ; yet 
this is not explicitly articulated in the sentence. Insofar as the bridging inference 
affects the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance, it does so as a result of free 
enrichment.13 
In typical cases free enrichment consists in making the interpretation of some 
expression in the sentence contextually more specific. This process has sometimes 
been described in the literature as 'specifization'. For example the mass term 'rabbit' 
will be preferentially interpreted as meaning rabbit fur in the context of 'He wears 
rabbit' and as meaning rabbit meat in the context of 'He eats rabbit' (Nunberg and 
Zaenen 1992).14 This not a matter of selecting a particular value in a finite set; with 
a little imagination, one can think of dozens of possible interpretations for 'rabbit' by 
manipulating the stipulated context of utterance; and there is no limit to the number of 
interpretations one can imagine in such a way. Nor can the process of specifization 
be construed as linguistically mandated, that is, as involving a hidden variable. Were 
it linguistically mandated (bottom up), it would be mandatory, but it is not: In some 
contexts the mass term 'rabbit' means nothing more than RABBIT STUFF ('after the 
accident, there was rabbit all over the highway'). 
 Can free enrichment be equated with specifization, or are there instances of 
free enrichment that are not cases of specifization? The provision of (optional) 
unarticulated constituents is supposed to be a case of free enrichment in which it is 
not the interpretation of some expression in the sentence that is enriched, but more 
globally the interpretation of the sentence. In most cases, however, what can be 
done in terms of unarticulated constituents can also be done in terms of specifization. 
We can construe the implicit instrument in the second conjunct or (1) either as an 
unarticulated constituent (corresponding to the unexpressed prepositional phrase 
'with the key'), or as an aspect of the interpretation of the predicate 'open' resulting 
from specifization (the concept contextually expressed by 'open' being the specific, 
                                            
13  The term ‗bridging inference‘ was originally introduced by Herb Clark, a pioneer of 
pragmatic studies, in the seventies. Example (2) is discussed in Carston (1988). 
14 The term 'specifization' comes from Bach. Nunberg & Zaenen use 'precision' in the same 
sense. 
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ad hoc concept OPEN_WITH_KEY, rather than the generic concept OPEN).15 The 
same options are presumably available for dealing with the 'rabbit fur/meat' example. 
In such cases, I will assume that there is a single form of free enrichment, that can be 
handled in different frameworks — either in terms of specifization (ad hoc concepts) 
or in terms of unarticulated constituents. Which framework we choose to handle such 
cases depends upon extraneous considerations. (For example, if we want to 
preserve the principle of compositionality, we'd better opt for the specifization view 
which spares us the postulation of unarticulated constituents.) Still, there is a type of 
case for which I think we need the notion of unarticulated constituent and cannot 
make do with specifization and ad hoc concepts: whenever the alleged unarticulated 
constituent is the intended 'circumstance of evaluation', we can't deal with it in terms 
of specifization or ad hoc concept. That type of case will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
Another issue regarding enrichment is whether or not it can be described as 
'strengthening' or logical enrichment (Recanati 1993: 261). I think it can. A predicate 
has conditions of application, and enrichment consists in restricting the application of 
a predicate by contextually providing further conditions that are not linguistically 
encoded. Thus 'table' has such and such conditions of application packed into the 
concept TABLE, and through contextual enrichment the further condition 
IN_THE_LIVING_ROOM is provided, which results in a restricted application. Thus 
construed enrichment can account for the (so-called) contextual restriction of 
quantifiers and for the interpretation of (so-called) 'incomplete' definite descriptions.  
('All the books are on the table', where a particular set of books and a particular table 
are in question).16 
                                            
15 The useful notion of 'ad hoc concept', originally introduced by Barsalou (19xx), now 
belongs to the toolkit of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1998, Wilson and Sperber 
2002, Carston 1998, 2002). 
16  Stephen Neale objects to my notion of strengthening: 
It is sometimes said that enrichment in Sperber and Wilson‘s sense involves 
strengthening in that the post-enrichment statement entails the statement one might 
associate with the utterance prior to enrichment. That this cannot be true in general is 
made clear by cases involving (non-persistent) determiners like ―every‖, ―no‖ and 
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The converse of enrichment is loosening (Cohen 19xx, Carston 1996). There 
is loosening whenever a condition of application packed into the concept literally 
expressed by a predicate is contextually dropped so that the application of the 
predicate is widened. An example is 'The ATM swallowed my credit card'. There can 
be no real swallowing on the part of an ATM, since ATMs are not living organisms 
with the right bodily equipment for swallowing. By relaxing the conditions of 
application for 'swallow', we construct an ad hoc concept with wider application. 
A third type of primary pragmatic process that is not linguistically mandated 
(bottom up) but contextually driven is semantic transfer (Nunberg 1979, 1995). In 
transfer the output is neither an enriched nor an impoverished version of the concept 
literally expressed by the input expression. It's a different concept altogether, bearing 
a systematic relation to it. Thus 'parked out back' denotes either the property a car 
has when it is parked out back, or a different property, namely the property a car-
owner has whenever his or her car has the former property ('I am parked out back'). 
Arguably, 'parked out back' literally denotes the former property, and comes to 
denote the latter property as a result of transfer (Nunberg 1995). Similarly, the 
expression 'ham sandwich' in 'The ham sandwich left without paying' arguably 
denotes, through transfer, the derived property HAM_SANDWICH_ORDERER rather 
than the linguistically encoded property HAM_SANDWICH. 
A number of problems arise in connection with primary pragmatic processes. 
Do we really need the four categories I have mentioned? It may be argued that we 
need less categories, or that we need more. In particular, if we construe enrichment 
not as logical strengthening but as a quasi-syntactic process of 'expansion' through 
which a representation (or a structured content) is made more complex by the 
                                                                                                                                        
―some‖. If, when discussing a dinner party I attended last night, I say, ―everyone drank 
a lot of wine‖, I am saying only that everyone who attended the dinner party drank a 
lot of wine, and this does not entail that everyone (unqualified) drank a lot of wine. 
(Neale forthcoming, chapter 1) 
But I had already disposed of that objection in Direct Reference: "Strengthening, it may be 
argued, can be understood as operating locally. For example, in the case of 'Every boy came', 
we might say that it is the predicate 'boy' that is strengthened into 'boy in the class', rather than 
the proposition 'Every boy came' into 'Every boy in the class came'." (Recanati 1993: 262-3) 
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addition of further constituents, then it may be that we don't need transfer, nor even 
loosening, but that we can handle everything in terms of that (little constrained) 
notion of expansion. Be that as it may, I will not deal with those problems, internal to 
the theory of primary pragmatic processes, in this chapter. What I am concerned with 
is a more basic set of issues pertaining to the very distinction between primary and 
secondary pragmatic processes. 
 
2.2. Rejecting the Gricean picture 
 
Even though he construed saying as a variety of meaningnn, Grice espoused 
Minimalism. On his view, disambiguation and saturation suffice to give us the literal 
interpretation of the utterance — what is literally said. All other pragmatic processes 
involved in the interpretation of the utterance are secondary and presuppose the 
identification of what is said. Interpretation is construed as a two-step procedure: (i) 
The interpreter accesses the literal interpretations of all constituents in the sentence 
and uses them to compute the proposition literally expressed, with respect to the 
context at hand;  (ii) on the basis of this proposition and general conversational 
principles he or she infers what the speaker means (which may be distinct from what 
is said, i.e. from the proposition literally expressed). 
 The picture I have presented also makes interpretation a two-step procedure, 
but there is a major difference. The primary pragmatic processes that are involved in 
determining what is said include not only saturation (and disambiguation) but also 
optional processes such as free enrichment, loosening and semantic transfer. Those 
processes take us from the literal meaning of some constituent (the meaning that is 
linguistically encoded, or that which results from saturating the linguistically encoded 
meaning) to a derived meaning which may be richer, poorer, or involve some kind of 
transfer. I hold that, for such processes to take place, there is no need to 
antecedently compute the proposition literally expressed. That is why I take those 
processes to be 'primary', like saturation. What I am disputing therefore is the claim 
that the process of semantic composition which consists in putting together the 
semantic values of the parts to determine the semantic value of the whole begins by 
paying attention only to literal semantic values (as delivered through disambiguation 
and saturation), and turns to derived values only after the literal semantic value of the 
whole (the proposition literally expressed) has been computed. 
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 There is a simple argument purporting to show that the Gricean picture must 
be right. Enrichment, loosening and transfer all take as input the literal meaning of 
some expression; hence they cannot take place unless that literal meaning has been 
accessed. This seems to support the Gricean picture, according to which we process 
the literal interpretation first, and move on to the derived interpretation only when this 
is required to make sense of the speaker's utterance. 
This argument is fallacious (Recanati 1994b, 1995). I admit that the literal 
interpretation must 'come first', insofar as the derived interpretation is derived from it 
through enrichment, loosening, or transfer. But I want to resist the conclusion that the 
literal interpretation must be 'processed' first, in the sense that is relevant to the 
debate. Or, to put it another way: What I am rejecting is not the claim that the literal 
interpretation of the constituent is accessed before the derived interpretation - that I 
take to be obvious - but the claim that a similar priority holds at the level of the 
complete sentence; that is, I reject the claim that the process of semantic 
composition begins by paying attention only to literal semantic values, and turns to 
derived values only after the literal semantic value of the whole (the proposition 
literally expressed) has been computed. It is this picture which I think is unwarranted.  
 If I am right, the asymmetric dependence of derived meaning upon literal 
meaning does not rule out an account according to which literal meaning and derived 
meaning are on equal footing in terms of semantic composition. Thus we can imagine 
that the literal meaning and the derived meaning of a given expression are processed 
in parallel, in constructing an interpretation for the whole utterance. In the model I 
have in mind, the literal meaning of the expression is accessed first and triggers the 
activation of associatively related representations. That literal meaning is a natural 
candidate for the status of semantic value, but there are others: some of the 
representations activated by association contribute further candidates for the status 
of semantic value. All candidates, whether literal or derived, are processed in parallel 
and compete. When an interpretation which fits the broader context of discourse is 
found, it is selected and the other candidates are suppressed. 
On this view, derived meanings still proceed (associatively) from literal 
meanings, which they indeed presuppose; but, although generated serially, they are 
processed in parallel. The literal meaning has no compositional privilege over derived 
meanings; they compete and it is possible for some derived meaning to be retained 
(if it fits the broader context of discourse) while the literal interpretation is suppressed. 
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In other words, the derived interpretation is associatively derived from the literal 
interpretation, but it is not inferentially derived. Inferential derivation entails 
computation of the literal value of the global sentence, while associative derivation is 
a 'local' process which does not require prior computation of the proposition literally 
expressed (Recanati 1993:263-6). 
 Consider, as an example, Geoff Nunberg's famous ham sandwich (Nunberg 
1979). The waiter says 'The ham sandwich has left without paying'. On the Gricean 
picture the interpreter computes the proposition literally expressed by the sentence 
— namely the absurd proposition that the sandwich itself has left without paying — 
and from its absurdity infers that the speaker means something different from what 
she says. On the parallel model I have outlined the description 'the ham sandwich' 
first receives its literal interpretation, in such a way that a representation of a ham 
sandwich is activated; activation then spreads to related representations, including a 
representation of the man who ordered a ham sandwich.17 All these representations 
activated by the description 'the ham sandwich' contribute potential candidates for the 
status of semantic value of the expression; all of which are equally susceptible of 
going into the interpretation of the global utterance. Now the ham sandwich orderer is 
a better candidate than the ham sandwich itself for the status of argument for '... has 
left without paying'. It is therefore the derived, non-literal candidate which is retained, 
while the literal interpretation is discarded.  
 An important difference between the Gricean model (according to which the 
literal interpretation is processed first) and the parallel model just outlined is this: on 
the parallel model is it possible for an utterance to receive a non-literal interpretation 
without the literal interpretation of that utterance being ever computed. The non-literal 
interpretation of the global sentence does not presuppose its literal interpretation, 
contrary to what happens at the constituent level. If the non-literal interpretation of 
                                            
17 As Sag (1981) and Nunberg (1995) pointed out, it is not the description as a whole, but the 
predicate 'ham sandwich' in the description which has a derived, non-literal value; the ham 
sandwich example is a case of property transfer, not a case of deferred reference (see footnote 
17). Since nothing hinges on this point, I will simplify matters in this and the next two 
sections by treating the description itself as a unit susceptible to both a literal and a derived 
interpretation. 
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some constituent fits the context especially well it may be retained (and the other 
interpretations suppressed) before the literal interpretation of the sentence has been 
computed. Whether or not this sort of thing actually happens, this is at least 
conceivable, on the parallel model. 
 
2.3. Accessibility 
 
When someone talks of 'wearing rabbit', the literal meaning of the mass term 'rabbit' 
(namely rabbit stuff) is accessed, but it has to compete with other candidates for 
semantic value. The more specific representation rabbit fur is also activated since it is 
associatively connected to the representations encoded by both 'rabbit' and 'wear'. 
As a result of this multiple activation, it is possible for the representation rabbit fur to 
be more active, in this context, than the less specific representation rabbit stuff which 
is linguistically encoded. Whatever we think of this particular example, it seems to me 
that the following situation can obtain: An expression linguistically encodes a certain 
representation; that representation becomes active when the expression is uttered, 
but another, associatively related representation is also activated (in part - but in part 
only - through the encoded representation) and turns out to be more active in that 
context than the original representation from which (in part) it derives.18 If we 
assume that the candidate for semantic value which is retained and undergoes 
semantic composition is that which is most accessible, i.e. that which corresponds to 
the most active representation when the interpretation process stabilizes, we explain 
how a derived meaning resulting from enrichment (or loosening, or transfer) can be 
selected as semantic value, in lieu of the literal meaning from which it is derived. 
The same phenomenon can happen dynamically. Some representation may 
be activated through its associative links to the representation linguistically encoded 
and become more active than the latter as a result of the coming into play of further 
                                            
18  I assume that representations can be activated because they are being processed (or have 
been recently), or because they receive activation from associatively related representations 
which are themselves activated. Frequency of processing is another important factor (among 
several others); it  can be conceived of as lowering the activation treshold of a representation. 
See e.g. Barsalou and Billman (1989). 
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linguistic material which raises its activation level. Before considering such a case, let 
us look at a simpler example of accessibility shift along the temporal dimension. 
Consider sentence (2) from Recanati 1993: 265: 
 
(2) John was arrested by a policeman yesterday; he had just stolen a wallet. 
 
In order to interpret the utterance one must assign a reference to the pronoun 'he' in 
the second sentence. The two persons who were mentioned in the first sentence, 
namely John and the policeman, are obvious candidates, and we may suppose that 
there is no other (sufficiently accessible) candidate. (There would be one if, for 
example, the speaker pointed to someone while uttering the pronoun.) We may 
suppose that when the pronoun 'he' is uttered one of the two candidates, John or the 
policeman, is more accessible than the other; John because he is foregrounded (qua 
subject of the sentence), or the policeman because he was mentioned last. For the 
sake of the argument, let us suppose that the second factor is more important than 
the first one, so that the policeman is slightly more accessible than John when the 
pronoun is uttered. This may well change when the other constituents of the 
sentence are processed. When the predicate 'had just stolen a wallet' is uttered, John 
becomes more accessible than the policeman as a candidate for the status of 
referent of 'he', even if the policeman was more accessible at an earlier stage in the 
processing of the utterance. For John is the subject of 'was arrested' and therefore 
occupies the role of the person being arrested; now that role is linked to the role of 
the person doing the stealing, in some relevant frame (on frames, see e.g. Fillmore 
and Atkins 1992). Because of this link, the representation of the referent of 'he' as the 
person doing the stealing contributes some activation to the representation of the 
person being arrested and therefore raises the accessibility of John qua occupier of 
this role. John thus becomes the most accessible candidate. 
 If we turn to a case in which some candidate is distinguished from the others 
by its being literal, we see that the same sort of temporal shift in accessibility can 
occur. When the words 'the ham sandwich' are uttered, we may consider that the 
representation of the ham sandwich is more active than other, related 
representations which are activated through their links to that representation. Thus 
we may suppose that the representation of the ham sandwich is more active than the 
'derived' representation of the ham sandwich orderer. This is similar to the fact that 
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the policeman is more accessible than John when the pronoun 'he' in (2) is uttered, 
except that the policeman is (perhaps) more accessible because he was mentioned 
last, while the representation of the ham sandwich is more active because it is 
linguistically encoded and has some form of priority over the ham sandwich orderer 
(derived value). In both cases, the initial ranking is reversed when further linguistic 
material comes into play. After the predicate in the sentence 'The ham sandwich has 
left without paying' has been processed, the ham sandwich is no longer a more 
accessible candidate than the ham sandwich orderer — the order of accessibility is 
reversed. The explanation, again, is very simple and does not appeal to inference on 
the hearer's part. The predicate 'has left without paying' demands a person as 
argument; this raises the accessibility of all candidates who are (represented as) 
persons. In this way the representation of the ham sandwich orderer gains some 
extra activation which makes him more accessible than the ham sandwich, after the 
predicate has been processed. 
 
2.4. Objections and responses 
 
In the framework I have sketched the interpretation which eventually emerges and 
incorporates the output of various pragmatic processes results from a blind, 
mechanical process, involving no reflection on the interpreter's part. The dynamics of 
accessibility does everything, and no 'inference' is required. In particular, there is no 
need to consider the speaker's beliefs and intentions. 
Dan Sperber objected to me in conversation that accessibility can lead us 
astray: Sometimes the first interpretation that comes to mind (the most accessible 
one) turns out not to be satisfactory and forces the hearer to backtrack. According to 
Sperber, the possibility of such garden-path effects shows that success, for a 
candidate semantic value, cannot be equated with sheer accessibility. This objection 
is misguided, I think. The most accessible interpretation at some stage s in the 
interpretation process may well turn out to be unsatisfactory at some later stage s', 
thereby resulting in a garden path effect and the need to backtrack. This does not 
show that interpretational success cannot be cashed out in terms of accessibility. At 
any given stage, the most accessible interpretation will be the winning one (at that 
stage). In garden path utterances we have two successive stages to consider. Some 
interpretation is the most accessible one, hence wins, at s, but that interpretation fails 
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to fit some schema, hence loses, at a later stage s'. In an accessibility-based 
framework, this means that this interpretation's accessibility at s' is no longer 
sufficient for it to be the winning candidate (at s'). Another candidate (which was less 
accessible at s, but turns out to be more accessible at s') takes over, hence the 
garden path effect. The distinction between successive stages of interpretation, 
together with the notion of an accessibility shift, is sufficient to account for garden 
path effects within the accessibility-based framework. 
The notion of an accessibility shift also provides immediate answers to the 
questions which, according to Kent Bach (1994b), my account of the ham sandwich 
metonymy and similar phenomena in terms of local pragmatic processes raises. 
Bach writes: 
 
Recanati supposes that the process of metonymical transfer takes place 
without the intrusion of a thought of the absurd proposition associated with the 
literal meaning of (i) ['The ham sandwich is getting restless']. That is, the hearer 
does not have to compute that the speaker does not mean that a certain 
culinary item is getting restless in order to determine what the speaker does 
mean. But, I ask, how can the hearer go from the concept of ham sandwich to 
that of ham-sandwich-orderer without first entertaining the absurd minimal 
proposition? What triggers the 'local process' and, for that matter, keeps it from 
being triggered in a cases like (ii) ['The ham sandwich is getting eaten'], uttered 
in similar circumstances? Recanati's account predicts that the hearer would 
entertain the proposition that the ham-sandwich-orderer is getting eaten, since 
the local process it posits would get triggered before a full proposition were 
reached. And yet (ii) could be understood perfectly well. (Bach 1994b: 158) 
 
But my account does not predict that the hearer would understand (ii) ('The ham 
sandwich is being eaten') as being about the ham sandwich orderer. There is 
something, in my account, which keeps the local process of metonymy from being 
triggered in a case like (ii). What keeps the local process of metonymy from being 
triggered in a case like (ii) is precisely what answers Bach's legitimate question: 'How 
can the hearer go from the concept of ham sandwich to that of ham-sandwich-orderer 
without first entertaining the absurd minimal [i.e. literal] proposition?' In my 
framework, the process of metonymical transfer is 'local', not global, yet it is sensitive 
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to the linguistic (and extralinguistic) context in which the expression which receives 
the metonymical interpretation occurs. In particular, it is sensitive to the meaning of 
the predicate expression; this is why it is triggered in (i) but not in (ii). 
 For the literal proposition to be entertained, the literal semantic value of 'the 
ham sandwich' must undergo semantic composition with the semantic value of the 
predicate; but the semantic value of the predicate cannot be accessed without 
making the metonymical interpretation of the subject-term more accessible than its 
literal interpretation, hence it prevents the latter from going into the proposition 
expressed. The activation of the concept which corresponds to the literal 
interpretation of the predicate is both what triggers the process of metonymical 
transfer in (i) and what prevents it from taking place in (ii). Yet the transfer's 
sensitivity to the interpretation of the other constituents in the sentence does not 
mean that the transfer is a global process involving the computation of the absurd, 
literal proposition. The interpreter does not go from the concept of ham sandwich to 
that of ham-sandwich-orderer after having entertained the absurd literal proposition; 
rather, it is because the interpreter goes from the concept of ham sandwich to that of 
ham-sandwich-orderer (as a result of an accessibility shift resulting from the 
interpretation of the predicate) that he or she does not entertain the absurd literal 
proposition. 
 In this account, the metonymical transfer from ham sandwich to ham-
sandwich-orderer results from a shift in accessibility triggered by the interpretation of 
another constituent in the sentence. The literal interpretation of the subject-term was 
more accessible than the metonymical interpretation before the predicate came into 
the picture, but the metonymical interpretation becomes more accessible as a result 
of interpreting the predicate. This accessibility shift has two consequences. First, the 
literal value of the subject term in (i) does not undergo semantic composition with that 
of the predicate, precisely because the semantic value of the predicate makes the 
literal value of the subject term less accessible than some other, non-literal 
interpretation. Second, if the sentence contained another predicate which did not 
require a person, but rather a  culinary item, as argument, then the accessibility shift 
would not occur and the description 'the ham sandwich' would be given the literal 
interpretation; this account for the difference between (i) and (ii). 
 
2.5. Interactive processing 
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So far I have considered the interpretation of a given constituent as if the 
interpretations of the other constituents were fixed; but nothing is fixed. All 
constituents can be given derived as well as literal interpretations, and how we 
interpret a constituent cannot but affect how we interpret the others. Consider (3), for 
instance. 
 
(3) The city is asleep. 
 
A city is not the sort of thing that sleeps (in the normal sense of the term), hence the 
overall interpretation of (3) is likely to involve some process of non-literal 
interpretation. There are various possibilities, though. 'The city' can be interpreted 
metonymically as standing for 'the inhabitants of the city' (transfer); or 'asleep' can be 
interpreted metaphorically in the sense of 'quiet and showing little activity' 
(loosening). Given the likelihood of a non-literal interpretation for some constituent, if 
'the city' literally applies to a city, 'asleep' will have to be taken non-literally; 
conversely, if 'asleep' is literal, 'the city' will not  be. 
 The same sort of trade off applies to seemingly unproblematic examples such 
as the following: 
 
(4) I finished the book. 
(5) John heard the piano. 
 
If 'finish' has its standard sense in (4), its object (what is said to be finished) must be 
a process, for only processes can start or finish in the standard sense (Pustejovsky 
1991). It follows that 'the book' must be interpreted non-literally — it must be 
interpreted as standing, not for a certain book, but for the process of, say, reading a 
certain book. Conversely, if 'the book' is interpreted literally and stands for a certain 
book, 'finish' must have a derived sense and mean something like finished reading. 
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Pustejovsky (1991) defends the former analysis, Langacker (1984) the latter.19 
 (5) is another example (discussed by Langacker) which can be interpreted in 
two ways. We may construe 'the piano' as standing for the sounds emitted by the 
piano (metonymy), in accordance with the 'postulate' that only sounds can be heard; 
or we may consider 'hear' as polysemous. When it is said that 'only sounds can be 
heard', 'hear' is taken in its basic sense ('hear'1), but there is another  sense 
('hear'2), which can be defined as follows: An object is heard2 whenever the sound it 
emits is heard1. Langacker analyses (5) as saying that John heard2 the piano, rather 
than as saying that he heard1 the sounds emitted  by the piano. 
 Though (3), (4) and (5) exhibit the same sort of trade off, there is an important 
difference between (3), on the one hand, and (4) and (5) on the other hand. 
Depending on which constituent receives a non-literal interpretation, the global 
interpretation of (3) itself will vary. In one case the speaker means that the 
inhabitants of the city are sleeping, in the other she means that the city itself is quiet 
and shows little activity; the truth-conditions are distinct. It follows that it is easy to 
say which constituent is responsible for the non-literal interpretation of the sentence: 
we have only to consult our intuitions concerning the truth-conditions of the 
utterance. (4) and (5) are very different, however. Whether one constituent or the 
other bears the onus of non-literal interpretation, the overall interpretation of the 
utterance does not seem to change. Hence it is not easy to establish which analysis 
is right, and one must appeal to indirect evidence, such as, for example, the fact that 
we can say things like: 'I can both hear and touch the piano'. (This fact shows that 
Langacker is right: when we say that we hear the piano, we are referring to the piano. 
It is the verb, not the noun-phrase, which has a derived sense in this context.)20 
                                            
19 The sentence may also be seen as elliptical and contextually 'expanded' into 'I finished 
reading the book' (Bach 1987, 1994a and b). I find this sort of analysis too much 
unconstrained (Recanati 1993:261ff), so I don't take it into consideration here. 
20A number of similar tests are offered in Nunberg 1993 and 1995. For example, Nunberg 
argues that (a) and (b) must be analysed in fairly different ways, despite their superficial 
similarity. 
(a) I am parked out back. 
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 The trade off talked about in this section is a particular case of a more general 
and fairly complex phenomenon: the search for coherence in interpretation. We have 
two constituents, A and B, each with (at least) two possible interpretations (Ai and Aj, 
and Bi and Bj). Now there is a better 'fit' between Ai and Bj or between Aj and Bi  
than there is between either Ai and Bi or Aj and Bj, hence the 'trade-off' effect: the 
two global interpretations <Ai, Bj> and <Aj, Bi > are favored, in such a way that the 
choice of either Aj or Ai as the correct interpretation for A 'coerces' a particular 
interpretation (Bi or Bj) for B. The tendency to prefer coherent interpretations (with a 
high degree of fit between the various semantic values) is what we must now try to 
account for. But first, we must introduce the notion of a schema (Rumelhart 1979, 
1980; Langacker 1987). 
 
2.6. The role of schemata 
 
                                                                                                                                        
(b) This one <pointing to a car key> is parked out back. 
(b) is a case of 'deferred ostension': an object is 'demonstrated' (the key), but the ultimate 
'referent', as opposed to the 'demonstratum', is another object suitably related to the 
demonstratum, namely the car itself. In contrast, 'I' does not refer to the car in (a); it normally 
refers to the speaker. It's the predicate 'parked out back' that bears the onus of non-literality. 
That the referent is the car rather than the (demonstrated) key in (b) is established by the fact 
that semantic features of the referring expression such as number or gender do NOT 
correspond to the key, but to the car; thus we would say 'this one' (in the singular) even if we 
were exhibiting a whole set of keys for the car in  question. Also, we can say things like: 
(c) This <pointing to a car key>, which is an old Chevrolet, is parked out back. 
The relative clause clearly qualifies the car, not the key. These tests provide evidence that the 
referent is the car, even if it is the key which is 'demonstrated'. When we turn to (a), the 
situation is totally different. Gender and number correspond to the speaker, not to the car. We 
would not say 'We are parked out back' if there was a single car owner and several cars 
(whereas we can say ' those <pointing to a key> are parked out back' if there is a single key 
and several cars). And we can't say  'I, who am an old Chevrolet, am parked out back'.  
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To say that two semantic values  and  'fit together' is to say that there is an 
abstract schema which <, > instantiates. The particular case discussed above, 
'coercion', can be analysed as follows. An expression E activates an  abstract 
schema in which there is a slot for a value of a certain type; as a result, the semantic 
value of E will preferably enter into composition with a semantic value of the relevant 
type. Thus in a sentence like 'the city is asleep', if we give to 'asleep' its literal value 
(thereby activating the SLEEP schema), the value of 'the city' will have to be of the 
relevant type (e.g. human or animal), hence non-literal. 
 The role of schemata in interpretation is best seen in connection with more 
complex examples. Consider example (2) again: 
 
(2) John was arrested by a policeman yesterday; he had just stolen a wallet. 
 
As I said earlier, John is selected as the referent for 'he' in the second clause 
because (i) the referent of 'he' is said to have stolen and John is known to have been 
arrested, and (ii) there is a frame or schema in which the two roles (stealing, and 
being arrested) are linked. This schema is jointly activated by the predicates 'was 
arrested' and 'had stolen'. An interpretation in which the same person steals and is 
arrested (and in which he is arrested because he has stolen - see below) satisfies the 
schema, and is more likely to be selected than one which violates it. 
 Given the link we have established between coherence (or fit) and schemata, 
the question we must answer becomes: Why are schema-instantiating interpretations 
more successful than others? In  line with what has been said so far, the following 
answer suggests itself. Interpretational success - what brings a 'candidate' or 
potential semantic value into the actual interpretation of the utterance - to a large 
extent depends on the candidate's accessibility or degree of activation. Now a 
schema is activated by, or accessed through, an expression whose semantic value 
corresponds to an aspect of the schema. The schema thus activated in  turn raises 
the accessibility of whatever possible semantic values for other constituents of the 
sentence happen to fit the schema. The schema itself gains extra activation from the 
fact that some other constituent of the sentence has a possible interpretation which 
fits the schema. In such a case all 'candidates' or potential semantic values which fit 
the schema evoked by some of them mutually reinforce their accessibility and 
therefore increase the likelihood that they will be globally selected as part of the 
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interpretation of the utterance. Coherent, schema-instantiating interpretations 
therefore tend to be selected and preferred over non-integrated or 'loose' 
interpretations. As a result, schemata drive the interpretation process. 
 The role played by schemata explains why the process of utterance 
interpretation is to such a large extent top down and driven by world knowledge. The 
interpreter unconsciously enriches the situation described by the utterance with many 
details which do not correspond to any aspect of the uttered sentence but are 
contributed in order to fit an evoked schema.21 Thus, in the policeman example 
above, not only is the reference of 'he' determined by the Steal (x) - Is arrested (x) 
schema, but (among other things) the causal interpretation of the relation between 
the two events mentioned - the fact that the referent was arrested because he had 
stolen - is also determined by the schema. 
                                            
21 Think of an example like (6): 
(6) John hates the piano. 
Contrary to (4)-(5), this example cannot be described in terms of 'coercion'. I mentioned 
earlier various contentions to the effect that only sounds can be heard and only processes 
finished. By virtue of these principles, some process of non-literal interpretation must take 
place in order to make sense of phrases such as 'finish the book' or 'hear the piano'. But a 
piano is certainly an object that can be hated, however strictly one construes the predicate 
'hate'. Still, some contextual enrichment is in order, because to hate the piano is to hate it 
under some aspect or dimension. One may hate the sounds emitted by the piano, or one can 
hate playing the piano, or one can hate the piano as a piece of furniture, etc. The relevant 
dimension is contextually provided through the process of enrichment. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Relevance-theoretic objections 
 
 
3.1. One or two systems? 
 
There is much that is common between the view so far presented and ‗relevance 
theory‘ (Sperber and Wilson 1986, Carston 2002b). The emphasis upon the 
psychological dimension of utterance interpretation, and the rejection of Minimalism, 
are among the important features that the two frameworks share. But there are also 
some differences. 
One difference that has been recently the focus of attention on the part of 
relevance theorists is this. According to me, the primary pragmatic processes 
involved in comprehension are not 'inferential' (Recanati 2002b). Only when the 
unreflective, normal process of interpretation yields weird results does a genuine 
inference process take place whereby we use evidence concerning the speaker's 
beliefs and intentions to work out what he means. There is no doubt that our ability to 
do so is an important part of our conversational competence, but the question at 
issue is: How essential is that inferential ability? Can linguistic communication 
proceed without it, at some basic level, or is it from the very start constituted by it? 
Following Millikan and Burge, I reply that communication is not constitutively 
inferential. As Burge writes,  
 
We seem normally to understand content in a way whose unconscious details 
(…) are not accessible via ordinary reflection. To be entitled to believe what 
one is told, one need not understand or be able to justify any transition from 
perceptual beliefs about words to understanding of and belief in the words' 
content. One can, of course, come to understand certain inferences from words 
to contents. Such empirical meta-skills do enrich communication. But they are 
not indispensable to it. (Burge 1993: 477) 
 
In my framework, however, conversational implicatures are inferentially derived 
from premisses concerning the speaker's intentions in saying what he says. They are 
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arrived at by answering questions such as, 'Why is the speaker saying what he 
says?' Instead of merely retrieving what is said through the operation of unconscious, 
primary pragmatic processes, we reflect on the fact that the speaker says what he 
says and use that fact, together with background knowledge, to infer what the 
speaker means without saying it. The retrieving of conversational implicatures 
therefore involves reflective capacities that are not exercised in what Millikan calls 
'normal language flow'. 
 As I emphasized in chapter 2, the contrast between primary and secondary 
pragmatic processes corresponds to different levels of processing. The determination 
of what is said takes place at a sub-personal level, like the determination of what we 
see. But the determination of what the speaker implies takes place at the personal 
level, like the determination of the consequences of what we see. 
Relevance theorists do not accept my distinction between the two sorts of 
process. They advocate a unified view, according to which « the various different 
pragmatic tasks are performed by processes that comprise a single system, which 
takes decoded linguistic meaning as its input and delivers the propositions 
communicated » (Carston 2002a: 141). And they insist that the processes in question 
are uniformly inferential, though in a sense that does not entail reflectiveness.  
According to relevance theorists, there is nothing 'special' about implicatures. 
They accept that in some cases a conscious, explicit process of inference takes 
place, which disrupts normal language flow;22 but it would be a mistake, they argue, 
to think of implicature derivation on this model. Implicature derivation is as automatic 
and unconscious as the other processes I treat as 'primary', viz. enrichment or 
loosening. In other words, there are two forms of inference: a spontaneous, 
automatic, unconscious form of inference which is involved both in explicature and 
implicature derivation, and an effortful, conscious form which is involved only in cases 
                                            
22  "There clearly are times at which the normal communicative flow is disrupted: certain 
instances of garden-path utterances, especially when exploited by speakers for particular, 
often humorous, effects; some cases of complex figurative use which require an effortful 
conscious search for interpretation; other cases where there is some apprehended difficulty in 
satisfying oneself that the intended interpretation has been reached (it doesn't seem 
sufficiently relevant, for instance)" (Carston 2002a: 145). 
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in which something goes wrong and there is disruption of normal language flow. As 
Carston puts it, 
 
The appropriate distinction within modes of processing and levels of 
explanation would seem to be between, on the one hand, a modular (sub-
personal) pragmatic processor which, when all goes well, quickly and 
automatically delivers speaker meaning (explicatures and implicatures), and, 
on the other hand, processes of a conscious reflective (personal-level) sort 
which occur only when the results of the fomer system are found wanting' 
(Carston 2002a: 146). 
 
In what follows I will discuss the arguments offered by relevance theorists in support 
of their position. This will enable me to clarify my view and to clear up some 
misunderstandings. 
 
3.2. Personal and subpersonal inferences 
 
Communication, in its most basic form, is non-inferential in the sense that it does not 
rest on reasoning. Reid defines 'reasoning' as 
 
the process by which we pass from one judgment to another which is the 
consequence of it. Accordingly, our judgments are distinguished into intuitive, 
which are not grounded upon any preceding judgment, and discursive, which 
are deduced from some preceding judgment by reasoning (Reid, 1969: 710). 
 
Evidently, comprehension is intuitive rather than discursive, except in the special 
situations in which one adopts a reflective stance towards the ongoing discourse. 
Normally we do not have to reason to understand what the others are saying: the 
judgment that the speaker has said that p is made directly upon hearing the 
utterance, without being inferentially grounded in some prior judgment to the effect 
that the speaker has uttered sentence S. 
Relevance theorists do not deny that comprehension is intuitive rather than 
discursive. When they say that communication is fundamentally inferential, they 
mean it in a sense which is compatible with its being intuitive. According to them, 
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there are two sorts of inference. One is conscious, explicit inference — what Reid 
calls 'reasoning'. Let us call that 'inference in the narrow sense'. But there is also 
inference in the broad sense: a type of inference which may well occur 
unconsciously, in such a way that the judging subject is aware only of the conclusion 
of the inference (which is, therefore, available not as the conclusion of an inference 
but as an immediate, intuitive judgment). 
 Relevance theorists admit, indeed emphasize, that the inferential procedure 
underlying ordinary understanding is unconscious. As Sperber says, « when most of 
us talk of reasoning, we think of an occasional, conscious, difficult, and rather slow 
mental activity. What modern psychology has shown is that something like reasoning 
goes on all the time — unconsciously, painlessly, and fast » (Sperber 1995: 195). It is 
in that modern psychological sense that communication is said to be 'inferential'. 
That there is such a broad notion of inference in contemporary cognitive 
science is beyond question. For example, Marr writes that « the true heart of visual 
perception is the inference from the structure of an image about the structure of the 
real world outside » (Marr 1982: 68). That is a very broad sense of 'inference' indeed. 
Nothing prevents the input to an inference in that sense from being nonconceptual.23 
Sperber and Wilson use ‗inference‘ more restrictively. For there to be inference, they 
claim, the transition must be from a conceptual representation to a conceptual 
representation. Moroever, the transition must be truth-preserving. Only if these 
conditions are satisfied will a cognitive transition count as a genuine 'inference'.24 
According to Sperber and Wilson, pragmatic inferences are genuine inferences by 
                                            
23 Representations of intensity changes in terms of zero-crossings are clearly nonconceptual 
(Crane 1990), yet Marr describes the transition from such proximal representations to distal 
representations of edges as an inference. Fodor (1983) uses ‗inference‘ in the same broad 
way. 
24  "[Whenever] the input and the output of a [computation] are not related as premise and 
conclusion in an argument, the computation is not interpretable as inferential"(Sperber and 
Wilson 1987: 137). 
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this criterion.25 Still, they are not inferences in the narrow sense – explicit, conscious 
inferences conducted at the personal level. They are inferences only in the broad, 
psychological sense. That is true whether we talk of the inferences which underlie my 
'primary pragmatic processes' (enrichment, saturation etc.) or of those through which 
conversational implicatures are generated. 
In response, I wish to maintain that implicature generation rests on a process 
of inference in the narrow sense: a process of conscious inference, corresponding to 
Reid's description of 'reasoning'. But the notion of conscious inference that is relevant 
here does not quite correspond to the description given by relevance theorists. 
Sperber contrasts explicit, conscious reasoning, which is a voluntary, effortful and 
slow activity, with spontanous inference, which is effortless, fast, and takes place 
unconsciously. That distinction I find misleading in the present context, for it mixes 
distinct issues. Like Sperber, I think that inference in the narrow sense is essentially 
conscious: it takes place only if one judgment (the conclusion) is grounded in another 
judgment (the premise), and if both judgments, as well as the fact that one is 
grounded in and justified by the other, are available (consciously accessible) to the 
judging subject. Secondary pragmatic processes are inferential in the narrow sense 
because they satisfy that essential condition — the availability condition. But it would 
be wrong to claim that narrow inferences are necessarily effortful, slow and under 
voluntary control. Among inferences in the narrow sense, some — including those 
that underly the retrieval of conversational implicatures — are typically spontaneous: 
the inference is drawn more or less automatically. 
 Consider Sperber's own example of spontanous inference: you hear the 
doorbell ringing, and you form the belief 'There is someone at the door' (Sperber, 
1997: 77-78). That belief is inferentially derived from a prior belief (to the effect that 
the doorbell is ringing) directly based on perception, but it does not issue from a 
process of explicit reasoning: 
 
If challenged, you might be able to produce, ex post facto, a missing premise 
that, together with the perceptual belief, warrants the inferential belief. 
                                            
25   This is debatable. In 'Does linguistic communication rest on inference?' (Mind and 
Language 17, 2002), pp. 122-3, I have questioned the claim that primary pragmatic processes 
can be described as truth-preserving operations on conceptual representations. 
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However, the fact is that you arrived at the inferential belief without engaging 
in deliberate or conscious inference (Sperber 1997: 78). 
 
I grant that there is a difference between spontaneous inference and explicit 
reasoning, but I deny that this corresponds to the distinction between inferences in 
the broad and the narrow sense. On my view, spontaneous inferences of the sort 
mentioned by Sperber are 'inferences in the narrow sense'. 
In all the examples given by Sperber in the passage from which I've just 
quoted, including the doorbell example, the availability condition is satisfied: the 
subject makes two judgments, one based on perception, the other based on 
inference from the first belief. The two judgments are conscious and available to the 
subject. Moreover, the subject is aware that the second judgment is grounded in, and 
justified by, the first. If she says, 'There is someone at the door', and is asked 'How 
do you know?', she will reply something like: 'The doorbell is ringing'. The perceptual 
judgment to the effect that the doorbell is ringing justifies, and is known to justify, the 
nonperceptual judgment that there is someone at the door. Since there are two 
judgments standing in the appropriate relation to each other, Reid's definition of 
'reasoning' applies, even though this piece of reasoning is spontaneous, effortless 
and fast. The only thing that is not conscious here are the inferential steps needed to 
bridge the gap between the first, perceptual belief and the second, inferential belief. 
Still, the inference, though not explicit, is conscious in the sense that the availability 
condition is satisfied.26 This is in contrast to cases in which the availability condition 
                                            
26 The distinction between the two notions is crucial. Overlooking it leads to fallacies, as in 
this passage from Michael Thau‘s Consciousness and Cognition (Oxford University Press, 
2002), p. 149 : 
Once we abandon the idea that conversational participants consciously calculate 
what‘s implicated from what is said, there‘s no reason to think that they should always 
have the ability to consciously distinguish the former from the latter. 
This is fallacious because the main reason for denying that conversational participants 
consciously calculate what‘s implicated from what is said is that they don‘t do so explicitly. 
(As Thau rightly points out, p. 145, « when I understand that your utterance [‗Fergie was 
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is not satisfied: cases, for example, where the subject is aware only of one judgment, 
the alleged inferential source of that judgment being unavailable to consciousness; or 
cases in which both judgments are available, but the subject is unaware of one being 
inferentially derived from the other. 
I conclude that there are two sorts of inference in the narrow sense : explicit 
reasoning, and spontaneous inference. In both cases the availability condition is 
satisfied. Inferences in the broad sense are characterized by the fact that the 
availability condition is not satisfied. Now it is my contention that, if primary pragmatic 
processes are indeed inferential, they are inferential only in the broad sense. The 
interpreter is not aware that his judgment, to the effect that the speaker has said that 
p, is inferentially derived from a prior judgment (e.g. a judgment to the effect that the 
speaker has uttered sentence S). Similarly, some theorists claim that perceptual 
judgments themselves are inferential, but the inferences at issue do not satisfy the 
availability condition: the perceiver is not aware that his perceptual judgment that p is 
based on a prior judgment (to the effect that things seem thus and so, or whatever). 
In contrast, when I judge that John is still here because I can see his car, that 
judgement is inferential in the narrow sense. Similarly, secondary pragmatic 
processes are inferential in the narrow sense, because the availability condition is 
satisfied: the subject is aware of the relation between the implicature and what is 
said. That is true even though (normally) conversational implicatures are not 
generated through a process of explicit reasoning. As relevance theorists rightly 
emphasize, implicature generation is often as automatic, as effortless as primary 
pragmatic processes. But this is irrelevant to the distinction I want to make. Despite 
their spontanous and automatic character, secondary pragmatic processes are 
conscious in the minimal sense that the availability condition is satisfied. In primary 
pragmatic processes, the availability condition is not satisfied. 
                                                                                                                                        
sober today‘] is intended to convey that Fergie is often drunk, I don‘t have any explicit 
thoughts about conversational maxims, nor do I perform any explicit inferential reasoning. »). 
But this has no bearing at all on the issue, whether or not the availability condition is satisfied. 
In this particular case I take it as obvious that the availability condition is satisfied : the 
interpreter is aware that the speaker has said that Fergie is sober today (thereby implying that 
he is often drunk). 
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3.3. Implicature or enrichment? 
 
Relevance theorists have provided a couple of arguments supporting their view that 
implicatures and explicatures are not processed by separate systems, a 'primary' 
pragmatic system that works blindly and in parallel, and a 'secondary' system that 
takes as input the output of the primary system. Those arguments attempt to show 
that the computation of what is said does not have to precede the derivation of 
implicatures, contrary to what my account suggests. 
Following Herb Clark, Carston points out that "there is a class of widely 
recognized implicatures, known as 'bridging' implicatures, which have to precede the 
full derivation of an explicature » (Carston 2002a : 143). One of Clark's original 
examples was (1), which is said to implicate (2). 
 
(1) The picnic was awful. The beer was warm. 
(2) The beer was part of the picnic. 
 
Carston writes: "in the absence of any argument that denies the status of implicature 
to assumptions like those in (2), they seem to present strong evidence in favour of a 
system of pragmatic interpretation which derives explicatures and implicatures in 
parallel" (Carston 2002a: 143). 
 Now I am puzzled by this particular example because it is so strikingly similar 
to other examples of 'bridging' which Carston herself (rightly) treats as instances of 
enrichment. If 'She took out her key and opened the door <with the key>' is an 
instance of bridging enrichment, the same thing should be said of the Clark example, 
since the only significant difference between the two cases is the fact that there is 
conjunction in one case, parataxis in the other. Conversely, if (2) is treated as a 
conversational implicature of (1), then 'the door was opened with the key' should be 
treated as a conversational implicature of 'She took out her key and opened the 
door', contrary to Carston's own analysis in terms of enrichment. As far as I am 
concerned, I opt for the enrichment account, and I therefore deny that (2) is a 
conversational implicature of (1). (The enrichment of incomplete descriptions is a 
standard phenomenon, which I have already mentioned. The enrichment of 'the beer' 
into something like 'the beer that was part of the picnic' is like the enrichment of 'the 
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table' into 'the table of the living room'.)27 
 Another example of implicature invoked by Carston in arguing against my view 
turns out to be best treated as a case of enrichment. She writes: 
 
Let's consider some examples of utterances which clearly communicate an 
implicature, starting with the first example Grice gave when illustrating the role 
of his conversational maxims: 
(3) A: I am out of petrol. 
B: There is a garage around the corner. 
(Gloss: B would be infringing the maxim 'Be relevant' 
unless he thinks, or thinks it possible, that the garage is 
open, and has petrol to sell; so he implicates that the 
garage is, or at least may be, open, etc.) 
Now, B could have given a more explicit response to A, one in which the 
information that petrol is currently being sold at a garage round the corner is 
part of what is said by the utterance. For instance she could have uttered the 
sentence in (4): 
(4) B': There is a garage round the corner 
which sells petrol and is open now. 
According to [Recanati's view], this utterance would have maintained the 
normal language flow while the one B actually gave, in (3), disrupts that 
normal language flow. It is perhaps difficult to have a sure sense of what is 
meant by the notion of 'normal' language flow, but the exchange in (3) seems 
to be about as natural, normal and flowing a conversation as there is, while, 
arguably, the implicature-less one in (4) is somewhat awkward, being quite 
unnecessarily explicit (in the absence of any doubt about the functioning of the 
                                            
27  Carston would probably argue that examples like (1) involve both enrichment and 
implicature generation. In (1), for example, the speaker implicates that there was beer at the 
picnic, and the explicature of (1) is enriched on the basis of that 'implicated premiss': 'the beer' 
is understood as 'the beer that was part of the picnic'. As far as I am concerned, however, I am 
unwilling to treat what relevance theorists call 'implicated premisses' as genuine implicatures 
(see §3.5). 
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garage. (Carston 2002a: 144) 
 
I have already said in what sense I mean that implicatures are special: their 
distinctness from what is said is grasped, while the aspects of meaning that are 
contextually provided through primary pragmatic processes are undistinguished. Be 
that as it may, I deny that a conversational implicature is involved in the Gricean 
example mentioned by Carston. The content of B's utterance in (3) is enriched into 
the proposition which (4) explicitly articulates. This is very standard. In the relevance-
theoretic framework favoured by Carston herself the word 'garage' can perhaps be 
taken to contextually express the ad hoc concept GARAGE*, paraphrasable as 'a 
garage that is presumably open and has petrol to sell'. 
 The inappropriateness of the alleged counterexamples should not blind us to 
the important issue raised by relevance theorists: if there are cases in which the 
derivation of an implicature must come before the computation of what is said, does 
this not argue against my account? To this issue I now turn. 
 
3.4. Mutual adjustment of explicature and implicature 
 
According to relevance theorists, I am committed to a sequential view of the 
derivation of implicatures and am therefore unable to account for the phenomenon of 
'mutual adjustment' between implicature and explicature. My view, it is said, 
 
assumes that explicature derivation precedes implicature derivation, and, 
thereby, commits [me] to a sequential processing model. By contrast, a 
relevance-based comprehension model is not a sequential model: the 
implicature derivation may coincide with, precede, or follow the implicature 
derivation, and the content of derived implicatures may affect the way 
explicatures are developed. (Matsui 2001: 250) 
 
Relevance theorists have documented the phenomenon of 'mutual adjustment' 
between implicature and explicature. As Sperber and Wilson say, "expectations of 
relevance warrant the derivation of specific implicatures, for which the explicit content 
must be adequately enriched" (Sperber and Wilson 1998: 194). One of their 
examples is the following exchange: 
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A: Do you want to go to the cinema? 
B: I am tired. 
 
A primary pragmatic process of enrichment maps the lexical concept TIRED to the ad 
hoc concept TIRED*, which can be paraphrased as something like 'tired to an extent 
that makes going to the cinema undesirable to B'. Enrichment here is driven by the 
need to derive from B's utterance an implicated response to A's question. Similarly, at 
the end of Chapter 1, I mentioned the connection between enrichment and 
implicature derivation:  
 
By saying that she's had breafkast, the speaker implies that she is not hungry 
and does not want to be fed. By saying that the child is not going to die, the 
mother implies that the cut is not serious; and so forth. Now those implicatures 
can be worked out only if the speaker is recognized as expressing the 
(nonminimal) proposition that she's had breakfast that morning, or that the 
child won't die from that cut. Clearly, if the speaker had had breafkast twenty 
years ago (rather than that very morning), nothing would follow concerning the 
speaker's present state of hunger and her willingness or unwillingness to eat 
something. The implicature could not be derived, if what the speaker says was 
not given the richer, temporally restricted interpretation. 
 
So I agree with Sperber and Wilson about the phenomenon they call 'mutual 
adjustment'. Carston concludes that " there is no generalization to be made about 
which of the two kinds of communicated assumption [explicature and implicature] is 
recovered first and functions as input to the recovery of the other; the parallel 
adjustment process entails that neither is wholly temporally prior to the other." 
(Carston 2002a: 143). Rather, the proper generalization to make is this: 
 
Any interpretation... results from mutual adjustment of the explicit and implicit 
content of the utterance. This adjustment process stabilises when the 
hypothesised explicit content is warranted by the hypothesised explicit content 
together with the context. (Sperber and Wilson 1998: 197) 
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But there is nothing with which I find that I have to disagree here. So I deny that my 
view commits me to a 'sequential model' in the sense under discussion. What matters 
from my point of view is only this: there is an asymmetry between implicature and 
explicature, in that the implicature must be grounded in, or warranted by, the 
explicature. Both Carson and Sperber and Wilson grant this point, at least as far as 
'implicated conclusions' are concerned. So there is no disagreement on this score. 
 
3.5. Implicated premisses 
 
Deirdre Wilson once objected to me that implicatures may be premisses as well as 
conclusions, hence they need not be 'grounded in' or 'warranted by' the explicature. 
Implicated premisses are background assumptions that either serve as auxiliary 
premisses in deriving the implicatures from the explicature, or, possibly, are appealed 
to in enriching the content of the utterance so as to yield an appropriate explicature. 
Wilson gave as example the following exchange: 
 
A: Why didn't you invite me to your party? 
B: I invited only nice people. 
 
The implicature here is the premiss that A is not nice. (B's utterance provides a 
relevant answer to A's question only if this is assumed.) The alleged 'bridging 
implicature' invoked by Carston as counterexample to my view is also an implicated 
premiss. That there was beer among the beverages served at the picnic is an 
implicated premiss by appeal to which one can enrich 'the beer' into 'the beer served 
at the picnic'. 
 In general I don't think so-called 'implicated premisses' are genuine 
implicatures in the sense in which I am using that term. They are not part of what the 
speaker means, i.e. intentionally communicates, but part of what he takes for granted 
(presupposes) and expects the hearer to take for granted. Thus I draw a distinction 
between the common ground to which such premisses belong, and the explicit or 
implicit content of the utterance — what the speaker specifically intends to 
communicate. Implicatures are, by definition, an aspect of content. Since that is not 
true of implicated premisses, they do not count as genuine implicatures (in my 
framework). 
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To be sure, there are cases in which an implicated premiss is part of what is 
meant. Thus in the above exchange we may imagine that B's point precisely is to 
convey to A that he (A) is not nice. Even in that case I would not treat that as an 
instance of implicature, but, rather, as an instance of 'staging' (§5.5). The speaker 
ostensively speaks as if it was common ground that A is not a nice person. The 
mechanism at work here is more similar to that which underlies irony than to the 
inferential mechanism characteristic of implicature. However, let us assume that 
there is a genuine implicature here. What, exactly, is implicated? Wilson says it is the 
premiss that A is not nice. But there is an alternative construal. We may consider that 
what the speaker implicates is that he considers A as not a nice person. Is this a 
premiss or a conclusion? Arguably, like other implicatures it is the conclusion of an 
inference taking as premiss the speaker's saying what he says. The speaker's saying 
that only nice persons were invited, in response to the question 'Why didn't you invite 
me?', implies that he considers the hearer as not a nice person. If this is an 
implicature, one may argue that it is, indeed, grounded in or warranted by the 
speaker's locutionary act (i.e. his saying of what is said), just as ordinary implicatures 
are. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Syncretic View 
 
 
4.1. Four levels? 
 
In Chapter 1 I described two approaches to what is said; the standard approach, 
based on the Minimalist principle, and the availability-based approach which entails 
rejecting Minimalism. The two pictures are summarized in figure 1.2 (p. 00). Now an 
intermediate position is available, according to which there are two equally legitimate 
notions of what is said: a purely semantic, minimalist notion, and a pragmatic notion 
('what is stated' as opposed to what is implied). If we accept this suggestion, we end 
up with four levels instead of three: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Such a compromise would seem to be acceptable to both parties. The 
minimalist wants to isolate a purely semantic notion of content, that is, a notion of the 
content of a sentence (with respect to a context) which is compositionally determined 
and takes pragmatic elements on board only when this is necessary. His opponent 
wants to capture the intuitive notion of 'what is said' (as opposed to what is implied) 
and stresses that what is said in that sense is, to a large extent, determined in a top 
down manner by the context. The two notions can be integrated within a unified 
framework if one accepts to replace the traditional triad by a four-level picture (fig. 
4.1). 
 
[Figure 4.1 about here] 
 
Several authors have made proposals to that effect. In 'The Pragmatic 
Fallacy', Nathan Salmon distinguishes two senses of the phrase 'what is said': what 
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is said in the strict and philosophical sense (the semantic content of the sentence, 
with respect to the context at hand) and what is said in the loose and popular sense 
(the content of the speaker's speech act). What is said in the loose and popular 
sense is typically richer than the sentence's semantic content, yet it does not 
encompass what the speaker merely conveys or implicates in Grice's sense. Salmon, 
in effect, draws a threefold distinction between (i) what is said in the minimalist sense 
(the semantic content of the sentence, in the speaker's context), (ii) what the speaker 
asserts, and (iii) what he or she implies. When the conventional meaning of the 
sentence-type is added, this yields something very much like the four-level picture 
above. 
 Kent Bach defends a similar view, with one more level (Bach 1994a, 1994b). 
'What is said' is so minimal, in Bach's conception, that it need not even be 
propositional. It may be a 'propositional radical'. Thus if, pointing to Tipper, I say 'He 
is ready' what I say is that Tipper is ready. This becomes a full-fledged proposition 
only if an answer is provided to the question: ready for what? A pragmatic process of 
'completion' must therefore take place to make the Bachian 'what is said' into a 
complete proposition. To go from that proposition (resulting from completion) to what 
is actually asserted a further pragmatic process of expansion often comes into play. 
That process is clearly non-minimalist: it is neither triggered by a linguistic 
constituent, nor necessary in order to achieve propositionality. ('Expansion' is Bach's 
word for free enrichment.) So in Bach's framework there are five distinct notions: the 
sentence's linguistic meaning; what is said in the less-than-minimal sense; the 
minimal proposition resulting from completion (= what is said in the minimalist sense); 
the non-minimal proposition resulting from expansion (= what is said in the pragmatic 
sense, i.e. the 'explicature', in relevance-theoretic terminology); and, finally, the 
conversational implicatures of the utterance (not to mention what the speaker 
nonliteraly communicates). The contextual components of meaning generated 
through completion and expansion are called by Bach 'conversational implicitures' 
because they are 'implicit in' what is said, in contrast to the implicatures which are 
'implied by' what is said (or the saying of it). 
 A third author worth mentioning in this connection is Scott Soames. In Beyond 
Rigidity he writes: 
 
When speaking of the information carried by an assertive utterance of a 
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sentence in a context, one must distinguish (i) the semantic content of the 
sentence uttered in the context; (ii) what the speaker says (asserts) by uttering 
the sentence; (iii) what the speaker implies, implicates, or suggests... (i) is 
standardly included in (ii), but... in the case of many utterances, (ii) is not 
exhausted by (i). (Soames 2002: 86) 
 
Like Salmon and Bach, Soames contrasts what is said in the semantic sense with 
what is said in the pragmatic sense (i.e. what is stated or asserted). It is what is said 
in the pragmatic sense which arguably serves as input to secondary pragmatic 
processes and satisfies the availability condition. As we have seen, that entails that 
what is said (in the pragmatic sense) cannot satisfy Minimalism. But nothing follows 
regarding what is said in the semantic sense; hence there is no reason to give up 
Minimalism when dealing with semantic content. 
 Whatever we think of the details of the views held by Bach, Salmon or 
Soames, it is clear that, by freeing us of the limitations of the traditional three-level 
picture, they make a reconciliation of Minimalism and Availability possible. One can 
be a minimalist with respect to what is said in the strict and literal sense, and at the 
same time give up Minimalism when it comes to what the speaker asserts, which is 
subject to the Availability constraint. 
The syncretic view promises to give us the best of both worlds. It sounds 
appealing and reasonable. As Jonathan Berg pointed out, I myself have proposed 
something along similar lines (Berg 1998: 466-7). Yet I think there is a serious 
problem with that view — a problem which makes it rather unattractive, despite its 
initial appeal. 
 The weak point in the syncretic view is the very notion of 'what is said in the 
strict and literal sense', i.e. the minimalist notion of what is said. How are we to 
understand that notion? A natural and widespread interpretation runs as follows: 
'What is said' in the minimalist sense is what the sentence says (with respect to the 
context at hand), as opposed to what the speaker says by uttering the sentence. 
Thus interpreted, however,  the syncretic view is closely related to a traditional way 
of construing the semantics/pragmatics distinction which I think must be rejected. In 
the next two sections of this chapter, I will spell out that conception and show what is 
wrong with it. 
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4.2. Semantics and pragmatics: the standard picture 
 
On the standard picture, knowing a language is like knowing a theory by means of 
which one can deductively establish the truth-conditions of (or the proposition 
expressed by) sentences which one has never encountered before. Semantic 
interpretation is the process whereby an interpreter exploits his or her knowledge of a 
language, say L, to assign to an arbitrary sentence of L its truth-conditions. 
 Pragmatic interpretation is a totally different process. It is not concerned with 
language per se, but with human action. When someone acts, there is a reason why 
he does what he does. To provide an interpretation for the action is to find that 
reason, that is, to ascribe the agent a particular intention in terms of which we can 
make sense of the action. 
 A distinguishing characteristic of pragmatic interpretation is its defeasability. 
The best explanation we can offer for an action given the available evidence may be 
revised in the light of new evidence. Even if an excellent explanation is available, it 
can always be overriden if enough new evidence is adduced to account for the 
subject's behaviour. It follows that any piece of evidence may turn out to be relevant 
for the interpretation of an action. In other words, there is no limit to the amount of 
contextual information that can affect pragmatic interpretation. 
A particular class of human actions is that of communicative actions. That 
class is defined by the fact that the intention underlying the action is a communicative 
intention — an intention such that (arguably) its recognition by the addressee is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for its fulfilment (Searle 1969, Bach and Harnish 
1979). To communicate that p is therefore to act in such a way that the addressee 
will explain one's action by ascribing to the agent the intention to communicate that p. 
For communication to succeed, the addressee must not only understand that the 
agent does what he does in order to communicate something to her; she must also 
understand what the agent tries to communicate. To secure that effect the 
communicator will do something which will evoke in the adressee's mind that which 
he wants to communicate. To that purpose the communicator may use icons, or 
indices, or symbols, that is, conventional signs. It is, of course, symbols that are used 
when the communicator and the addressee share a common language. 
 At this point semantic interpretation and pragmatic interpretation make contact 
with each other. A speech act is an action performed by uttering a sentence in some 
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language, say L. Let us assume that the sentence has a certain semantic 
interpretation in L: it means that p. Since the speaker utters a sentence which means 
that p and manifests the intention to communicate something to the hearer, one 
reasonable hypothesis is that he intends to communicate that p. If that is the best 
explanation for the action given the available evidence, the hearer will settle for it and 
(if that was indeed the speaker's intention) the communicative intention will be 
fulfilled: the speaker will have succeedeed in communicating that p to the hearer. In 
this case the speech act will be assigned a particular content as a result of pragmatic 
interpretation; and that content will coincide with the content which comes to be 
assigned to the sentence as a result of semantic interpretation. That is not really a 
coincidence, of course; for the semantic interpretation of the sentence was part of the 
evidence used in pragmatically determining the content of the speech act. But there 
are cases in which the two contents do not coincide: the sentence means that p, but 
that is not what the speaker means — what he manifestly intends to communicate. 
So far I have expounded the standard picture of the relation between semantic 
and pragmatic interpretation. I will criticize it shortly (§4.3). Before doing so, let me 
spell out the connection between that picture and the Syncretic View talked about in 
the first section. 
 On the standard picture, as we have just seen, there is a basic distinction 
between what the sentence says and what the speaker means, even when they 
coincide. What the sentence says is determined by semantic interpretation, that is, 
deductively and without paying any regard to the speaker's beliefs and desires. Of 
course, one needs to make sure that the speaker utters what he does as a sentence 
of L; and that may require a good deal of pragmatic interpretation. But once it is 
determined that the utterance at issue counts as an utterance of a particular 
sentence of L, semantic interpretation takes over, and the content of that sentence is 
mechanically determined.— On the other hand what the speaker means is 
determined by pragmatic interpretation. Pragmatic interpretation invoves an 
assessment of the speaker's communicative intentions, given an overall assumption 
of rationality. As I pointed out any piece of contextual information may turn out to be 
relevant to establishing the correct interpretation for the speech act. 
 In this framework there is room for the notion of what the speaker says — what 
is said in the pragmatic sense, or, as Bach puts it, 'what is stated'. Sometimes we can 
distinguish two components within what the speaker means: what he states, and 
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what he implies in virtue of stating it. What is stated may, but need not, be identical to 
what the sentence says. Often what is stated is richer than what the sentence says, 
as we have seen. Be that as it may, there are two notions of what is said: one is the 
output of semantic interpretation. It is what the sentence says. The other is a 
particular aspect of speaker's meaning. It is what the speaker states. That distinction 
is the core of the Syncretic View. 
 
4.3. Semantic underdeterminacy 
 
I think there is something deeply wrong with the standard picture (and the Syncretic 
View insofar as it is based on it). What is wrong — or one of the things that are wrong 
— is the assumption that semantic interpretation can deliver something as 
determinate as a complete proposition. On my view semantic interpretation, 
characterized by its deductive character, does not deliver complete propositions: it 
delivers only semantic schemata — propositional functions, to use Russell's phrase. 
 By saying that semantic interpretation properly conceived delivers only 
schemata, not complete propositions, I do not mean that it delivers only characters in 
Kaplan's sense (Kaplan 1989). When a sentence contains an indexical, like 'I' or 
'tomorrow', the meaning of the indexical (its character) contextually determines its 
content in a very straightforward manner. There is no reason not to consider that 
aspect of content-determination as part of semantic interpretation. For the type of 
context-dependence exhibited by (pure) indexicals has nothing to do with the radical 
form of context-dependence which affects speaker's meaning. The hallmark of the 
more radical form of context-dependence is the fact that any piece of contextual 
information may be relevant. But the context that comes into play in the semantic 
interpretation of indexicals is not the total pragmatic context; it is a very limited 
context which contains only a few aspects of the pragmatic context: who speaks, 
when, where, and so forth. As Bach puts it, 
 
There are two quite different sorts of context, and each plays quite a different 
role. Wide context concerns any contextual information relevant to determining 
the speaker's intention and to the successful and felicitous performance of the 
speech act... Narrow context concerns information specifically relevant to 
determining the semantic values of [indexicals]... Narrow context is semantic, 
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wide context pragmatic. 28 
 
 But most context-sensitive expressions are semantically indeterminate rather 
than indexical in the strict sense. A possessive phrase such as 'John's car' means 
something like the car that bears relation R to John, where 'R' is a free variable. The 
free variable must be contextually assigned a particular value; but that value is not 
determined by a rule and it is not a function of a particular aspect of the narrow 
context. What a given occurrence of the phrase 'John's car' means ultimately 
depends upon what the speaker who utters it means. It therefore depends upon the 
wide context. That is true of all semantically underdeterminate expressions: their 
semantic value varies from occurrence to occurrence, just as the semantic value of 
indexicals does, yet it varies not as a function of some objective feature of the narrow 
context but as a function of what the speaker means. It follows that semantic 
interpretation by itself cannot determine what is said by a sentence containing such 
an expression: for the semantic value of the expression — its own contribution to 
what is said — is a matter of speaker's meaning, and can only be determined by 
pragmatic interpretation. 
Even  if we restrict our attention to expressions traditionally classified as 
indexicals, we see that they involve a good deal of semantic indeterminacy. This is 
true, in particular, of demonstratives. The reference of a demonstrative cannot be 
determined by a rule, like the rule that 'I' refers to the speaker. It is generally 
assumed that there is such a rule, namely the rule that the demonstrative refers to 
the object which happens to be demonstrated or which happens to be the most 
salient, in the context at hand. But the notions of 'demonstration' and 'salience' are 
pragmatic notions in disguise. They cannot be cashed out in terms merely of the 
narrow context. Ultimately, a demonstrative refers to what the speaker who uses it 
refers to by using it. 
 To be sure, one can make that into a semantic rule. One can say that the 
character of a demonstrative is the rule that it refers to what the speaker intends to 
refer to. As a result, one will add to the narrow context a sequence of 'speaker's 
intended referents', in such a way that the nth demonstrative in the sentence will refer 
to the nth member of the sequence. Formally that is fine, but philosophically it is clear 
                                            
28 From the handout of a talk on 'Semantics vs Pragmatics', delivered in 1996. 
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that one is cheating. We pretend that we can manage with a limited, narrow notion of 
context of the sort we need for handling indexicals, while in fact we can only 
determine the speaker's intended referent (hence the semantic referent, which 
depends upon the speaker's intended referent) by resorting to pragmatic 
interpretation and relying on the wide context. 29 
 We encounter the same sort of problem even with expressions like 'here' and 
'now' which are traditionally considered as pure indexicals (rather than 
demonstratives). Their semantic value is the time or place of the context respectively. 
But what counts as the time and place of the context? How inclusive must the time or 
place in question be? It depends on what the speaker means, hence, again, on the 
wide context. We can maintain that the character of 'here' and 'now' is the rule that 
the expression refers to 'the' time or 'the' place of the context — a rule  which 
automatically determines a content, given a (narrow) context in which the time and 
place parameters are given specific values; but then we have to let a pragmatic 
process take place to fix the values in question, that is, to determine which narrow 
context, among indefinitely many candidates compatible with the facts of the 
utterance, serves as argument to the character function. On the resulting view the 
(narrow) context with respect to which an utterance is interpreted is not given, it is not 
determined automatically by objective facts like where and when the utterance takes 
place, but it is determined by the speaker's intention and the wide context. Again, we 
                                            
29  One may acknowledge the need to appeal to the wide context in interpreting 
demonstratives while arguing that the appeal thus made is 'pre-semantic'. The speaker's 
directing intention is necessary to endow a demonstrative with a character in the first place, 
one might say. We need the wide context to fix the expression's character, but once the 
character is thus determined, through a pragmatic procedure akin to disambiguation, it maps 
the narrow context onto the proposition expressed by the utterance in that context. Similarly, 
we might say that whenever there is semantic underdeterminacy, some form of pragmatic 
disambiguation must take place before the process of semantic interpretation can start. — To 
argue in this way, it seems to me, is to acknowledge that semantic interpretation by itself 
cannot determine the content of a sentence containing a semantically underdeterminate 
expression. 
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reach the conclusion that pragmatic interpretation has a role to play in determining 
the content of the utterance, in such a case. 
To sum up, either semantic interpretation delivers something gappy, and 
pragmatic interpretation must fill the gaps until we reach a complete proposition. Or 
we run semantic interpretation only after we have used pragmatic interpretation to 
pre-determine the values of semantically indeterminate expressions, which values we 
artificially feed into the narrow context. Either way, semantic interpretation by itself is 
powerless to determine what is said, when the sentence contains a semantically 
indeterminate expression. 
 Now I take it that such expressions can be found all over the place. Moreover, 
semantic indeterminacy is not limited to particular lexical items. One can follow 
Waismann and argue that the satisfaction conditions of any empirical predicate are 
semantically indeterminate and subject to pragmatic interpretation (§9.4). There is 
also constructional indeterminacy. For example consider something as simple as the 
Adjective+Noun construction, as in 'red pen'. What counts as a red pen? A pen that is 
red. But when does a pen count as red? That depends upon the wide context. The 
satisfaction conditions of 'red pen' can only be determined by pragmatic interpretation 
(§9.3). 
 Suppose I am right and most sentences, perhaps all, are semantically 
underdeterminate. What follows? That there is no such thing as 'what the sentence 
says' (in the standard sense in which that phrase is generally used). There is a single 
notion of what is said, and that is a pragmatic notion: saying, as Grice claimed, is a 
variety of non-natural meaning, characterized by the role which the conventional 
meaning of the sentence plays in the hearer's intended recognition of the speaker's 
communicative intention. 
 
4.4. The minimal proposition as 'common denominator' 
 
My conclusion at this point should not be overstated. I am not (yet) saying that the 
Syncretic View cannot be made sense of, only that a particular interpretation (the 
standard interpretation) must be rejected. There is, I claimed, no such thing as 'what 
the sentence says' in the standard sense, i.e. no such thing as a complete 
proposition autonomously determined by the rules of the language with respect to the 
context but independent of speaker's meaning. As Bach points out, what the 
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sentence says, in the purely semantic sense, "excludes anything that is determined 
by [the speaker's] communicative intention (if it included that, then what is said would 
be partly a pragmatic matter)" (Bach 2001: 21). It is for that reason that I say there is 
no such thing: in order to reach a complete proposition through saturation, we must 
appeal to speaker's meaning. That is the lesson of semantic underdeterminacy. 
 There is another possible interpretation for the semantic notion of 'what is 
said', however. Instead of construing what is said as a nonpragmatic property of the 
sentence, independent of speaker's meaning, we can start with the pragmatic notion 
of what is said, and define the semantic notion in terms of it. What is said in the 
minimal sense can thus be defined as what is said in the full-fledged, pragmatic 
sense minus the contextual ingredients that are optional and whose provision is 
context-driven. To filter out the optional ingredients, while retaining the contextual 
ingredients that are necessary for propositionality (reference of indexicals, etc.), one 
may follow Soames and define the semantic content of a sentence s relative to a 
context C as 
 
that which would be asserted and conveyed by an assertive utterance of s in 
any normal context in which the reference of all indexicals in s is the same as 
their reference in C. (Soames 2002: 106). 
 
Soames's strategy therefore consists in abstracting what is said in the semantic 
sense from what is said in the pragmatic sense. That is possible because, according 
to Soames, the semantic content of the sentence is included in the content of the 
assertion. To get to the semantic content, one only has to filter out those aspects of 
assertion content that go beyond semantic content and are tied to specific contexts of 
utterance. What remains, i.e. the 'common denominator', is the minimal proposition 
expressed by the sentence itself: 
 
The semantic content of a sentence relative to a context is information that a 
competent speaker/hearer can confidently take to be asserted and conveyed 
by an utterance of the sentence in the context, no matter what else may be 
asserted, conveyed, or imparted. It is a sort of minimal common denominator 
determined by the linguistic knowledge shared by all competent speakers, 
together with contextually relevant facts such as the time, place, and agent of 
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the context; the identity of individuals demonstrated by the speaker; and the 
referents of the names, as used in the context. As such, the semantic content 
of a sentence functions as a sort of minimal core around which 
speaker/hearers can structure the totality of information the sentence is used 
to communicate in a given context. (Soames 2002: 109) 
 
 This alternative strategy is also a failure, however. What is said in the minimal, 
semantic sense cannot be abstracted from what is said in the pragmatic sense simply 
because it need not be part of it. Soames's claim that semantic content is included in 
assertion content seems plausible because his examples are all cases in which the 
asserted content is richer than the alleged semantic content. He gives the following 
sort of example: 
 
A man goes into a coffee shop and sits at the counter. The waitress asks him 
what he wants. He says, "I would like coffee, please." The sentence uttered is 
unspecific in several respects — its semantic content does not indicate 
whether the coffee is to be in form of beans, grounds, or liquid, nor does it 
indicate whether the amount in question is a drop, a cup, a gallon, a sack, or a 
barrel. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the situation what the man has in mind, 
and the waitress is in no doubt about what to do. She brings him a cup of 
frehsly brewed coffee. If asked to describe the transaction, she might well say, 
"He ordered a cup of coffee" or "He said he wanted a cup of coffee", meaning, 
of course, the brewed, drinkable kind. In so doing, she would, quite correctly, 
be reporting the content of the man's order, or assertion, as going beyond the 
semantic content of the sentence he uttered. (Soames 2002: 78) 
 
Now Soames thinks that in such cases several propositions are asserted, including (i) 
the unspecific proposition literally expressed (to the effect that the man wants coffee 
in some form or other) and (ii) more specific propositions recoverable from the literal 
proposition and the context. Those more specific propositions resulting from 
enrichment are tied to the particular context in which they are generated, hence they 
can be filtered out by considering other contexts in which that sentence would be 
uttered and the indexicals would be given the same semantic values. Soames 
equates the minimal proposition expressed by the sentence with the proposition 
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which would be asserted in all such contexts. 
The problem is that enrichment is only one optional process among others. 
Only in the case of enrichment, however, is it plausible to suggest that the minimal 
proposition itself is part of what is asserted. Soames glosses assertion in terms of 
commitment: "assertively uttering a sentence with the intention to assert or convey p 
involves doing so with the intention of committing oneself to p" (73). Since one 
cannot commit oneself to the truth of a specific proposition p without committing 
oneself to the truth of a less specific proposition q which it entails, it makes sense to 
say that the minimal proposition q is asserted when one (intuitively) asserts an 
enriched proposition p. But the principle that the minimal proposition is part of what is 
asserted (hence can be abstracted from it) does not hold when the primary 
processes at issue are instances of loosening or transfer. The speaker who 
assertively utters 'The ham sandwich left without paying', thereby referring to the ham 
sandwich orderer, does not assert the minimal proposition that the sandwich itself left 
without paying! Hence the minimal proposition cannot be defined as the common 
denominator — what is asserted in all contexts in which the sentence is uttered and 
the indexicals are given the same semantic values as in the current context. 
 To be sure, the counterexamples involving loosening or transfer are taken 
care of, in Soame's framework, by the notion of a 'normal' context, that is, of a 
context in which the sentence "is used with its literal meaning", i.e. "is not used 
metaphorically, ironically, or sarcastically". However this qualification cannot be 
invoked in the context of the present debate without begging the question. We are 
supposed to start with the intuitive (nonminimalist) notion of what is said, which 
sometimes is affected by loosening or transfer. If, following Soames, we want to build 
the notion of the minimal proposition out of what is said in that sense, we cannot 
arbitrarily set aside the cases that potentially threaten the enterprise. 
 
4.5. Interaction between saturation and optional pragmatic processes 
 
The problem with the 'minimal proposition' is that it results from, and presupposes, 
the process of saturation (i.e. the contextual assignment of semantic values to 
indexicals and other context-sensitive expressions) — a process that, in most cases, 
is impossible without appealing to speaker's meaning. It follows that the minimal 
proposition is not independent from speaker's meaning. On the other hand, the 
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alleged minimal proposition does not necessarily correspond to an aspect of what the 
speaker means or asserts.  
 Another, related difficulty is this. To get the minimal proposition, we must 
separate those aspects of speaker's meaning which are provided in the course of 
saturation, i.e., which fill gaps in the representation associated with the sentence as a 
result of purely semantic interpretation, and those aspects of speaker's meaning 
which are optional and enrich or otherwise modify the representation in question. The 
former, but not the latter, contribute to the minimal proposition. Those aspects of 
speaker's meaning cannot easily be separated, however. They are indissociable, 
often mutually dependent aspects of a single process of pragmatic interpretation. 
This can be seen by considering yet another example in which the interpretation of 
various constituents in a sentence proceeds in an interactive manner. 
As we saw in §2.4, how we interpret a particular constituent often depends 
upon how we interpret the other constituents in the sentence. The cases described in 
§2.4 were cases in which one constituent had to be interpreted non-literally if the 
others were interpreted literally. There are also cases in which a non-literal 
interpretation for a constituent prompts a non-literal interpretation for another 
constituent, and cases of interaction involving e.g. saturation. Thus in interpreting an 
utterance of: 'Mike finished John's book', we have to assign a contextual value to 
'finish' (finish reading, finish writing, finish binding, etc.) and a contextual value to 
'John's book' (book owned by John, written by John, read by John, etc.). There is an 
obvious interaction between the two values respectively assigned to the two 
constituents; the overall assignment must be coherent. If 'John's book' is interpreted 
as meaning the book written by John, it's unlikely that 'finished' will be interpreted as 
meaning finished writing. 
 The cases of interaction that are relevant to the present discussion are cases 
in which the primary pragmatic processes which interact respectively belong to the 
two broad classes I have distinguished: the primary pragmatic processes which are 
semantically mandatory because no proposition would be expressed without them 
(saturation), and the processes which are optional, i.e. non-mandatory (enrichment, 
loosening, and transfer). We naturally interpret 'He took out his key and opened the 
door' as meaning that he opened the door with the key, but even if we did not 'enrich' 
the interpretation of the utterance in this way the latter would still express a complete 
proposition (namely the proposition that he did two things: take out his key, and open 
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the door in some way or other). In this regard enrichment is optional and differs from 
saturation; for 'I read John's book' does not express a complete proposition if a 
certain relation between John and the book is not contextually provided. 
  Now it is possible for two pragmatic processes respectively belonging to the 
two classes distinguished above to interact in such a way that the mandatory process 
depends upon the optional one, and cannot operate until the latter has. For example, 
take the construction: the x of y, or even better the possessive construction: y's x. For 
the sentence where such a construction occurs to express a definite proposition, a 
certain relation between x and y must be contextually provided. Which relation is 
actually provided as part of the interpretation of the utterance obviously depends 
upon the identity of the relata and what we know about them. The relata, x and y, will 
themselves be referred to by means of linguistic expressions, say NP1 and NP2. Now 
it's easy to imagine a case in which, say, NP2 can undergo a process of non-literal 
interpretation. For example a definite description such as 'the lion' can be either 
interpreted literally (as referring to a lion) or non-literally (as referring metonymically 
to, say, the warrior whose shield carries a picture of a lion). How we interpret the 
description determines the identity of one of the relata, and we have seen that (in 
some cases at least), how we interpret the relation expressed by the possessive 
construction depends upon the identity of the relata. I want to argue that, in such a 
case, if the description is used non-literally (if it refers to the warrior), then a 
pragmatic process which must take place for the utterance to express a complete 
proposition (namely the assignment to the possessive construction of a particular 
relation as contextual value) cannot take place unless a non-literal interpretation has 
been antecedently provided for some other constituent in the sentence. It follows that 
the utterance is semantically indeterminate at the purely literal level, for the 
mandatory process of saturation - without which no complete proposition would be 
expressed - itself depends on some feature of the non-literal interpretation of the 
utterance and therefore cannot be achieved at the literal level. This is a case in which 
it is not possible (even in principle) to determine the proposition literally expressed 
before one has determined what the speaker non-literally means. 
 Let us now actually construct the example by filling in the context. Suppose 
that there has been a ritual fight between respectively five warriors and five beasts. 
The beasts are a wolf, a lion, a hyena, a bear, and an alligator; the warriors are 
armed with swords, and carry shields with distinctive decorations (the first warrior has 
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the moon on his shield, the second one has the Eiffel Tower, the third one has the 
Metro-Godwin-Mayer roaring lion, etc.). Each warrior is assigned a particular beast 
which he or she must stab to death. After the ritual fight, the five beasts lay on the 
ground with a sword through their body. This is the context. Now suppose that in this 
context I utter 
 
 Bring me the lion's sword - I want to have a look at it. 
 
In this context I think there are two accessible interpretations for 'the lion'; the lion can 
be interpreted literally as referring to the lion (one of the beasts), or non-literally as 
referring to the warrior who has (a picture of) a lion on his shield. If we choose the 
first interpretation, the relation which will be contextually assigned to the possessive 
construction will be one of the salient relations which hold between the lion (the 
animal) and the sword which can be seen emerging from its pierced body. If we 
choose the second interpretation, the relation will be totally different; it will be one of 
the salient relations between the warrior and the sword which he used in his fight 
against, say, the bear. 
 Now suppose the correct interpretation is the second one: the speaker actually 
refers to the warrior with a lion on his shield and wants to see his sword (i.e. the 
sword which emerges from the bear's body).  What is the minimal proposition 
expressed by the utterance, in this context? I doubt that there is one, but if the 
minimalist insists, here is the only available procedure for determining it: To get the 
minimal proposition, we must give the word 'lion' its literal interpretation, because the 
nonliteral interpretation results from an optional, non-minimalist process; and we 
must assign a particular value to the variable ‗R‘ carried by the possessive 
construction. Which value? Well, the value which corresponds to what the speaker 
actually means. (Remember: There is no other way to contextually determine a value 
for the genitive, than by appeal to speaker's meaning.) But that value is that which 
goes together with the intended nonliteral interpretation of 'lion'! The result is a 
monster: what the phrase 'the lion's sword' contributes to what is said in the 
minimalist sense is something like the sword which the lion (the animal) used during 
the fight. The minimal proposition thus determined is absurd and evidently 
corresponds to no stage in the actual process of understanding the utterance.  
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4.6. Taking stock 
 
We have seen that the minimal proposition which the Syncretic View  posits as the 
semantic content of the utterance, and which results from saturation alone, is not 
'what the sentence says' in the objectionable sense glossed in §4.2 and criticized in 
§4.3. It is not autonomously determined by the rules of the language independent of 
speaker's meaning. At the same time, the minimal proposition does not necessarily 
correspond to an aspect of what the speaker asserts (§4.4). The minimal proposition 
is a hybrid which goes beyond what is determined by the rules of the language yet 
has no psychological reality and need not be entertained or represented at any point 
in the process of understanding the utterance (§4.5). 
Do we need such a notion in theorizing about language and communication? 
Many people claim that we do, but I can hardly understand why. In a forthcoming 
paper ('Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Role of Semantic Content'), King and Stanley 
argue against semantic theories which ascribe (functional) characters to sentences 
on the basis of the characters of their parts, on the grounds that "the job of character 
is to give us content, and we can assign contents to complex expressions in contexts 
using only the characters of the parts, and combining the contents they determine in 
those contexts." They conclude that  
 
Both a semantics that assigns characters to simple expressions and 
recursively assigns characters to complex expressions and a semantics that 
assigns characters to only simple expressions allow for an assignment of the 
same contents in contexts to simple and complex expressions. So unless the 
functional characters of complex expressions have some additional job to do, 
they are unnecessary. But there seems to be no such additional job. 
 
The same sort of argument seems to me to rule out the minimal proposition as 
unnecessary. What must ultimately be accounted for is what speakers say in the 
pragmatic sense. The job of characters, contents etc. is to contribute to the overall 
explanation. But it is sufficient to assign semantic contents (in context) to simple 
expressions. Pragmatic processes will operate on those contents, and the 
composition rules will compose the resulting pragmatic values, thereby yielding the 
content of the speaker's assertion. Of course it is possible to let the composition rules 
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compose the semantic contents of the constituent expressions, thereby yielding the 
minimal proposition expressed by the sentence. (An absurd proposition, in the lion's 
sword case.) However, the content of the speaker's assertion will still be determined 
by composing the pragmatic values resulting from the operation of pragmatic 
processes on the contents of the constituent expressions; so it is unclear what 
additional job the minimal proposition is supposed to be doing. 
 
4.7. Minimal or reflexive? 
 
If one insists in using a purely semantic notion of 'what is said', i.e. a notion of what is 
said which is propositional (truth-evaluable) yet "excludes anything that is determined 
by the speaker's communicative intention", there is a much better candidate than the 
alleged minimal proposition. For every utterance, there arguably is a proposition 
which it expresses in virtue solely of the rules of the language, independent of 
speaker's meaning: that is the 'reflexive' proposition in the sense of John Perry (a 
variant of Stalnaker's diagonal proposition).30 The main difference between the 
minimal proposition and the reflexive proposition is that the reflexive proposition is 
determined before the process of saturation takes place. The reflexive proposition 
can't be determined unless the sentence is tokened, but no substantial knowledge of 
the context of utterance is required to determine it. Thus an utterance u of the 
sentence 'I am French' expresses the reflexive proposition that the utterer of u is 
French. That it does not presuppose saturation is precisely what makes the reflexive 
proposition useful, since in most cases saturation proceeds by appeal to speaker's 
meaning. If one wants a proposition that's determined on purely semantic grounds, 
one had better not have it depend upon the process of saturation. 
Soames considers the possibility of equating 'what the sentence says' with the 
reflexive proposition or something close to it, but he rejects that option with the 
following argument: 
 
Consider... the first-person singular pronoun as it occurs in a sentence I am F. 
There is no such thing as "what this sentence says" independent of the context 
                                            
30 See R. Stalnaker, Context and Content, Oxford University Press 1999; J. Perry, Reference 
and Reflexivity, CSLI Publications 2001. 
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of utterance in which it is used. The competence conditions associated with 
the first-person singular pronoun guarantee that when I assertively utter the 
sentence, I use it to say something about me, whereas when you assertively 
utter it, you use it to say something about you. One might be tempted to 
suppose that there is some more general thing that the sentence "says" in 
every context — namely, the proposition expressed by the speaker is F (or 
some such thing). But this will not do. Our notion of "what a sentence says" is 
tied to what speakers who assertively utter the sentence say. Typically, when I 
assertively utter I am F, I  don't assert that I am speaking or using language at 
all. Further, the proposition that I assert when I assertively utter such a 
sentence may be true in a possible circumstance in which no one is using 
langage, and someone may believe this proposition without believing anything 
about me being a speaker. (Soames 2002: 104) 
 
Soames' main objection is that the alleged reflexive proposition is not (part of) what 
the speaker asserts. As we have seen, however, the same thing often holds for the 
minimal proposition posited by the syncretists. The advantage of the reflexive 
proposition over the minimal proposition is that it (the reflexive proposition) is 
determined solely by the rules of the language, independent of speaker's meaning, in 
such a way that there is a path to the reflexive proposition that does not go through 
the speaker's meaning; hence it does not matter much if that proposition can't be 
reached by abstraction from what the speaker asserts. 
The reflexive proposition is admittedly distinct from that which the speaker 
asserts – they have different possible worlds truth-conditions, as Soames points out 
— but why is this an objection? Are we not supposed to draw a distinction between 
the proposition expressed by the sentence and the proposition asserted by the 
speaker who utters that sentence? Note that we can, if we wish, incorporate into the 
reflexive proposition something to the effect that the linguistic mode of presentation 
associated with the first person pronoun will not be part of the proposition asserted, 
while the reference it contextually determines will be. Thus we might take the 
reflexive proposition expressed by an utterance u of 'I am French' to be the 
proposition that there is an x such that x utters u and u is true iff x is French. This 
comes as close as one can get to capturing, in propositional format, the information 
provided by the utterance in virtue solely of the linguistic meaning of the sentence 'I 
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am French'. (See Recanati 1993 for an analysis along those lines.) Such a reflexive 
proposition determines that the proposition contextually asserted by 'I am French' will 
consist of the reference of 'I' and the property of being French. The reflexive 
proposition is therefore 'tied to what speakers who assertively utter the sentence say', 
even if it is not (part of) what they say. 
I conclude that there may be a way of preserving the notion of 'what the 
sentence says', in the purely semantic sense, if one wants to; but it does not support 
the Syncretic View with its four levels. What characterizes the reflexive proposition is 
that, although fully propositional, it does not incorporate those contextual ingredients 
whose provision is linguistically mandated; it is much closer to the linguistic meaning 
of the sentence — indeed it is directly and immediately determined by the linguistic 
meaning of the sentence. Appealing to the reflexive proposition instead of the 
minimal proposition takes us back to the nonminimalist picture with its three basic 
levels: the linguistic meaning of the sentence (and the reflexive proposition it directly 
and immediately determines); what is said in the pragmatic sense; and what is 
implied or otherwise conveyed by the utterance.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Nonliteral uses 
 
 
It may be thought that the pragmatic approach to what is said advocated in the first 
four chapters of this book blurs the commonsensical distinction between what is 
(literally) said and what is nonliterally conveyed. What is said, in the pragmatic sense, 
already incorporates the derived, nonliteral values resulting from primary pragmatic 
processes of the optional variety. Is there still room for a contrast between literal and 
nonliteral speech? Sperber and Wilson think this distinction belongs to folklinguistics 
and must be repudiated (Wilson and Sperber 2002: 622-4). In this chapter, however, 
I will attempt to show that the ordinary, folk-theoretical notion of nonliteral use can be 
rescued. It corresponds to a range of phenomena which constitute a natural class, 
from a phenomenological point of view. 
 
5.1. Nonliteral uses as nonminimal departures from literal meaning 
 
Let us start with a sense of the phrase 'literal meaning' which is reasonably clear and 
raises no particular problem. In that sense, the literal meaning of a linguistic 
expression is its conventional meaning: the meaning it has in virtue of the 
conventions which are constitutive of the language. Thus understood literal meaning 
is a property of the expression-type; for it is the expression-type which the 
conventions of the language endow with a particular meaning. Literal meaning, in 
that sense, I will dub 't-literal meaning' (with 't' standing for 'type'), in order to 
distinguish the sense just introduced from other possible senses of the phrase 'literal 
meaning'. 
Particular occurrences of an expression also possess meaning. First, every 
occurrence inherits the meaning of the expression-type of which it is an occurrence. 
Every occurrence of a meaningful expression-type therefore possesses a t-literal 
meaning. Second, an occurrence also possesses a meaning which depends not 
merely upon the conventional significance of the expression-type, but also on 
features of the context of use. That meaning is, by definition, not t-literal. Insofar as it 
departs from the meaning of the expression-type, it may even be said to be 't-
 80 
nonliteral'. Yet it need not be 'nonliteral' in the ordinary sense. When we speak of 
'nonliteralness', in the ordinary sense, we mean that what is meant departs from t-
literal meaning in a fairly specific way. Not any old departure from t-literal meaning 
adds up to nonliteralness in the ordinary sense. 
 Consider the following example. Suppose that Paul is thirsty, and I tell you, 
while pointing to him: "He is thirsty". I thereby say of Paul that he is thirsty. What is 
thus said is not t-literal because the reference to Paul is something that is achieved 
by partly contextual means. The demonstrative pronoun 'he', qua expression-type, 
does not refer to Paul. The semantic conventions of the language do not assign that 
expression a reference, but merely a rule of use in virtue of which it may, in context, 
acquire a reference. Since the reference of the expression is not fixed by the 
semantic conventions of the language, independent of context, it is not part of the t-
literal meaning of the sentence. The proposition that Paul is thirsty (at the time of 
utterance) therefore counts as t-nonliteral, but of course no one wants to say that 
there is anything 'nonliteral' in the ordinary sense going on in that example (as 
described so far). The speaker is speaking literally, in the ordinary sense of the word. 
It may be that he is communicating something nonliterally by his utterance, but that 
can only be something different from the proposition that Paul is thirsty. If the speaker 
means that Paul should be offered a drink, that aspect of the meaning of his 
utterance will indeed count as nonliteral in the ordinary sense. The proposition that 
Paul should be offered a drink is conveyed without being literally expressed. 
 What is the difference between the proposition that Paul is thirsty and the 
proposition that he should be offered a drink, in the above example? The former 
departs from the t-literal meaning of the sentence since it includes something (the 
reference of 'he') which depends upon the context and not merely upon the 
conventional significance of the uttered words. Yet it is the words themselves which, 
in virtue of their conventional significance, make it necessary to appeal to context in 
order to assign a reference to the demonstrative. It is part of the t-literal meaning of 
indexical expressions that they should be assigned a reference in context. In 
interpreting indexical sentences, we go beyond what the conventions of the language 
give us, but that step beyond is still governed by the conventions of the language. 
The rule of use which constitutes the t-literal meaning of indexical expressions is 
what triggers the search for a contextual value. (This is the process I call 'saturation'.) 
The departure from t-literal meaning is therefore pre-determined by t-literal meaning. 
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Whenever that is so, I say that the departure is 'minimal'. When the meaning of an 
utterance only minimally departs from t-literal meaning, that meaning does not count 
as nonliteral in the ordinary sense. Only nonminimal departures make for 
nonliteralness in the ordinary sense. That is precisely what we have in the other case 
— when the speaker says that Paul is thirsty and implies that he should be offered a 
drink. For there is nothing in the sentence-type 'He is thirsty' that triggers the 
contextual generation of the implicature that Paul should be offered a drink. 
 Let me define: the meaning conveyed by an utterance is 'm-literal' iff it involves 
only minimal departures from t-literal meaning. (The case in which no departure is 
involved may count as a limiting case of m-literalness. I doubt that there are such 
cases, however.) Standard cases of nonliteralness, in the ordinary sense, are cases 
of m-nonliteralness: they involve nonminimal departures from t-literal meaning. Yet, 
as we shall see, not all cases of m-nonliteralness (i.e. not all cases involving such 
departures) count as 'nonliteral' in the ordinary sense. 
 
5.2. Nonliteral uses and secondary meaning 
 
More often than not, nonliteral meaning is secondary meaning — meaning derived 
from some more basic, primary meaning which it presupposes. In the above 
example, the proposition that Paul is thirsty is primary. By asserting that proposition, 
the speaker indirectly conveys something more: that Paul should be offered a drink. 
 Conversational implicatures and indirect speech acts obviously have a 
secondary character. Let us start with conversational implicatures. They are a special 
case of pragmatic implication. Pragmatic implications are the implications of actions. 
When I do something, my so doing may imply various things. For example, my taking 
an unmbrella implies that I think it will rain. Conversational implicatures are pragmatic 
implications of an act of speech. They fall under the schema: the speaker's saying 
that p implies that q. Not all implications of an act of speech are implicatures, 
however. My saying that Frege died in 1940 implies that I am ignorant, but that is not 
something I mean by my utterance. Arguably, a necessary condition for something to 
count as an implicature is that it be part of what the speaker means by his utterance. 
For that condition to be satisfied, the speaker must overtly intend the hearer to 
recognize the pragmatic implication of his utterance, and to recognize it as intended 
to be recognized. (Other conditions may have to be satisfied for a pragmatic 
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implication of a speech act to count as a genuine conversational implicature, but I will 
be content with what I have just said.) 
 Since what is conversationally implicated is implied by the speaker's saying 
what she says, it immediately follows that conversational implicatures have a 
secondary character. The speaker implies that q by saying that p. In order to derive 
the implicature, we need the premiss that the speaker has said what he has said; 
therefore we need to have identified the primary content of his utterance. 
 The same thing holds, even more obviously, for indirect speech acts. As their 
name indicates, indirect speech acts are performed 'indirectly', via the performance of 
another speech act which falls within the illocutionary-act potential of the uttered 
sentence and is said to be performed directly. For example, I may make a request 
either directly ('Pass me the salt, please') or indirectly, by asking a question ('Can you 
reach the salt?') or by making a statement ('I can't reach the salt'). Twenty years ago 
I suggested that indirect speech acts are nothing but a special case of conversational 
implicature, where the speaker's intention to perform the indirect speech act is 
conversationally implicated by his performance of the direct speech act (Recanati 
1979, Recanati 1987: 121-126). Be that as it may, everyone agrees that there is 
much in common between conversational implicatures and indirect speech acts. 
What they have in common is, in effect, their secondary character: The interpretation 
of both conversational implicatures and indirect speech acts involves an inference 
from the utterance's primary meaning to its derived meaning. 
 In both conversational implicatures and indirect speech acts, the meaning of 
the utterance involves something over and above its primary meaning — something 
whose derivation presupposes the primary meaning. In other cases, like irony, the 
situation is more complex. Suppose the speaker says 'Paul really is a fine friend', in a 
situation in which just the opposite is known to be the case. The speaker does not 
really say, or at least she does not assert, what she 'makes as if to say' (Grice's 
phrase). Something is lacking here, namely the force of a serious assertion. While in 
conversational implicature, the speaker asserts something and conveys something 
more as well, in irony the speaker does less than assert what she would normally be 
asserting by uttering the sentence which she actually utters. What the speaker does 
in the ironical case is merely to pretend to assert the content of her utterance. Still, 
there is an element of indirectness here, and we can maintain that irony also 
possesses a secondary character. By pretending to assert something, the speaker 
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conveys something else, just as, in the other types of case, by asserting something 
the speaker conveys something else. By pretending to say of Paul that he is a fine 
friend in a situation in which just the opposite is obviously true, the speaker manages 
to communicate that Paul is everything but a fine friend. She shows, by her 
utterance, how inappropriate it would be to ascribe to Paul the property of being a 
fine friend. The utterance has a primary meaning — it expresses the proposition that 
Paul is a fine friend; and it is by expressing that primary meaning (under the 
'pretense' mode, and without the force of a serious assertion) that the speaker is able 
to convey what she conveys. 
 Whenever the meaning conveyed by an utterance is secondary and derived 
from some antecedent meaning expressed by the utterance, it is 'nonliteral' in the 
ordinary sense. Let us therefore introduce a third notion alongside t-literalness and 
m-literalness: that of p-literal meaning, where 'p' stands for 'primary'. An interpretation 
for an utterance is p-literal just in case it directly results from interpreting the 
sentence (in context), without being derived from some antecedently determined 
meaning by an inferential process akin to that which is involved in conversational 
implicatures, indirect speech acts, etc. 
 The question I want to raise concerns the relation between p-literalness and 
m-literalness. We have seen that a meaning is m-literal if it departs from the t-literal 
meaning of the sentence only minimally. Now we have another notion, that of p-literal 
meaning. To what extent do they coincide? In the example I used ('He is thirsty'), the 
proposition that Paul is thirsty was both m-literal and p-literal, in contrast to the other 
proposition (the implicature), which was neither. How general is this coincidence? 
More specifically: Is a primary meaning necessarily a meaning that only minimally 
departs from the t-literal meaning of the sentence? A positive answer to that question 
tends to be assumed in the literature on this topic, but it should be clear, from what I 
said in previous chapters, that I think that is a mistake. 
 
5.3. Nonminimal departures without secondariness 
 
There are, I hold, meanings that are primary yet involve nonminimal departures from 
the conventional meaning of the sentence. Examples abound in the pragmatic 
literature. Let us start with two conjunctive utterances which have been analysed and 
discussed many times: 
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(1) They got married and had many children 
(2) The policeman raised his hand and stopped the car 
 
 We naturally interpret (1) as depicting a situation in which marriage took place 
before the coming of the children. Yet, according to Grice, this is not encoded in the 
meaning of the sentence. Not only is the temporal ordering of the events not part of t-
literal meaning; it is not even part of m-literal meaning.31 Remember how m-literal 
meaning was characterized: m-literal meaning is not fully conventional since it 
involves, or may involve, contextual ingredients (e.g. assignment of values to 
indexicals), yet it departs from t-literal meaning only minimally, where a 'minimal' 
departure from t-literal meaning is a departure that is itself governed by the 
conventions of the language. But the temporal order between the events described 
by the conjuncts in (1) is not something that the t-literal meaning of the sentence 
forces an interpreter to specify. There are conjunctive utterances similar in all formal 
respects to (1) which can be given a quite satisfactory interpretation without 
specifying that order. Grice concludes that the temporal ordering of the events, 
though strongly suggested by the order of the conjuncts, is not part of 'what is said' 
by the utterance. ('What is said' is Grice's term for the m-literal meaning.) The 
contextual provision of that component of the meaning of the utterance constitutes a 
'nonminimal' departure from t-literal meaning. 
 Example (2) is similar. As Rumelhart pointed out, we naturally interpret the 
sentence as depicting a scene in which the stopping of the car was caused by the 
raising of the policeman's hand. Moreover, we interpret the relevant form of causation 
as involving no direct physical contact between hand and car but rather the mediation 
of intentional states: the raising of the policeman's hand is understood to have 
caused the driver (i) to recognize the policeman's intention that she should stop the 
car and (ii) to stop the car so as to comply with the policeman's request. In other 
words, we understand (2) as saying that the policeman stopped the car by signalling 
to the driver that she was to stop. Yet neither the form of causation, nor even the 
existence of a causal link between hand-raising and car-stopping, is encoded in 
sentence (2). Nor is the contextual provision of those elements of utterance meaning 
                                            
31  This is controversial. See §6.2 for an alternative analysis. 
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required in virtue of some aspect of the t-literal meaning of the sentence. Once again 
we find that the interpretation of the utterance involves nonminimal departures from t-
literal meaning. 
 Still, I maintain that the meanings thus conveyed by (1) and (2) are p-literal. In 
conversational implicatures, indirect speech acts, irony etc., there is something which 
is said (or which the speaker 'makes as if to say'), and something else that is implied 
by saying what is said. This distinction between two separate components, one 
dependent upon the other, is actually part of the meaning of the utterance: whoever 
understands the utterance realizes that something is said and something else is 
implied by saying it. For example, if I am asked whether I talked to Freddy, and I 
reply 
 
I don't talk to crooks 
 
a normal hearer will understand me as saying that I don't talk to crooks and thereby 
implying that I did not talk to Freddy. (Someone who does not understand that does 
not understand the utterance.) Moreover, as Grice insisted, the understander will 
grasp the inferential connection between what is said (or the saying of it) and what is 
implied. (In this particular case, the connection involves the premiss: 'Freddy is a 
crook'.) Faced with (1) and (2), however, an interpreter does not construct an m-
literal interpretation — an interpretation that differs only minimally from t-literal 
meaning — and use it to infer the m-nonliteral elements. The m-nonliteral 
interpretations are arrived at directly, as a result of the interaction of the t-literal 
meaning of the words (and constructions), salient features of  the speech situation, 
expectations created by the discourse, schemata stored in memory and evoked by 
the words, etc. As I pointed out in Chapters 1 to 3, there is no inference here, or at 
least no inference of which the interpreters themselves are aware. 
 Consider a third (and last) example which I already mentioned several times: 
 
(3)  You are not going to die 
 
In the context imagined by Kent Bach, a boy is crying because of a minor cut and her 
mother utters (3). What she means is: 'You're not going to die from that cut'. But m-
literally, Bach points out, the utterance expresses the proposition that the kid will not 
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die tout court. The extra element contextually provided (the implicit reference to the 
cut) is not a component of m-literal meaning: it is not triggered by anything in the 
sentence, nor is it necessary for the utterance to express a complete proposition. On 
the other hand, that element is not 'inferred' on the basis of m-literal meaning: the 
hearer does not construct the m-literal interpretation, realize that the utterance, thus 
interpreted, would violate Grice's maxim of quality by entailing something blatantly 
false (that the child is immortal), and infer what the speaker's actually means; rather, 
she directly understands the mother's utterance as characterizing the situation 
created by the cut (Recanati 1999). Once again, the conveyed meaning turns out to 
be m-nonliteral, but p-literal nonetheless. 
 
5.4. The transparency condition 
 
In the sort of case I have just discussed (the policeman example, etc.), the 
interpretation of the utterance goes well beyond what the conventions of the 
language dictate. The conventional meaning of the sentence is not only 'completed' 
from the bottom up by assigning contextual values to indexicals and other free 
variables, it is also enriched in a top-down manner by appealing to background 
assumptions and world-knowledge. That process of enrichment yields an output that 
is not m-literal, yet there is nothing nonliteral in the ordinary sense in that output. 
Nonliteral interpretations (in the ordinary sense) are 'special', by definition, but there 
is nothing special about the interpretations of utterances like (2). Utterance 
interpretation, in general, proceeds by matching the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence to the particular situation or sort of situation the speaker intends to talk 
about. The output of this matching process typically is a richer meaning, as (2) clearly 
illustrates: a number of features which are not linguistically encoded are nonetheless 
incorporated into the described scene as a result of top down pressures. This is the 
phenomenon of sense modulation, to be described in Chapter 9. 
 In contrast, there is something special about the interpretation of p-nonliteral 
utterances; it is a two-step procedure instead of being a one-step procedure. The 
interpreter first determines the utterance's primary meaning, then infers some 
additional meaning. This two-step process (which may be short-circuited or 
conventionalized — a complication which I shall ignore) does not take place all the 
time: it takes place only when the speaker conveys something indirectly. But the 
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process of enrichment in virtue of which what the speaker means by an utterance 
goes beyond the conventional significance of his words is universal: there is no 
utterance, however explicit, whose interpretation does not involve adjusting the 
conventional meanings of words to the particulars of the situation talked about. 
Communication would be impossible if things were not so. 
 The 'special' character of nonliteral communication is not the whole story, 
however. Even if there were something special about m-nonliteralness — if, say, 
most uses of words were m-literal — a use of words would still not count as nonliteral 
in the ordinary sense merely in virtue of the fact that it is m-nonliteral. A use of words 
counts as nonliteral in the ordinary sense only if there is something special about that 
use that is, or can be, perceived by the language users themselves. That is so 
because nonliteralness is a feature of the interpretation of utterances, and the 
interpretation of utterances is something that is bound to be available to the language 
users who do the interpreting. Now m-nonliteralness per se is not transparent to the 
language users. The speaker and hearer need not be aware that in their 
understanding of the uttered words they are going beyond what the conventions of 
the language dictate. It is not part of their competence to reflect upon the complex 
cognitive processes through which the meaning of an utterance gets built up from a 
number of distinct sources. On the other hand, we have seen that whenever a 
meaning is accessed via an inference from a primary meaning, as in (genuine) 
conversational implicatures, the language users themselves are aware of the 
distinction between the two layers of meaning as well as of the connection between 
them. In other words, p-nonliteralness is transparent to the language users; hence it 
counts as nonliteralness in the ordinary sense. (This transparency is not a contingent 
property of p-nonliteralness. It is definitive of p-nonliteralness that the sort of 
inference at issue is conducted at the 'personal', rather than 'sub-personal', level and 
is therefore available to the language users.) 
 To sum up, for something to count as nonliteral in the ordinary sense it must 
not only go beyond the conventional significance of the uttered words (m-
nonliteralness), but it must be felt as such: the language users must be aware that 
the conveyed meaning exceeds the conventional significance of the words. That 
condition I dub the 'transparency condition'. It is satisfied whenever the conveyed 
meaning has a secondary character, as in conversational implicatures and indirect 
speech acts. 
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5.5. Varieties of nonliteral meaning 
 
Is secondariness a necessary, or merely a sufficient condition of transparency? If it is 
necessary, then only p-nonliteral instances of m-nonliteral meaning (conversational 
implicatures, indirect speech acts, etc.) will count as nonliteral in the ordinary sense. 
If it is merely sufficient, then presumably there will be p-literal instances of m-
nonliteral meaning which will count as nonliteral in the ordinary sense, because the 
transparency condition has been satisfied through something other than indirectness. 
I see no reason to deny that there are such instances. 
 The paradigm case of nonliteral meaning is metaphor. Now metaphor, in its 
most central varieties, I count as p-literal. To re-use an example from Chapter 2, if I 
say that the ATM swallowed my credit card, I speak metaphorically; there can be no 
real 'swallowing' on the part of an ATM, but merely something that resembles 
swallowing. Still, an ordinary hearer readily understands what is said by such an 
utterance, without going through a two-step procedure involving the prior 
computation of the 'literal' meaning of the utterance (whatever that may be) and a 
secondary inference to the actual meaning. Knowing the linguistic meaning of 
'swallow', and knowing what sometimes happens with ATMs, the hearer 
unreflectively constructs the sense in which the ATM can be said to 'swallow' the card 
by adjusting the meaning of the word to the situation talked about. This is not very 
different from what goes on when the meaning of words is enriched so as to fit the 
specific situation of discourse, as in the policeman example from §5.3. In both cases, 
as Langacker persuasively argued, the situation talked about is 'categorized' by 
means of the words which are used to describe it. In enrichment the situation talked 
about is a straightforward instantiation of the schema encoded in the words, which 
schema therefore gets 'elaborated' through its application to the situation. That 
defines what Langacker calls full schematicity: "the target is compatible with the 
sanctioning unit [= the word, with its conventional meaning], and is therefore judged 
by a speaker to be an unproblematic instantiation of the category it defines" 
(Langacker 1987: 68). In contrast, partial schematicity occurs when "there is some 
conflict between the specifications of the sanctioning and target structures, so that 
the former can be construed as schematic for the latter only with a certain degree of 
strain" (Langacker 1987: 69): 
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Because partial schematicity involves conflicting specifications, the 
sanctioning and target structures cannot merge into a single, consistent 
conceptualization; in a categorizing judgement of the form [[SS ---> TS]], the 
discrepancy between SS and TS keeps them at least partially distinct. The 
result is a bipartite conceptualization including what we recognize as a literal 
sense (SS) and a figurative sense (TS). On the other hand, nothing prevents 
the sanctioning and target structures from merging into a unified 
conceptualization when there is full consistency between their specifications. 
In the schematic relationship [[SS ---> TS]], SS is in effect 'swallowed up' by 
TS, since all of the specifications of the former are implicit in the latter, which 
simply carries them down to a greater level of precision. (Langacker 1987: 92-
93) 
 
 The picture that emerges is this. As words are applied, in context, to specific 
situations, their meaning is adjusted. Depending on whether the conventional 
meaning is fully or only partially schematic for the situation talked about, adjustment 
will take one of two forms: sense elaboration (enrichment), or sense extension 
(loosening). In sense elaboration the meaning carried by the words is made more 
specific through the interaction with contextual factors. In sense extension, those 
dimensions of meaning which stand in conflict to the specifications of the target are 
filtered out, but they remain somewhat active and may generate a feeling of 
discrepancy between the evoked schema and the sense constructed by (partially) 
applying the schema to the situation at hand. That feeling, like the conflict which 
underlies it, comes in degrees. Hence there is a continuum between ordinary cases 
of sense extension that we don't even perceive (the ATM swallowing the credit card) 
and more dramatic cases of metaphor whose nonliteral character cannot be 
ignored.32 The more noticeable the conflict, the more transparent the departure from 
t-literal meaning will be to the language users. Beyond a certain threshold, cases of 
sense extension will therefore count as special and nonliteral in the ordinary sense, 
despite their p-literal character. They will count as figurative uses of language (Fig. 
                                            
32  On this continuum, see D. Sperber and D. Wilson,'Loose talk', Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 86, 1986, pp. 153-71. 
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5.1). 
 
[Figure 5.1 about here] 
 
 Irony and nonserious uses of language are another type of case in which, I 
think, the transparency condition is satisfied through something other than 
indirectness. To be sure, irony possesses a secondary character (§5.2): By 
pretending to say of Paul that he is a fine friend in a situation in which just the 
opposite is obviously true, the speaker manages to communicate that Paul is 
everything but a fine friend. She shows, by her utterance, how inappropriate it would 
be to ascribe to Paul the property of being a fine friend. But let us put aside what is 
thus implied by saying something ironically — let us concentrate on the primary 
meaning of the ironical utterance. In order to understand the utterance at the primary 
level one must recognize that the act of asserting that Paul is a fine friend is staged 
or simulated rather than actually performed. And that means that one must discern 
two 'layers' within the primary meaning of the utterance: the surface speech act wich 
the speaker pretends to perform, and the ironical act of staging the performance of 
that speech act (Clark 1996: 353-4). This layering, internal to the primary meaning of 
the utterance, characterizes 'staged communicative acts', a large family which 
includes not only irony but also "sarcasm, teasing, overstatement, understatement, 
rhetorical questions, and their relatives" (Clark 1996: 369). Insofar as the duality of 
layers is internal to the (primary) meaning of the utterance and is recognized by 
whoever understands it, the transparency condition is eo ipso satisfied: the utterance 
is intuitively recognized as special, as exhibiting a duality which is absent from 
standard ('serious') uses of language. That duality, characteristic of staged 
communicative acts, is a third type of duality, distinct both from the 'two-step 
procedure' at work in the recovery of secondary meanings, and from the 'bipartite 
conceptualization' induced by metaphorical discrepancy. (Of course, nothing 
prevents a single utterance from exhibiting the three types of duality, in various 
patterns of interaction.) 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
The literal/nonliteral distinction turns out to cover two quite different things: 
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• For the semanticist, the literal meaning of an expression is the semantic value 
which the conventions of the language assign to that expression ('with respect to 
context', if the expression is indexical). Whenever the meaning which the expression 
actually conveys departs from that literal meaning, it is said to be 'nonliteral'. 
 
• In the ordinary sense of the term, nonliteral meaning contrasts with normal 
meaning. Nonliteral meaning is special,  it involves a form of deviance or departure 
from the norm; a form of deviance or departure which must be transparent to the 
language users. 
 
 Both distinctions are legitimate, but they should be kept separate. Yet they are 
standardly confused. The culprit here is the tacit, but very widespread, assumption 
that the m-literal meaning of words is what, in context, they normally express. In 
semantics (as opposed to psychology), departures from m-literal meaning tend to be 
treated as special, on the pattern of figurative language, nonserious speech or 
indirect communication. I think that assumption is mistaken. In context, words 
systematically express meanings that are richer than (or otherwise different from) 
what the conventions of the language dictate. Contrary to what formal semanticists 
tend to assume, the (intuitive) truth-conditions of our utterances are not 
compositionally determined by the meanings of words and their syntactic 
arrangement, in a strict bottom-up manner. They are shaped by contextual 
expectations and world-knowledge to a very large extent. That is true of all 
utterances, however 'literal' they are (in the ordinary sense). If we abstract from those 
top-down factors, what we get — the utterance's m-literal meaning — no longer 
corresponds to the intuitive truth-conditions which the language users themselves 
associate with their own utterances. In other words, there is a gap between the 
deliverances of semantic theory and the intuitive content of utterances. That gap is 
bridged by pragmatic processes which take place normally and do not generate 
'nonliteral meanings', except in special cases. 
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Chapter 6 
 
From Literalism to Contextualism 
 
 
6.1. Five positions 
 
I take it that there currently are five basic positions concerning the role of context in 
the determination of truth-conditions. I have already attempted to refute two of these 
positions. Before proceeding, it will be helpful to identify all five, and to take a bird's 
eye view of the theoretical landscape. 
The five positions I am about to list can be ordered on a scale, one end of 
which is occupied by the extreme position I call Literalism, and the other end by 
another extreme position, which I call Contextualism. The debate between Literalism 
and Contextualism was at the forefront of attention in the philosophy of language of 
the middle of the twentieth century. It is widely believed to have been settled (in 
favour of Literalism) but I think that is a mistake. The alleged refutations of 
Contextualism that have been offered actually refute nothing; while Literalism strikes 
me as by and large indefensible. So I think the history of twentieth-century philosophy 
of language ought to be rewritten. I will not do so in this book, however. 
What is the Literalism/Contextualism debate exactly about? The basic 
question, I think, is whether we may legitimately ascribe truth-conditional content (the 
property of "saying" something, of expressing a thought or a proposition) to natural-
language sentences, or whether is it only speech acts, utterances in context, that 
have content in a basic, underived sense. Consider the type of formal language 
philosophers of the first half of the century were concerned with. In these languages, 
sentences are given an interpretation that is fixed and does not depend on the 
context of use. Natural language sentences, by contrast, express a complete thought 
(say something definite) only with respect to a context of utterance — in many cases 
at least. This difference between natural language and a certain type of formal 
language is well-known, and no one has ever attempted to deny it. But there was 
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disagreement as to the importance of the distinction. Contextualists33 held that the 
difference between the two types of language was all-important; natural-language 
sentences, according to them, were essentially context-sensitive, and did not have 
determinate truth-conditions. Literalists, on the other hand, believed that the 
difference between the two types of language could be abstracted from through a 
legitimate idealisation. 
 The literalist idealisation was based on the following claim: 
 
(L) For every statement that can be made using a context-sensitive sentence in a 
given context, there is an eternal sentence that can be used to make the same 
statement in any context. 
 
To obtain an eternal sentence from a context-sensitive one, one has only to replace 
the indexical constituents of the latter by non-indexical constituents with the same 
semantic value. Owing to (L), the difference between natural languages and the 
formal languages in which the context of utterance plays no role turns out not to be 
essential. Using natural language, we could behave so as to abolish the difference - 
simply by choosing to utter only eternal sentences. The reason why we also (and 
mainly) use context-sensitive sentences is only that this enables us "to speak far 
more concisely than otherwise" (Katz 1977: 20).34 
                                            
33   The contextualists I am talking about here are the so-called ordinary language 
philosophers: Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, etc. (with the exception of Grice, who was not 
a contextualist). 
34 Note that (L) is much weaker than another principle of effability, namely (T): 
(T) Every entertainable thought may be expressed by means of an eternal sentence the 
sense of which corresponds exactly to that thought. 
Many philosophers have (rightly) argued against (T). For example, Sperber and Wilson write: 
It seems plausible that in our internal language we often fix time and space references 
not in terms of universal coordinates, but in terms of a private logbook and an ego-
centred map; furthermore, most kinds of reference — to people and events for instance 
— can be fixed in terms of these private time and space coordinates. Thoughts which 
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 The contextualists denied (L), if only because they did not really believe that 
there were eternal sentences. Against eternal sentences, it can be argued, on 
contextualist grounds, that fundamental semantic mechanisms such as reference, 
quantification, or predication are essentially context-sensitive: there is no way to 
refer, or to predicate, or to quantify without relying on features of the context of 
utterance. It follows that sentences, by themselves, don't express propositions. 
 Whatever we think of Contextualism, there are not many amateurs of eternal 
sentences nowadays. It is more or less accepted that natural language sentences 
are irreducibly context-sensitive. But there are fallback positions for Literalism. The 
strongest fallback position consists in acknowledging the extent of context-
dependence, while insisting that it still is the sentence which, in virtue of the rules of 
the langage, expresses a proposition with respect to the context. This semantic 
notion of the content of a sentence (with respect to context) is distinct from the 
pragmatic notion of the content of a speech act. For it is the linguistic rules, not the 
speaker's beliefs and intentions, which fix the content of the sentence with respect to 
context. So Literalism in its modern form holds that the truth-conditions of a sentence 
are fixed by the rules of the language quite independent of speaker's meaning. 
So construed, Literalism must be rejected because, as we have seen, 
                                                                                                                                        
contain such private references could not be encoded in natural languages but could 
only be incompletely represented. (Sperber & Wilson 1986b: 192). 
(L) is not subject to this criticism. (L) says only that every statement can be made using an 
eternal sentence, not that every thought can be literally expressed by an eternal sentence. 
Now, a statement may be of an object, in the sense that it may be about a certain object 
without involving a particular mode of presentation of that object. Such a de re statement 
corresponds to a class of thoughts, each involving a particular (and, perhaps, private) mode of 
presentation of the object referred to. The fact that, in the thought, there are private modes of 
presentation attached to the objects referred to implies that there are thoughts that cannot be 
totally and adequately represented by means of eternal sentences, but does not imply that 
there are statements that cannot be made by means of eternal sentences: statements are public 
objects at a more abstract level than thoughts, and as such do not contain private modes of 
presentation. 
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semantic underdeterminacy makes it unavoidable to appeal to speaker's meaning in 
determining truth-conditions. Even though there still are theorists who argue in its 
favour, I think Literalism is clearly a nonstarter and I will not be concerned with it in 
what follows. 
The next two fallback positions correspond to weaker forms of Literalism. 
According to them, we need to appeal to speaker's meaning in determining truth-
conditions, but we do so only when the sentence itself demands it. In other words, 
optional pragmatic processes are not allowed to affect what is said; what is said 
obeys the Minimalist constraint (Chapter 1). 
The weaker of the two positions in question is what I dubbed the Syncretic 
View (Chapter 4). It acknowledges the fact that what is said, in the intuitive sense, 
may be affected by primary pragmatic processes of the optional variety; but it draws 
a distinction between what is said in the intuitive sense (the input to secondary 
pragmatic processes), and what is strictly and literally said. What is strictly and 
literally said, at least, obeys the Minimalist constraint. 
The other position is not as weak as that. For reasons that will become 
apparent, I call it Indexicalism. It denies that what is said, in the intuitive sense, can 
be affected by pragmatic processes of the optional variety. No contextual influences 
are allowed to affect the intuitive truth-conditional content of an utterance unless the 
sentence itself demands it. This position can be thought of as a research programme: 
whenever it is argued that the truth-conditions of an utterance are affected by context 
in a top-down manner, the indexicalist feels compelled to re-analyse the example so 
as to show that the pragmatic process at issue is an instance of saturation after all. 
So far I have listed three positions. Literalism denies that speaker's meaning 
plays any role in fixing the truth-conditions of sentences. Indexicalism allows 
speaker's meaning to play a role, but only when there is a slot to be filled in logical 
form; no top down influences can affect truth-conditions. The Syncretic View 
acknowledges such influences, but limits their effects to what is said in the intuitive 
sense, as opposed to what is strictly and literally said (the minimal proposition). 
The next two positions I want to consider fully acknowledge the role of 
pragmatic processes, including pragmatic processes of the optional variety, in the 
determination of what is said. What is said is taken to be pragmatically determined, in 
a way that is sensitive to top-down influences. In contrast to the Syncretic View, 
those positions do not find it necessary to postulate a level of content that is 
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unaffected by top-down factors. So they fall squarely on the contextualist side. They 
differ from each other in their respective attitudes towards the minimal proposition 
posited by the Syncretic View. One position, which I call Quasi-Contextualism, simply 
considers the minimal proposition as a theoretically useless entity which plays no role 
in communication (§4.5). Contextualism tout court goes much further and denies that 
the notion even makes sense. 
To sum up, the five positions in the ballpark are: 
 
Literalism 
Indexicalism 
The Syncretic View 
Quasi-contextualism 
Contextualism 
 
Literalism and the Syncretic View have been explicitly criticized, and I have implicitly 
endorsed Quasi-Contextualism in arguing against the Syncretic View in Chapter 4. 
So two positions remain to be introduced and discussed: Indexicalism, and 
Contextualism. 
 
6.2. Indexicalism 
 
The pragmatics literature is replete with examples in which what is said in the intuitive 
sense seems to be affected by pragmatic processes of the optional (top-down) 
variety — what King and Stanley call 'strong pragmatic effects'. Yet, as Steven 
Levinson (one of the providers of examples) puts it, "there will always be doubt about 
whether a better semantic analysis of the relevant construction might not 
accommodate the apparent pragmatic intrusion in some other way" (Levinson 2000: 
214). Indeed, in most cases, there are different ways of analysing a given example. 
Some of those analyses may well suggest that the pragmatic process at issue is not 
a primary pragmatic process of the optional variety, but a regular instance of 
saturation. 
 Consider the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction. I may utter the 
sentence 'Most students are male' in order to assert that most students in my class 
are male. This is arguably a case in which what is asserted goes beyond what is 
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linguistically encoded, for I tacitly refer to my class. Moreover, the additional 
ingredient in the meaning of the utterance which is thereby provided seems to be 
optional, for there is a possible reading of 'Most students are male' in which no such 
contextual restriction of the domain occurs. (I call that an 'absolute' reading for the 
quantifier phrase.) So quantifier domain restriction is a prima facie candidate for the 
status of 'strong pragmatic effect': a truth-conditionally relevant aspect of what is 
asserted seems to result from an optional pragmatic process. There are many ways 
of analysing the phenomenon, however. We may consider that the predicate 'student' 
is contextually enriched and expresses the ad hoc concept 
STUDENT_IN_MY_CLASS. We may also consider the class as an unarticulated 
constituent of what is said, like the location of rain in 'It's raining'. But it is also 
possible to consider that, in the logical form of the sentence, there is a slot to be 
contextually filled: a variable corresponding to the domain of quantification, which 
variable can be associated either with the determiner or (more plausibly perhaps) 
with the common noun 'student'. On such a view the semantic analysis of the 
sentence-type will reveal a hidden quasi-indexical component, namely the domain 
variable d: 
 
Mostd (students) (are male) 
Most (studentsd) (are male) 
 
The suggestion is that, when the sentence is uttered, a value has to be contextually 
assigned to the variable, thereby restricting the domain of quantification. If we take 
this line, we treat quantifier domain restriction as, in effect, a case of saturation 
(Stanley and Szabo 2000). In this framework, the cases in which the quantifier 
phrase is given an 'absolute' reading are treated as cases in which a value is 
contextually assigned to the variable, but intuitively no restriction takes place 
because the contextually selected domain is the whole universe (or the entire domain 
relevant to the variable, in case we use sorted variables). 
Or consider the examples of enrichment with which our discussion of 
Minimalism began: 
 
I've had breakfast <this morning> 
You're not going to die <from that cut> 
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The contextually provided ingredients (within angle brackets) seem to correspond to 
no element in the sentence; they are putative 'unarticulated constituents'. But this is 
not the only possible analysis. According to event semantics, such sentences 
quantify over events, hence it is possible to extend the analysis in terms of quantifier 
domain restriction to them. In 'The pragmatics of what is said' (Recanati 1989) I 
suggested that the intuitive difference between 'I've had breakfast' ('restricted' 
reading) and 'I've been to Tibet' ('absolute' reading) can be handled in those terms: 
 
In both cases what is conveyed by virtue of linguistic meaning alone is that, in 
some temporal domain x prior to the time of utterance,35 there is a certain 
event, viz. the speaker's having breakfast or his going to Tibet; but in the first 
case, the time interval is contextually restricted to the day of utterance, while in 
the second case the relevant interval is more extended and covers the 
speaker's life (up to the time of utterance). (Recanati 1989/1991: 104) 
 
If that is so then the intuitive understanding of 'I've had breakfast' in the relevant 
context results from saturation rather than free enrichment. 36 The same sort of 
thing can be said about the other example. If the sentence is interpreted as 
quantifying over events ('you're not going to die' = 'there is no future event e such 
that e is your death'), we can say that the contextually selected domain of 
quantification is the set of events which causally follow from the cut. In my 1989 
paper I offered a similar analysis for Sperber and Wilson's favorite example of 
enrichment, 'It will take us some time to get there'. 
 Another type of example for which two sorts of analysis are possible involves 
the temporal understanding of conjunction, as in: 
                                            
35  The domain in question is "a set of events defined by a time interval". 
36  The same sort of analysis can be provided even if we don't take the sentence to quantify 
over events, but, in virtue of the tense it contains, over times. 'I've had breakfast' then says that 
there is a past time t such that the speaker has breakfast at t. The contextually specified 
domain of quantification now is a set of times (rather than a set of events). Like the event-
theoretic analysis, this analysis can be extended to 'You're not going to die'. 
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They got married and had many children 
 
In chapter 5 I said that the temporal order of the events which is intuitively part of the 
truth-conditions corresponds to nothing in the sentence and is provided through free 
enrichment. Indeed there is a possible reading of that sentence (or formally similar 
sentences) in which no temporal order is implied. But an alternative analysis in terms 
of saturation is available (Carston 1988). Barbara Partee famously suggested that the 
role of the past tense is, or may be, to refer to a particular time in the past.37 Let's 
take that for granted. Then, to determine what is said by means of the sentence 
'They got married and had many children', the hearer must assign a reference to 
each of the referring expressions, including the past tense 'got married' and 'had'. 
Just as pragmatic principles are employed in ascertaining the referent of 'they', so, 
Carston says, they are used in assigning temporal reference. The hearer goes 
beyond the strict semantic content of the sentence uttered, and on the basis of 
contextual assumptions and pragmatic principles recovers from 'They got married 
and had many children' a representation such as 'John and Mary got married at t and 
had many children at t+n'. 
 
t is some more or less specific time prior to the time of utterance and t+n is 
some more or less specific time, later than t. The temporal ordering of the 
events described in the conjuncts is thus treated as a by-product of the 
reference assignment process involved in determining [what is said] (Carston 
1988:161). 
 
As I pointed out in 'The pragmatics of what is said', this analysis faces difficulties 
when the past tense is replaced by the present perfect, as in Jonathan Cohen's 
example ('The old king has died of a heart attack and a republic has been declared'). 
That is so because the present perfect can hardly be considered as referring to a 
specific time. But if, plausibly enough, we construe the present perfect as quantifying 
over times, we can extend the analysis in terms of quantifier domain restriction to that 
                                            
37   See B. Partee, 'Some structural analogies between tenses and pronouns in English', 
Journal of Philosophy 70, 1973, p. 602-3. 
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type of example also. The sentence will be understood as saying that there is a time t 
in the past such that the old king dies of a heart attack at t, and there is a time t' in 
the past such that a republic is declared at t'. If the domain to which the second 
quantifier is indexed is contextually restricted to the set of times that are posterior to t, 
we account for the relevant temporal reading. So it seems that there always is a way 
of analysing Gricean examples of temporally understood conjunctions in terms of 
saturation rather than enrichment. 
 Examples can be multiplied at will. The indexicalist position consists in 
systematically offering an analysis in terms of saturation, whenever the intuitive truth-
conditions of an utterance are affected by contextual factors. As Jason Stanley, the 
chief representative of this research program, puts it, "all effects of extra-linguistic 
context on the truth-conditions of an assertion are traceable to elements in the actual 
syntactic structure of the sentence uttered" (Stanley 2000: 391). To maintain such a 
sweeping claim, one must deal with every putative counterexample, in order to 
establish, in each case, the conclusion that "we have been given no reason to 
abandon the thesis that the only truth-conditional role of context is the resolution of 
indexicality, broadly construed" (Stanley 2000 : 401; see also Stanley and Szabo 
2000, King and Stanley forthcoming.) 
 At this point the debate becomes technical (and, fortunately, empirical). It's a 
matter of detailed analyses of particular examples (or classes of examples). Without 
going into those details, it is fair to say that the indexicalist starts with a significant 
disadvantage, for he makes a universal claim while his opponent only makes an 
existential claim. For his opponent to win, it is sufficient to produce one convincing 
example of a strong pragmatic effect. But the indexicalist is condemned to deal with 
all putative cases, and to show that they are not what they seem to be. A hopeless 
task, unless the indexicalist can develop methods, or strategies, for dealing with large 
classes of cases at once. Unsurprisingly, such general methods are what the 
indexicalist is after. Stanley has come up with one strategy, in particular, that seems 
very powerful and which he has applied both to the case of quantifier domain 
restriction and to 'unarticulated constituents' more generally. In Chapter 7 I will 
discuss that strategy and show that it is not as successful as Stanley thinks. 
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6.3. Contextualism 
 
According to Contextualism — a provocative view which certainly deserves to be 
explored — there is no level of meaning which is both (i) propositional (truth-
evaluable) and (ii) minimalist, i.e. unaffected by top-down factors. As I put it in Direct 
Reference, "no proposition could be expressed without some unarticulated 
constituent being contextually provided" (Recanati 1993: 260). Such a radical view 
has been defended by Charles Travis, John Searle, and a few others. Searle, for 
example, argues that a determinate proposition can be expressed only against a 
background of unarticulated assumptions. He gives the following example of 
unarticulated assumptions at work in understanding a simple utterance: 
 
Suppose I go into the restaurant and order a meal. Suppose I say, speaking 
literally, 'Bring me a steak with fried potatoes.' (...) I take it for granted that they 
will not deliver the meal to my house, or to my place of work. I take it for 
granted that the steak will not be encased in concrete, or petrified. It will not be 
stuffed into my pockets or spread over my head. But none of these 
assumptions was made explicit in the literal utterance. (Searle 1992: 180) 
 
Though unarticulated, those assumptions contribute to determining the intuitive 
conditions of satisfaction (obedience-conditions, truth-conditions, etc.) of the 
utterance. The order 'Bring me a steak with fried potatoes' does not count as satisfied 
if the steak is delivered, encased in concrete, to the customer's house. It is mutually 
manifest to both the hearer and the speaker that the speaker intends the ordered 
meal to be placed in front of him on the restaurant table he is sitting at, etc. 
 In that sort of case a syncretist will insist that what is strictly and literally said is 
free from the relevant assumptions: the order 'Bring me a steak with fried potatoes' 
would be literally satisfied if the steak was delivered, encased in concrete, to the 
customer's house. (See Soame's treatment of the 'coffee' example in §4.4.) That is 
precisely what the contextualist denies. Another example given by Searle will help to 
make sense of the contextualist position. The word 'cut' is not ambiguous, Searle 
says, yet it makes quite different contributions to the truth-conditions of the utterance 
in  'Bill cut the grass' and 'Sally cut the cake'. That is because background 
assumptions play a role in fixing satisfaction-conditions, and different background 
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assumptions underlie the use of 'cut' in connection with grass and cakes respectively. 
We (defeasibly) assume that grass is cut in a certain way, and cakes in another way. 
The assumed way of cutting finds its way into the utterance's truth-conditions: 
 
Though the occurrence of the word "cut" is literal in [both] utterances..., and 
though the word is not ambiguous, it determines different sets of truth 
conditions for the different sentences. The sort of thing that constitutes cutting 
the grass is quite different from, e.g., the sort of thing that constitutes cutting a 
cake. One way to see this is to imagine what constitutes obeying the order to 
cut something. If someone tells me to cut the grass and I rush out and stab it 
with a knife, or if I am ordered to cut the cake and I run over it with a 
lawnmower, in each case I will have failed to obey the order. That is not what 
the speaker meant by his literal and serious utterance of the sentence. (Searle 
1980: 222-223) 
 
Now the syncretist will insist that a sentence such as 'Cut the grass' expresses 
something that has literal conditions of satisfaction quite independent of any 
background assumption; something very abstract, involving the constant, 
underspecified meaning of 'cut' and not the definite sense it takes on particular uses 
(or types of use). Stabbing the grass with a knife and running over it with a 
lawnmower are two ways of literally obeying the order 'Cut the grass', on this view. 
But the contextualist stands skeptical. To get something genuinely evaluable, he 
claims, i.e. something which enables us to partition possible worlds into those in 
which the relevant condition is satisfied and those in which it is not, we need 
background assumptions. We cannot specify a determinate proposition which the 
sentence can be said literally to express, without building unarticulated assumptions 
into that proposition. The best we can do is to construct a disjunction of the 
propositions which could be determinately expressed by that sentence against 
alternative background assumptions. 
In support of this claim, Searle sets up an example for which no background 
assumption is readily available:  'Cut the sun'. What counts as obeying that order? 
We don't quite know. The abstract condition we can associate with that sentence 
(involving some form of linear separation affecting the integrity of the sun) is, 
precisely, too abstract to enable us to tell the worlds in which the condition is satisfied 
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from the worlds in which it is not. It is not determinate enough to give us specific 
truth-conditions or obedience-conditions.38 
 
6.4. Literalist responses to the contextualist challenge 
 
According to Emma Borg (who follows the lead of other radical syncretists,39 such 
as Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore), the fact that we are unable to specify 
intuitive conditions of application for the predicate 'cut the sun' does not support the 
contextualist conclusion that sentences per se do not have truth-conditions. There is, 
she claims, a crucial difference between "knowledge of truth-conditions and the 
knowledge that truth-conditions are satisfied". We may know the obedience-
conditions of 'Cut the sun' in a purely 'disquotational' manner (i.e. we may know that 
'Cut the sun' is obeyed iff the addressee cuts the sun), without knowing what counts 
as cutting the sun, in the context at hand. So there is no reason to deny sentences 
                                            
38 In Recanati 1997a, p.120 I gave a real-life example of the phenomenon Searle is drawing 
our attention to. In the 1936 movie Desire, by Frank Borsage, Gary Cooper meaningfully 
utters the imperative sentence 'Disarm the fricassee'. In context, the obedience conditions of 
the utterance are quite clear: we know which state of affairs the addressee must bring about to 
obey the order. Without a proper background, however, we no more know the obedience 
conditions of this utterance than we know the obedience conditions of 'Cut the sun'. 
39 As King and Stanley (forthcoming) point out, Syncretism — what they call 'semantic 
modesty' — "is a position that comes in degrees. On the one extreme, there are those who 
hold that most of our intuitions about what is said by a sentence in a context are affected by 
strong pragmatic effects. On the other end of the spectrum, are theorists who hold that while 
generally intuitions about what is said by a sentence are reliable guides to semantic content, 
there are a restricted range of cases in which strong pragmatic effects may affect speaker 
intuitions about what they take to be the semantic content of a sentence." Cappelen and 
Lepore are radical syncretists. They argue for systematically disconnecting the semantic 
content which the theorist assigns to a sentence from what is intuitively said by uttering that 
sentence (see Cappelen and Lepore 1997). 
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genuine truth-conditions. The sentence 'Oscar cuts the sun' does possess truth-
conditions; such truth-conditions are determined by a recursive truth-theory for the 
language, which issues theorems such as 'Oscar cuts the sun is true iff Oscar cuts 
the sun'. We know those truth-conditions provided we know the language. What we 
don't know, simply in virtue of knowing the language, is "a method of verification for 
those truth-conditions". This, then, is the syncretist's ultimate reply to the 
contextualist. According to the syncretist, the contextualist is guilty of endorsing a 
form of (so-called) 'verificationism'. 
This move strikes me as an unacceptable weakening of the notion of truth-
condition. The central idea of truth-conditional semantics (as opposed to mere 
'translational semantics') is the idea that, via truth, we connect words and the 
world.40 If we know the truth-conditions of a sentence, we know which state of 
affairs must hold for the sentence to be true; and that means that we are able to 
specify that state of affairs.41 T-sentences display knowledge of truth-conditions in 
that sense only if the right-hand-side of the biconditional is used, that is, only if the 
necessary and sufficient condition which it states is transparent to the utterer of the 
T-sentence. If I say 'Oscar cuts the sun is true iff Oscar cuts the sun', without 
knowing what it is to 'cut the sun', then the T-sentence I utter no more counts as 
displaying knowledge of truth-conditions than if I utter it without knowing who Oscar is 
(i.e. if I use the name 'Oscar' deferentially, in such a way that the right hand side is 
not really used, but involves some kind of mention). 
The contextualist challenge is likely to elicit another unsatisfactory response, 
this time from the indexicalist. To each dimension of indeterminacy, the indexicalist 
may argue, there corresponds a slot in logical form, which must be filled for the 
utterance to say something definite. To illustrate that point, let us consider another 
contextualist example from Searle (Searle 1983, pp.145-7). 
When we ask someone to open the door, the content of the request goes 
beyond what is linguistically encoded. Not only is it necessary for the addressee to 
                                            
40  See Lewis 1970:xx, Evans and McDowell 1975:xx. 
41  In §1.5 I gave an example of the way knowledge of truth-conditions can be tested, by 
asking subjects to pair sentences with situations. Pure 'disquotational' knowledge of the sort 
invoked by Emma Borg does not suffice to pass that sort of test. 
 105 
identify the relevant door (i.e. to complete or otherwise enrich the incomplete definite 
description 'the door'). She must also determine in what sense the door must be 
'opened'. Besides doors and windows, eyes and wounds can be opened. Now if the 
addressee 'opened' the door by making an incision in it with a scalpel, as when 
opening a wound, she would not have satisfied the request. Still, in a special context, 
it could be that the request to open the door must be satisfied precisely by incising it 
by means of a scalpel. The manner of opening is thus defeasibly indicated by 
context, it is not determinable on the basis of just the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence (including the direct object of the verb). To be sure, we can make it explicit 
in the sentence itself by introducing supplementary details, but each addition of this 
sort cannot fail to introduce other indeterminacies. If, for example, we add that the 
door must be opened 'with a key', we don't specify whether the key must be inserted 
into the lock or rather used like an axe to break the door open (Searle 1992, p.182). 
However explicit the sentence, there will always be some aspect of truth-conditional 
content that is contextually determined without being explicitly articulated. 
At this point, the imagined indexicalist response consists in saying that, like all 
verbs, 'open' is associated with a complex frame42 — the opening frame — involving 
a  certain number of argument roles: a location playing the role of INSIDE; another 
location operating as OUTSIDE; a BOUNDARY separating the two; a MOVING 
OBJECT liable to pass from inside to outside (or the other way round); an 
OBSTACLE, that is, an entity preventing the passage of the moving object; an 
AGENT liable to free the passage by means of ACTION on the obstacle; an 
INSTRUMENT serving to accomplish the action; and so on and so forth. In context, 
each of the variables I have enumerated must be assigned a particular value: the 
inside, the outside, the obstacle, the site of passage etc., all must be contextually 
identified. In the case of 'opening a wound', the inside is the interior of the wound, the 
outside is the exterior of the body, the moving object is the puss or internal secretions 
of the wound and so on. This contextual instantiation of the variables is what 
determines the specific interpretation assigned to 'open' in a given context, and it is is 
no different from what is required for interpreting 'John's boat' or 'He came' or any 
other context-sensitive expression in need of saturation. It is therefore unnecessary 
                                            
42 The notion of frame which I am using is that elaborated by Fillmore in a series of papers; 
for a general presentation see Fillmore 1982, 1985, 1991. 
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to modify semantic theory in order to give an account of Searle's examples; it is 
enough to extend the list of context-sensitive expressions, so as to include all verbs 
(insofar as they are all associated with frames which comprise a number of argument 
roles, the fillers of which must be contextually assigned). 
This indexicalist response is no more convincing than the syncretist response 
was. Let's admit that the verb 'to open' is associated with the complex frame I have 
mentioned. Does that make it an indexical or context-sensitive expression, whose 
use triggers, indeed mandates, a primary pragmatic process of saturation? No. There 
is an important difference between the argument roles of a frame and the indexical 
variables associated with context-sensitive expressions. Indexical variables must be 
contextually assigned values for the expression to acquire a definite semantic 
content. If the referent of 'he' in 'He boarded John's boat' is not contextually specified, 
or if the relation between John and the boat remains indefinite, the utterance does 
not have definite truth conditions. In contrast, the argument roles of a frame may but 
need not be assigned contextual values. The contextual assignment process is 
optional; it may, or may not, take place, depending on what is contextually relevant. 
In other words, it is the context (not the sentence) which determines which, among 
the many argument roles of a given frame, are contextually assigned particular 
values, and which remain indefinite (existentially quantified). In many contexts, it is of 
no importance whether the door is opened with a key or in another way; what counts 
is simply that it is opened. To be sure, for any given verb (or verb plus syntactic 
context), there is a small number of argument roles in the frame for which the 
contextual assignment of value is linguistically mandated; but the indexical response 
presupposes something much stronger: that the verb 'open' is like an indexical 
expression, which acquires a definite content only when the argument roles of the 
associated frame (all the argument roles, insofar at they can all be contextually 
foregrounded) are contextually assigned values. That is evidently too strong. In a 
given context, many of the argument roles which feature in the frame are existentially 
quantified rather than contextually assigned values. This does not prevent the verb 
'open' from expressing a definite content, in such a context. 
To sum up, for indexicals it is the conventional meaning of the expression 
which triggers the process of saturation and makes it mandatory. With ordinary 
expressions such as 'open', it is the context, not the conventional meaning of the 
expression, which is responsible for foregrounding certain aspects of the described 
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situation and triggering a process of contextual specification which goes well beyond 
what is linguistically encoded. The process in question is top-down, not bottom up. It 
is a pragmatically controlled pragmatic process, rather than a linguistically controlled 
pragmatic process, like saturation. 
 
6.5. Where Indexicalism and Contextualism meet 
 
In §6.1. I described Indexicalism as the strongest fallback position for a literalist 
forced to acknowledge that speaker's meaning plays a role in fixing truth-conditional 
content. According to Indexicalism, it is the sentence which, via the conventional 
meaning of the context-sensitive expressions it contains, triggers and controls the 
appeal to speaker's meaning. Speaker's meaning thus plays a role in the 
determination of truth-conditional content, but it does so only when the sentence itself 
sets up slots to be pragmatically filled (Minimalism). The Syncretic View is a weaker 
form of literalism since it concedes that the intuitive truth-conditions of an utterance 
may not satisfy the Minimalist constraint, which holds only for 'what is strictly and 
literally said' (the minimal proposition). Next comes Quasi-Contextualism, which 
differs from the Syncretic View in downplaying the minimal proposition. For the quasi-
contextualist, the minimal proposition literally expressed by the sentence exists in 
semantic heaven but plays no role in the actual process of communication. Finally, 
Contextualism denies the very existence and possibility of the minimal proposition, 
insofar as it is determined in a purely bottom-up manner: without pragmatic intrusions 
of the optional (top-down) variety, no determinate proposition could be expressed. 
Even though it is useful and illuminating to order the five positions on the scale 
from Literalism to Contextualism, as I have done, their relations are more complex 
than a simple ordering can suggest. In particular, there is a dimension along which 
Indexicalism and Contextualism are close neighbours.  
One must not forget that the gist of Literalism is an attempt to minimize 
context-sensitivity, while Contextualism takes it to be an essential feature of natural 
language (as opposed to formal languages). From this point of view, the indexicalist 
position is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, by rejecting contextual influences 
on content that are not linguistically controlled, the Indexicalist does his best to 
preserve the literalist doctrine that linguistic entities are genuine bearers of content, 
context-sensitivity notwithstanding. On the other hand, by multiplying indexical 
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variables, the indexicalist widens the gap between sentence meaning and 
propositional content, in the spirit of Contextualism. Indexicalism can thus be seen as 
a natural ally of Contextualism. 43 
Likewise, Contextualism can be construed as an extreme form of Indexicalism 
that generalizes context-sensitivity so as to rule out eternal sentences not merely de 
                                            
43 In 'The Pragmatics of what is said' I argued that the Minimalist Principle can serve as a 
methodological weapon in the hand of the contextualist: 
Since, for a defender of the Minimalist Principle, what is said departs from what the 
sentence means only insofar as there is in the meaning of the sentence a slot to be 
contextually filled, he is led to posit new slots, new dimensions of semantic 
indeterminacy, every time the following condition obtains: the traditional slots 
(identity of the speaker, time of utterance, etc.) have been filled, yet it seems that the 
meaning of the sentence still underdetermines what is said. (...) It follows that there are 
more slots to be filled for a sentence to express a complete proposition, from the point 
of view of a minimalist, than there is from the point of view of someone who rejects 
the Minimalist Principle. (...) I conclude that the Minimalist Principle is an incentive 
to maximize context-sensitivity; it leads its defenders to widen the gap between 
linguistic meaningfulness and full propositionality. From a contextualist point of view, 
this is a good reason for maintaining the Minimalist Principle as far as possible. (...) 
 What I have just said shows that it is a mistake to claim, as Carston does, that 
the Minimalist Principle is partly responsible for the usual underrating of the gap 
between sentence meaning and what is said. Carston believes that partisans of the 
Minimalist Principle "assume that the domain of grammar, sentences, and the domain 
of truth-conditional semantics, propositions, are essentially the same" (Carston 
1988:164). But this is not at all the case. Quite the contrary, defenders of the 
Minimalist Principle take the meaning of a sentence to be far less "propositional", 
much more underdetermined as far as truth-conditions are concerned, than is 
ordinarily supposed. (Recanati 1989/1991: 117-8) 
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facto but de jure. It's not just that there are expressions whose meaning is schematic 
and involves contextual variables; it is linguistic meaning in general which suffers 
from a form of indeterminacy which makes it unfit to carry content save against a rich 
contextual background. Owing to that indeterminacy, some form of enrichment or 
contextual elaboration becomes mandatory for the sentence to express a definite 
proposition. The reason why Contextualism and Indexicalism become so close is 
precisely that, with Contextualism, the distinction between mandatory and optional 
pragmatic processes is somewhat blurred. 
According to Contextualism, the meaning of words and/or phrases (whether 
indexical or not) is not determinate enough to yield even a minimal proposition. In 
chapter 9 I will consider various arguments in favour of that claim, and various 
contextualist positions corresponding to these arguments. One extreme position 
denies that words have meanings in anything like the traditional sense. Another, less 
extreme view takes takes polysemous words such as 'open' or 'cut' as paradigmatic 
and generalizes the form of underdeterminacy they reveal. According to both of these 
views, the meaning of a predicate is not a determinate concept: it is a 'semantic 
potential', which only determines a concept against a rich pragmatic context.44 At 
this point Contextualism becomes hard to distinguish from (an extreme form of) 
Indexicalism. Nearly all words are like indexicals, whose contents must be 
contextually determined.45 As Sperber and Wilson say, "words are used as pointers 
to contextually intended senses" (1998: 200).46 
                                            
44  A third contextualist position to be discussed in Chapter 9 construes the process of 
semantic composition as, to a large extent, pragmatically sensitive, in such a way that 
complex phrases must be assigned a sense, in context, even if the constituent words all 
possess a definite sense. 
45  For an explicit statement to that effect, see Georgia Green, "Some Remarks on How 
Words Mean" (197xx). 
46 The difference between the contextualist positions mentioned in the text and the view of 
Sperber and Wilson is that Sperber and Wilson take words also to encode concepts. Sperber 
and Wilson are quasi-contextualists. They accept that ordinary words have contents, in and by 
themselves, and that sentences containing them express propositions (once indexicals etc. 
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have  been assigned semantic values) — even though they take these contents and these 
propositions to be communicationally irrelevant: 
Many words seem to encode not a full-fledged concept but what might be called a pro-
concept. (...) As with pronouns, their semantic contribution must be contextually 
specified for the associated utterance to have a truth-value. (...) All words behave as if 
they encoded pro-concepts: that is, whether or not a word encodes a full concept, the 
concept it is used to convey in a given utterance has to be contextually worked out. 
(Sperber and Wilson 1998: 185) 
In contrast, a radical contextualist denies that words have full-fledged contents or encode 
concepts. All words — or, more cautiously, nearly all words — encode only 'pro-concepts' 
(semantic potentials) and serve as pointers to intended senses. In Thoughts and Utterances, 
pp. 359-64, Robyn Carston tentatively amends relevance theory along those lines. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Indexicalism and the Binding Fallacy 
 
 
7.1. Mandatory v. Optional 
 
What characterizes contextual ingredients of the optional variety is the fact that their 
contextual provision is not mandatory — it is not required in virtue of a linguistic 
convention governing the use of a particular construction (or class of constructions). 
In context, it may be that that ingredient is ‗required‘; but then it is required in virtue of 
features of the context, not in virtue of linguistic properties of the expression-type. A 
contextual ingredient is mandatory in the relevant sense, and is provided through 
saturation, only if in every context such an ingredient has to be provided (precisely 
because the need for saturation is not a contextual matter, but a context-independent 
property of the expression-type). This, then, is the criterion we must use for deciding 
whether a contextual ingredient results from an optional pragmatic process or from 
saturation: Can we imagine a context in which the same words are used normally, 
and a truth-evaluable statement is made, yet no such ingredient is provided? 
 To illustrate the contrast between the two types of pragmatic process, let us 
consider the phenomenon of 'null instantiation' (to use Fillmore's terminology), where 
the direct object of a transitive verb is not syntactically realized, or at least not overtly. 
There are two sorts of case, which must be sharply distinguished (Fillmore 1986, 
Fillmore and Kay 1994). In indefinite null instantiation (INI), the argument role 
corresponding to the direct object is existentially quantified instead of being assigned 
a particular value. In that type of case the suppression of the direct object arguably 
changes the semantic value of the verb: it denotes not the original two-place relation, 
but a property generated by existentially quantifying the object argument-role of the 
original relation. As Quine pointed out, from any n-place predicate P, one can 
generate an n-1 place predicate by applying to P an operator he calls 
‗Derelativization‘, which he describes as follows: 
 
(Der P) x1...xn-1 iff there is something xn such that Px1...xn 
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If ‗P‘ is a two-place predicate, ‗Der P‘ will be a genuine one-place predicate, denoting 
a property rather than a relation (Quine 1960: 229-231). In the case of 'eat' and other 
verbs subject to INI, suppressing the direct object in surface syntax amounts 
semantically to the same result as applying ‗Der‘ to the original two-place predicate. 
Intransitive 'eat' thus denotes the property of eating (Eat1), namely the property one 
has in virtue of filling the Eater argument-role in some instance of the dyadic EAT 
relation (Eat2). One eats1 iff there is something that one eats2. 
 In definite null instantiation (DNI) the situation is quite different. Like 'eat', 'hear' 
and 'notice' are transitive verbs which have an intransitive use: they can be used 
without a direct object, as in 'I heard' or 'I noticed'. When that is the case, however, 
there must be something definite, in context, which the speaker is said to have heard 
or noticed. To understand what is said, an interpreter must identify that thing. This 
shows that the objectless verb still denotes the original two-place relation, even 
though the second argument-role is not realized in surface syntax.47 Unless a 
particular filler is contextually assigned to the unrealized argument role, the utterance 
remains semantically incomplete. Thus 'I heard' or 'I noticed' cannot be interpreted as 
meaning that the speaker has heard or noticed something or other. This is what it 
means to say that, in contrast to 'eat', 'hear' is not subject to INI, but to DNI. ‗John 
eats‘ is true iff there is something that John eats2. The fact that the relevant thing 
does not have to be specified supports the conclusion that intransitive ‗eat‘ denotes 
the property of eating1. In contrast, ‗x noticed‘ is definitely not true iff there is 
something y which x noticed. Rather, it is true, for some contextually specified thing 
                                            
47 In the situation-theoretic framework I will sketch in Chapter 8, an alternative account of 
DNI is available. The missing argument can be construed as belonging to the 'circumstance of 
evaluation' rather than to the 'articulated content'. Thus, instead of maintaining that the 
objectless verb still denotes the original two-place relation, we can say that the objectless 
DNI-verb is an indexical one-place predicate : the property it denotes is relativized to, and 
varies with, the 'circumstantial' constituent that is contextually provided. Thus in a context c1 
intransitive 'notice' will denote the property of noticing the accident, while in another context 
c2 it will denote the property of noticing the man. See my 'Unarticulated constituents', p. 312, 
footnote 11 for an analogous suggestion concerning another type of implicit argument. 
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y, iff x noticed that thing. The relevant y has to be specified for the utterance to be 
truth-evaluable.48 That is an instance of saturation, even though the constituent to 
be contextually provided is 'unarticulated' in surface syntax.49 
To sum up, it is a conventional property of the English verb ‗eat‘ that (i) it can 
be used intransitively (in contrast to ‗devour‘), and (ii) when so used it does not 
require saturation of the unarticulated argument-role. That argument role is best 
thought of as suppressed: the two-place relation has been replaced by a property. 
Likewise, it‘s a conventional property of the English verb ‗finish‘ that (i) it too can be 
used intransitively (in contrast to ‗complete‘), but (ii) when so used it does require 
saturation of the unarticulated argument-role. The latter is not suppressed, though it 
remains implicit. 
The fact that the suppressed argument role of intransitive 'eat' does not require 
saturation does not entail that a value cannot be contextually provided for that role. 
What the DNI/INI contrast suggests is only this: if a value is provided for the 
suppressed argument role of 'eat', it is provided through an optional pragmatic 
process of enrichment. This is different from the mandatory provision of a contextual 
value for the implicit argument-role in need of saturation, in cases of DNI such as 
'finish' or 'notice'. Verbs subject to DNI carry something like a free variable in 
semantic structure, which must be assigned a definite value in context. Verbs subject 
to INI do not carry such a free variable, hence the contextual provision of a value for 
the suppressed argument role cannot be treated as an instance of saturation, but as 
                                            
48 On the contrast between the two sorts of verbs, see Barbara Partee, 'Compositionality', in 
F. Landman and F. Veltman (eds.), Varieties of Formal Semantics, Foris 1984, 281-311, p. 
299, Fillmore 1986, Prandi 19xx, Groefsema 1995. As Cresswell pointed out (after Partee), 
we observe the same contrast between two sorts of relational nouns: «Unlike nouns like 
mother and sister whose default cases are existentially quantified the default cases of enemy 
and of representative appear to have the second argument supplied contextually» (Cresswell 
1996: 39). 
49  Insofar as it is mandatory and provided through saturation, the constituent is unarticulated 
only in a weak sense. For the distinction between two senses of 'unarticulated', see Recanati 
2002: 307-313.  
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a case of enrichment. 
Let me give an example. We can imagine a context in which ‗Look! He‘s 
eating!‘ would be understood as stating not merely that the individual denoted by ‗he‘ 
is eating something or other, but that he is eating a certain salient piece of food, e.g. 
a dangerous mushroom which has been the focus of attention for some time. The 
eaten object would then be contextually provided without being linguistically required, 
since the intransitive verb only denotes the property and does not require saturation. 
In such a case the contextual specification of the eaten object would result from free 
enrichment. But in the above cases of DNI ('I heard', 'I finished', 'I noticed'), the 
contextual provision of the relevant ingredient is a bottom-up pragmatic process — a 
variety of saturation — rather than a top-down pragmatic process of free enrichment. 
This is established by the fact that the provision of an object filling the second 
argument role is required in every context, not just in the contexts in which it turns out 
to be relevant. 
 
7.2 Two Criteria 
 
I have argued that, whenever a contextual ingredient of content results from a 
pragmatic process of the optional variety, we can imagine contexts in which the lack 
of such an ingredient would not prevent the sentence from expressing a complete 
proposition. This gives us a criterion for telling apart cases in which a contextual 
ingredient results from saturation and cases in which it does not: 
 
Optionality Criterion 
Whenever a contextual ingredient of content is provided through a pragmatic process 
of the optional variety, we can imagine another possible context of utterance in which 
no such ingredient is provided yet the utterance expresses a complete proposition. 
 
Systematically used, that criterion may give surprising results. Thus it is common to 
hold that the sentence 'It's raining' expresses a complete proposition only if a location 
is contextually provided. If that's right, then the contextual specification of the location 
of rain is an instance of saturation, much like the contextual provision of the thing 
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heard in 'I heard'.50 Using the Optionality Criterion, however, I have established that 
the location of rain is not provided through saturation; for there are contexts in which 
the sentence ‗It is raining‘ expresses a complete proposition, even though no location 
is contextually provided as that which the utterance concerns (§1.3). 
Applying the Criterion is not always easy, however. For it is not always easy to 
tell whether or not a contextual ingredient is actually provided. In §6.2 I gave an 
example of that difficulty. There are two ways to look at contextual restrictions of the 
domain of quantification. First option: we say that a contextual ingredient is provided 
only when the domain of quantification is implicitly restricted. The cases in which the 
quantifier ranges over the entire domain of discourse, without contextual restriction, 
are treated as cases in which no pragmatic process takes place — the sentence is 
simply taken at face value. The fact that there are such 'absolute' readings of 
quantified sentences can then be considered as showing that the process of 
contextual domain restriction is not mandatory but optional. Second option: we 
consider that a primary pragmatic process of saturation must take place to assign a 
value to the domain variable in logical form. Absolute readings themselves result 
from a particular assignment of value to the variable, but that is not visible because of 
the nature of the assignment: the entire domain is assigned to the variable, hence no 
                                            
50 Thus Ken Taylor writes: 
The view which I favor supposes that the verb ‗to rain‘ has  a lexically specified 
argument place which is marked THEME and that this argument place takes places 
as values. This is a way of saying that the subatomic structure of the verb ‗to rain‘ 
explicitly marks rainings as a kind of change that places undergo. (...) Thus though: 
 It is raining 
is missing no syntactically mandatory sentential constituent, nonetheless, it is 
semantically incomplete. The semantic incompleteness is manifest to us as a felt 
inability to evaluate the truth value of an utterance of [that sentence] in the absence of 
a contextually provided location (or range of locations). This felt need for a 
contextually provided location has its source, I claim, in our tacit cognition of the 
syntactically unexpressed argument place of the verb ‗to rain‘. (Taylor 2001 : 53) 
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contextual restriction intuitively occurs. A contextual ingredient is nonetheless 
provided. — The Optional Criterion, by itself, cannot help us with the choice between 
the two options. It's only after the choice has been made that we can apply the 
Optionality Criterion. That is, we must decide, first, whether or not a contextual 
ingredient is provided when the quantified sentence is given the 'absolute' reading. 
It's only if we give a negative answer that we can use the Optionality Criterion to 
establish that quantifier domain restriction is not an instance of saturation. 
Are there other criteria? According to Jason Stanley, there is one that is most 
helpful: the Binding Criterion. Stanley's idea is the following. Whenever a contextual 
ingredient is provided as a result of saturation, there is something like a free variable 
in logical form, which must be contextually assigned a value. If a contextual 
ingredient does not result from saturation, but is pragmatic through and through, 
there is no variable in logical form to which that ingredient corresponds. It is 
'unarticulated' in the strongest possible sense. But that entails that no 'binding' of the 
relevant constituent is possible: 
 
Since the supposed unarticulated constituent... is not the value of anything in 
the sentence uttered, there should be no reading of the relevant linguistic 
constructions in which the unarticulated constituent varies with the values 
introduced by operators in the sentence uttered. Operators in a sentence only 
interact with variables in the sentence that lie within their scope. But, if the 
constituent is unarticulated, it is not the value of any variable in the sentence. 
Thus, its interpretation cannot be controlled by operators in the sentence. 
(Stanley 2000: 410-411) 
 
For binding to occur, Stanley argues, there must be a bindable variable in the 
sentence to which the operator is prefixed; but if there is such a variable, then the 
contextual ingredient (when there is one) ought to be seen as the value contextually 
assigned to that variable in the process of saturation, rather than as an 'unarticulated 
constituent' corresponding to nothing in the sentence and resulting from 'free 
enrichment'. This, then, is the criterion Stanley uses: 
 
Binding Criterion 
A contextual ingredient in the interpretation of a sentence S results from saturation if 
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it can be ‗bound‘, that is, if it can be made to vary with the values introduced by some 
operator prefixed to S. 
 
 Using that criterion, Stanley attempts to show that quantifier domain restriction 
is an instance of saturation. For there are cases in which the domain of a quantifier 
may be bound by another quantifier, as in the following examples: 
 
(1) In most of John's classes, he fails exactly three Frenchmen. 
(2) In every room in John's house, every bottle is in the corner 
(3) Whatever John does, most of the class falls asleep 
 
"In each of these examples", Stanley and Szabo say, 
 
the domain of the second quantifier expression varies with the values of the 
first quantifier expression. For example, the proposition intuitively expressed 
by an utterance of (1) is the proposition that, for most x such that x is a class 
of John's, John failed three Frenchment in x. Thus the domain of the quantifier 
expression 'three Frenchmen' varies with the value of the variable introduced 
by the quantifier 'most'. (Stanley and Szabo 2000: 243) 
 
Since there is no binding without a bindable variable, Stanley and Szabo conclude 
that "in the logical form of quantified sentences, there are variables whose values, 
relative to a context, are (often restricted) quantifier domains" (258). It follows that the 
contextual provision of a restricted domain of quantification is an instance of 
saturation. 
 
7.3. The indexicalist challenge 
 
Sometimes the Binding Criterion and the Optionality Criterion converge and give the 
same verdict. Take syncategorematic predicates such as 'small', or verbs subject to 
Definite Null Instantiation, such as 'notice': 
 
(4) John is small <for a basketball player> 
(5) John noticed <the mistake> 
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The Optionality Criterion tells us that the contextual provision of the comparison class 
(for 'small') or of the thing noticed (for intransive uses of 'notice') is in both cases an 
instance of saturation because there is no possible context of utterance for (4) or (5) 
in which no such ingredient would be contextually provided yet the sentence would 
still express a complete proposition. Using the Binding Criterion we reach the same 
conclusion, for binding can occur in both cases. Stanley gives the following example: 
 
(6) Most species have members that are small 
 
Here, instead of being contextually specified, the comparison class varies with the 
values introduced by ‗most species‘: each species in turn serves as comparison class 
for smallness. Likewise, Partee (1989) points out that we can bind the ‗object‘ of 
‗notice‘ even though it is unarticulated in surface syntax: 
 
(7) Every secretary made a mistake in his final draft. The good secretary corrected 
his mistake. Every other secretary did not even notice. 
 
The two criteria converge also with respect to examples like 
 
(8) John is home 
 
No proposition is expressed unless it is determined whose home is in question 
(John's home, or the speaker's home – not to mention other possibilities). Moreover, 
there is no possible context of utterance for that sentence where it means that John 
is at someone or other's home. Saturation is required. The Binding Criterion confirms 
this verdict. We can say 
 
(9) Everybody went home 
 
and mean that each of the persons in question went to his or her home. On that 
interpretation the implicit argument varies with the values introduced by the 
'everybody'. According to the Binding Argument, this shows that there is a variable in 
logical form, which can be bound or contextually assigned a value, as the case may 
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be. When a value is contextually assigned, as in (8), this is an instance of saturation. 
 Life is not as simple as that, however. There are also cases in which the two 
criteria yield conflicting results. By the Optionality Criterion, as we have seen, the 
location of rain which is implicit in 'It's raining' is provided through an optional process 
of free enrichment; yet, Stanley points out, it can be bound: 
 
 (10) Everywhere I go, it rains 
 
In such a statement the location of rain is undertood as varying with the places 
introduced by the quantifier ‗Everywhere I go‘. The statement means that: 
 
For every location l such that I go to l, it rains in l (when I am there) 
 
For such binding to occur, Stanley says, there must be a free variable l in the 
sentence ‗it rains‘. That variable can either be bound (as in (10)), or be contextually 
given a value. Whatever location may be contextually provided for the rain is 
therefore not a genuine 'optional' ingredient, but the contextual value of a free 
variable in logical form. The contextual provision of a specific location therefore 
counts as an instance of saturation, contrary to the verdict delivered by the 
Optionality Criterion 
 Similarly, the temporal location of the breakfast event in Sperber and Wilson's 
example ('I've had breakfast') seems to result from enrichment according to the 
Optionality Criterion; yet it can be bound by a quantifier.51 We can say: 
 
(11) No luck. Each time you offer me lunch, I‘ve had a very large breakfast. 
 
The temporal location of the breakfast event now systematically varies with the 
temporal values introduced by ‗each time you offer me lunch‘. It follows that there is a 
variable in logical form. But if there is, then the alleged instance of enrichment is an 
instance of saturation after all. So the argument goes. 
 Unsurprisingly, Stanley uses the Binding Criterion in arguing for Indexicalism. 
He appeals to data of the sort originally collected by Barbara Partee (1989) to show 
                                            
51  Stanley does not actually discuss that example, but his general argument applies 
nonetheless. 
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that, whenever an 'optional' ingredient has been postulated to account for the intuitive 
meaning of an utterance, one can intuitively ‗bind‘ it, i.e. make it vary according to the 
values introduced by some operator. It follows that "we have been given no reason to 
abandon the thesis that the only truth-conditional role of context is the resolution of 
indexicality, broadly construed" (Stanley 2000 : 401). Stanley therefore maintains that 
"all truth-conditional context-dependence results from fixing the values of contextually 
sensitive elements in the real structure of natural language sentences" (Stanley 
2000: 392). There are no 'optional' contextual ingredients in truth-conditional content. 
 
7.4. Is the Binding Criterion reliable? 
 
For the 'breakfast' example, we could perhaps accept Stanley's conclusion. For that 
example is very similar to cases of quantifier domain restriction (§6.2); and for such 
cases it is not easy to apply the Optionality Criterion in a non-question-begging 
manner. When the Optionality Criterion is not reliable, it seems reasonable to appeal 
to the other criterion. Still, the conflict between the criteria (in cases such as 'It is 
raining') creates an obvious problem, and should make us cautious; especially in 
view of the use which Stanley makes of the Binding Criterion. For he uses it to deny 
the very existence of optional ingredients in truth-conditional content. Before 
accepting such an extreme conclusion, we must assure ourselves that the Binding 
Criterion is reliable. Is it really? 
I think it is not, for it works too well. It obliges us to treat as provided through 
saturation not only contextual elements which can plausibly be regarded as values of 
variables in logical form, as well as elements for which at least the question arises, 
but also many contextual elements for which that sort of treatment is simply out of 
question. This is a serious weakness which should lead one to doubt the reliability of 
the Binding Criterion. Let me give two striking examples. 
 The first example, which I already mentioned in Chapter 5, is adapted from 
David Rumelhart (1979: 78):  
 
(12) The policeman stopped the car 
 
In interpreting this utterance we make certain assumptions concerning the way the 
car was stopped by the policeman. On the most natural interpretation we assume 
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that the policeman issued appropriate signals to the driver, who stopped the car 
accordingly. But if we know, or suppose, that the policeman was actually driving the 
car in the reported scene, we will understand his stopping of the car very differently 
from the way we understand it when we assume that he was regulating the traffic. 
Quite different ‗manners of stopping‘ are involved in the two cases. Those implied 
manners of stopping are part of the way we understand the utterance but they are 
additional aspects of the interpretation, linguistically optional hence external to what 
is said by minimalist standards. What is said in the minimal sense is only that the 
policeman stopped the car in some way or other. The specific manner of stopping is 
provided through ‗free enrichment‘. 
 Here, as in the case of ‗It‘s raining‘, the Optionality Criterion tells us that the 
contextually provided manner of stopping is provided through free enrichment. For 
we have no trouble imagining a context in which no such manner of stopping would 
be contextually specified. Moreover, in contrast to the ‗rain‘ case, there is a wide 
consensus among theorists that the contextually provided manner of stopping in such 
an example is a pragmatic embellishment of the interpretation which is of no more 
concern to semantics than our tendency, as interpreters, to imagine the policeman 
dressed in a certain way. Indeed I think that everybody, including Stanley, would 
agree that in the policeman case the contextually provided constituent is pragmatic 
through and through. It is not part of the proposition literally expressed in the 
minimalist sense (what is saidmin). Yet the argument from binding shows that, even in 
that case, the contextually provided constituent is linguistically articulated by a 
variable. For we can say things like 
 
(13) However he did it, the policeman stopped the car 
(14) In some way or other, the policeman stopped the car 
 
meaning: 
 
For some manner of stopping m, the policeman stopped the car in manner m. 
 
If we apply the Binding Criterion, we shall have to conclude that the contextually 
provided manner of stopping is articulated and determined through a bottom-up 
process of saturation, like the reference of indexicals. The absurdity of this 
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conclusion argues against the Binding Criterion. 
 The other example is even more striking. Remember the utterance: ‗Look! He 
is eating!‘ We imagined a context in which a salient mushroom was understood as 
being the thing eaten. That the contextually provided constituent results from free 
enrichment follows from the fact that intransitive ‗eat‘, as Stanley himself accepts 
(2000, p. 401, fn. 14), denotes the property of eating, abstracted from the relation of 
eating-something by suppressing the second argument role. That is a case of 
'indefinite null instantiation' in which no contextual specification of the thing eaten is 
required in virtue of the semantics of the verb (in contrast to what happens in cases 
of 'definite null instantiation', such as 'I noticed' or 'I heard). Still, intuitively, binding is 
possible. We can say: 
 
(15) John is anorexic, but whenever his father cooks mushrooms, he eats. 
 
On a natural interpretation, we understand that John eats the mushrooms his father 
has cooked. Intuitively, a form of binding is operative here; for the food eaten by John 
covaries with the food cooked by his father. Such examples show that intuitive 
binding, per se, does not entail the existence of a free variable in logical form. The 
Binding Criterion, on which Stanley‘s argument rests, must be rejected. 
 It remains to be shown what exactly is wrong with the Binding Criterion, and 
with Stanley's argument in support of Indexicalism. I will provide a detailed analysis 
of what I call the 'Binding fallacy' in §7.6. First, however, we need a bit of stage-
setting, which the next section will provide. 
 
7.5. Variadic functions 
 
When someone says 'It's raining', there often is a tacitly understood location, such 
that the utterance is true if and only if it's raining at that location. The location can 
also be made explicit, by means of modifiers such as ‗in Paris‘, ‗here‘, or ‗everywhere 
I go‘. Looking at those modifiers can help us understand the status of the contextually 
provided ingredient in cases in  which the location remains implicit. 
The modifiers in question are syntactically optional. They make a predicate out 
of a predicate. If we start with a simple predicate, say ‗rain‘, we can make a different 
predicate out of it by ajoining an adverb such as ‗heavily‘ or a prepositional phrase 
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such as ‗in Paris‘. Thus we go from ‗It‘s raining‘ to ‗It‘s raining heavily‘ to ‗It‘s raining 
heavily in Paris‘. Semantically, I suggest that we construe the modifier as contributing 
a certain sort of function which I call a variadic function. A variadic function is a 
function from relations to relations, where the output relation differs from the input 
relation only by its decreased or increased adicity. Adding a predicate modifier 
(adverb or a prepositional phrase) to a predicate expressing a n-ary relation Rn thus 
results in a complex predicate expressing an n+1-ary relation, in which the n+1th 
argument is a circumstance: a time, a location, a manner, or what not.  
 A relation can be represented as a set of interconnected argument-roles, as in 
frame semantics. Thus the Eat relation contains two argument-roles : the Eater and 
the Food. The effect of an ‗expansive‘ variadic function of the sort contributed by 
adverbial modifiers is to add an argument-role. The output relation therefore contains 
the same argument-roles as the input relation, plus the extra argument-role provided 
by the variadic function. For example, in the statement ‗John eats in Paris‘ the 
prepositional phrase ‗in Paris‘ contributes a variadic function which maps the property 
of eating, ascribed to John in the simpler statement ‗John eats‘, onto the dyadic 
relation Eat_in (x, l ) between an individual and a location. That relation is predicated 
of the pair <John, Paris> in the more complex statement. Note that the prepositional 
phrase ‗in Paris‘ contributes not only the variadic function, but also the argument 
(Paris) which fills the extra argument-role.52 
 There are also ‗recessive‘ variadic functions that decrease the valence of the 
input relation by suppressing an argument-role.53 In English, various alternations 
such as the passive alternation and the intransitive alternation (Levin 1993) can be 
described in such terms. The operation of passivation (‗John kisses Mary‘  ‗Mary is 
kissed‘) suppresses the argument-role corresponding to the subject of the active 
sentence, whereas intransitivation (‗John eats the apple‘  ‗John eats‘) has the effect 
                                            
52 As McConnell-Ginet puts it, such phrases "have a dual role of augmenting the predicate to 
which they attach and of providing an argument for the augmented predicate" (McConnell-
Ginet 1982: 171). 
53  ‗Recessive‘ comes from Lucien Tesniere, a pioneer in that area (Tesniere 1969). 
‗Expansive‘ comes from Dowty (cited in McConnell-Ginet 1982: 168), and is also 
reminiscent of Bach‘s ‗expansion‘. 
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of suppressing the argument-role corresponding to the direct object of the verb. 
Quine‘s ‗Der‘ operator, which I mentioned earlier, does something similar: it 
decreases the adicity of the input relation Rn by existentially quantifying the nth 
argument. But I think recessive variadic functions do not, by themselves, involve 
existentially quantifying the suppressed argument-role. Thus if we start with ‗John 
spoke to Mary‘, we can suppress the argument-role of Adressee and generate ‗John 
spoke‘. This does not entail that John spoke to someone. Whether or not the 
suppression of an argument-role, effected through a recessive variadic function, 
amounts to existentially quantifying that argument-role depends upon the nature of 
the argument-roles that remain unsuppressed. To fill the Speaker argument-role one 
need not have an addressee. One can speak without speaking to anyone. But to fill 
the Eater argument-role, arguably, there must be something (edible) that one eats: 
No Eater without an Eatee. The suppressed argument-role therefore remains in the 
background via the Eater argument-role which, for metaphysical reasons, cannot be 
entirely dissociated from it. That is why ‗John is eating something‘ can be inferred 
from ‗John is eating‘. That, according to me, is a nonformal, ‗metaphysical‘ inference 
similar to that from ‗Mary is dancing‘ to ‗Mary is dancing somewhere‘.54 
                                            
54 It is arguably for the same sort of reasons that the agent remains lurking in the background 
even after the Agent argument-role has been suppressed through passivation. The fact that 
‗The ship was sunk voluntarily/to collect the insurance‘ is possible, while ‗The ship sank 
voluntarily/to collect the insurance‘ is not, is sometimes taken to show that in the passive 
sentence the Agent argument-role has not been suppressed but remains covertly present at 
some level of syntactic structure (Stanley 2002: 152-3). Chomsky argues that the argument-
role is present lexically (in the valence of the verb) even though, syntactically, it is not 
(Chomsky 1986: 32-35). As far as I am concerned, I favour the hypothesis that the argument-
role is metaphysically implied rather than linguistically realized. A passive sentence such as 
‗The ship was sunk‘ results from passivation of the transitive ‗sink‘, as in ‗John sank the 
ship‘. Now the ship plays two roles in (the relations described by) sentences such as ‗The ship 
was sunk‘ or ‗John sank the ship‘ : the P-role (‗patient‘ or thing acted upon), and the U-role 
(undergoer of change of state).  ‗John sank the ship‘ means John did something to the ship 
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 The variadic functions that increase the valence of the input relation through 
the addition of a circumstance to the set of its argument-roles can be represented by 
means of an operator (or rather, a family of operators) ‗Circ‘. When applied to an n-
place predicate P, ‗Circ‘ produces an n+1 place predicate (‗Circ P’). There will be as 
many Circ-operators as there are argument-roles which can be added to the set of 
argument-roles of the input relation. There will be a temporal Circ-operator, a 
locational Circ-operator, etc., depending on the nature of the extra argument-role. 
Which Circ-operator is at issue will be indicated by means of a subscript. For 
example, the operator ‗Circlocation‘ contributed by locative modifiers (such as the 
prepositional phrase ‗in Paris‘) will map e.g. the Eat relation to the Eat_in relation by 
adding a Location argument-role: 
 
Circlocation (Eats (x)) = Eats_in (x, l) 
 
As I pointed out, a modifier such as ‗in Paris‘ does not merely increase the 
valence of the input relation by adding a new argument-role; it also provides the extra 
argument needed to fill that argument-role. ‗John eats in Paris‘ should therefore be 
represented as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                        
that resulted in the ship’s sinking, where the two tokens of ‗the ship‘ correspond to the P-role 
and the U-role respectively. In ‗The ship sank‘, the ship plays only the U-role. Now nothing 
can fill the P-role unless there is an agent doing something. Hence expressions like 
‗voluntarily‘ or ‗to collect the insurance‘, which qualify the manner of acting or the goal of an 
agent, can be adjoined to sentences like ‗The ship was sunk‘, since the P-role which occurs in 
the denoted relation is metaphysically tied to the (linguistically unrealized) Agent role. In 
contrast, the expression cannot be adjoined to sentences like ‗The ship sank‘, because no 
action is denoted and no agent is even ‗lurking in the background‘. (The explanation I have 
just offered is very tentative, of course. There may be decisive syntactic evidence that the 
argument-role has not really been suppressed through passivation. But the mere fact that ‗The 
ship was sunk to collect the insurance‘ is good while ‗The ship sank to collect the insurance‘ 
is bad is not sufficient to establish such a conclusion, contrary to what Stanley suggests.) 
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Circlocation: Paris (Eats (John)) = Eats_in (John, Paris) 
 
Like the prepositional phrase ‗in Paris‘, the Circ-operator thus completed does two 
things: map the Eat relation to the Eat_in relation by adding a Location argument-
role; and supply a particular value (Paris) for that role.55  
 
7.6 The Binding Fallacy 
 
In ‗Everywhere I go, it rains‘ a variable is bound by the quantifier ‗everywhere I go‘. 
The sentence says that, for every place l such that I go to l, it rains in l. Stanley 
concludes that, when ‗It rains‘ is understood with respect to a contextually provided 
location, that location is provided through saturation. The sentence ‗It rains‘ really is 
the sentence ‗It rains in l’, where the unpronounced location variable can either be 
bound or be contextually assigned a value. Fully spelled out, Stanley‘s indexicalist 
argument against optional ingredients runs as follows: 
 
1. Contextualists say that in the simple statement ‗It rains‘, the tacitly understood 
location of rain is unarticulated and results from an optional pragmatic process of free 
enrichment. 
2. In ‗Everywhere I go it rains‘, binding occurs: the location of rain varies with the 
values introduced by the quantifier ‗everywhere I go‘.  
3. There is no binding without a bindable variable. 
4. Therefore, ‗It rains‘ involves a variable for the location of rain. 
5. It follows that the contextualist is mistaken: in the simple statement ‗It rains‘, the 
location of rain is articulated. It is the (contextually assigned) value of a free variable 
in logical form, which variable can also be bound (as in the complex sentence 
‗Everywhere I go, it rains‘). 
 
                                            
55 According to McConnell-Ginet, who puts forward a similar proposal, adverbs such as 
‗slowly‘ do not contribute an argument filling the extra argument-role, but they existentially 
quantify the new argument-role while contributing a property of its values (McConnell-Ginet 
1982). If we accept McConnell-Ginet‘s idea, ‗John eats slowly‘ will be analysed as follows: 
Circrate: slow (Eats (John)) = (r ) (Slow (r) & Eats_at_rate (John, r) 
That is, there is a rate r which is slow, such that John eats at that rate. 
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The argument is fallacious because of a crucial ambiguity at stage 4. When it is said 
that ‗It rains‘ involves a variable (because binding occurs), which sentence ‗It rains‘ is 
at issue? One may well accept that in the complex sentence ‗Everywhere I go it 
rains‘, the (open) sentence on which the quantifier operates involves a location 
variable which the quantifier binds: ‗For every place l such that I go to l, it rains in l’. 
That indeed follows from step 3. But in order to reach the conclusion at step 5, we 
need something stronger: 4 must be understood as claiming that the location variable 
is also involved when the sentence ‘It rains’ is uttered in isolation. Stanley‘s argument 
therefore relies upon an unstated premiss, namely the following: 
 
(SUP) In ‗Everywhere I go it rains‘, the sentence on which the quantifier ‗everywhere I 
go‘ operates is the very sentence ‗It rains‘ which can also be uttered in isolation (and 
whose usual interpretation involves a contextually provided ingredient). 
 
If we accept (SUP) it follows that the variable which is bound in the complex sentence 
has got to be present also, unbound, in the simple sentence ‗It rains‘. Whoever 
accepts the analysis of adverbial modification in terms of variadic functions must 
reject (SUP), however. 
 According to the variadic analysis, the phrase ‗everywhere I go‘ does not 
merely contribute what binds the variable, it also contributes the variable itself, i.e. 
the extra argument-role for a location. The phrase ‗everywhere I go‘ has a dual role 
exactly like that of any prepositional phrase. Consider ‗in Paris‘. In ‗In Paris it rains‘, 
the prepositional phrase ‗in Paris‘ contributes both (a) a variadic function which adds 
an extra argument-role to the set of argument-roles of the input predicate ‗rain‘, and 
(b) an argument which fills the role. This duality is quite transparent since the 
prepositional phrase consists of two items: a preposition which determines the type of 
the extra argument-role, and a name which specifies what fills the role. When the 
prepositional phrase is an ‗intransitive preposition‘ like ‗here‘, it is less obvious that it 
plays two semantic roles, but it does so nonetheless. In ‗It rains here‘, the locative 
adverb ‗here‘ contributes a variadic function which increases the valence of the 
expressed relation, and it also contributes a specific location which fills the extra 
argument-role. We find the same duality when the phrase is quantificational instead 
of being singular. In ‗Everywhere I go, it rains‘, the phrase ‗everywhere I go‘ 
contributes both the expansive (adicity-increasing) variadic function and the operator 
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which binds the extra argument-role. From the point of view of the variadic analysis, 
therefore, the proper representation of ‗Everywhere I go it rains‘ is: 
 
[For every place l such that I go to l ] (in l  (it rains)) 
 
What the quantifier operates on here is the subformula ‗in l (it rains)‘, whose free 
variable it binds. In that subformula we do find a variable for a location. The simple 
sentence ‗It rains‘ does not correspond to that subformula, however, but to the sub-
subformula ‗it rains‘, which does not contain a free variable for a location. Stanley‘s 
argument goes through only if we conflate two different things: the open sentence on 
which the quantifier operates, and the simple sentence ‗It rains‘ to which the phrase 
‗everywhere I go‘ has been adjoined. On the variadic analysis, they are clearly 
distinguished. 
 
7.7. Conclusion: the failure of Indexicalism 
 
Stanley uses the Binding Criterion in attempting to establish that, in examples like ‗It 
rains‘, the contextually provided location is not a optional ingredient of truth-
conditional content, as the contextualists claim, but results from contextually 
assigning a value to a free variable. The same argument can be used in indefinitely 
many cases to show that what was thought to be an optional ingredient of truth-
conditional content is not really. Indeed, the Binding argument is the major weapon 
Stanley uses in his indexicalist assault on Contextualism. It is this argument which 
Stanley and Szabo use to show that quantifier domain restriction is an instance of 
saturation. 
In this chapter we have seen that Stanley's attempt fails. It fails because the 
Binding Argument rests on a fallacy. The construction ‗rain + locative prepositional 
phrase‘ expresses a relation in which there is indeed an empty argument-slot for a 
location. When the prepositional phrase is quantified, as in ‗Everywhere I go it rains‘, 
the variable representing that empty slot is indeed bound. But in the simple 
construction, without prepositional phrase, there is neither an empty argument-slot for 
a location nor a free variable. That is so because the quantified prepositional phrase 
(QPP) does more than bind the variable; it also contributes the variadic function ‗in l’ 
which maps the relation ‗rain‘ to ‗rain_in_l’. If we disregard the prepositional phrase 
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and abstract from its contribution, we suppress the variadic function and the free 
variable that goes with it. 
I conclude that 'It rains' no more contains a free variable for a location than 'he 
is eating' (with intransitive 'eat') contains a free variable for the thing eaten. When, in 
context, an implicit location is contextually supplied, or when some specific piece of 
food (e.g. the dangerous mushroom) is tacitly understood as being the thing eaten, 
the contextual ingredient thus provided is not assigned to a free variable; it does not 
come to fill a pre-existing gap in semantic structure, but enriches the interpretation of 
the utterance, in a typical top-down manner. This is similar to the sort of enrichment 
that takes place in (12) (Rumelhart's policeman example). 
With quantifier domain restriction also the Binding Argument fails. As Stanley 
and Szabo themselves mention, 
 
one might respond [to the argument] by conceding that in sentences such as 
(1)-(3) there is a quantifier domain variable that is bound by the initial 
quantifier, but deny that in an 'unembedded' sentence such as 
 
(16) John failed exactly three students 
 
there is a quantifier domain variable present. According to this response, a 
variable is associated with quantifier expressions only in the special case of 
bound readings such as (1)-(3). (Stanley and Szabo 2000: 244) 
 
This exactly parallels the response I made to the Binding Argument as applied to the 
'rain' example. Now Stanley and Szabo think they can dispose of this response, in 
the quantifier domain case. They write: 
 
Consideration of facts from ellipsis serves to dispose of this response. 
Consider the discourse: 
 
(17) John has failed exactly three Frenchmen. In fact, in most classes 
John has taught, he has. 
 
The natural reading of the second sentence in (17) is that in most classes x 
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such that John has taught x, he has failed exactly three Frenchmen in x. 
However, if there is no quantifier domain variable present in the initial 
sentence in (17), then there is no way of deriving the natural reading of the 
second sentence. 
The second sentence of (17) is a standard case of syntactic ellipsis 
(verb phrase ellipsis). According to standard theories of such ellipsis, the 
predicate 'failed exactly three Frenchment' in the first sentence is copied or 
reconstructed in the final syntactic structure of the second sentence. If there is 
no quantifier domain variable available for binding in the predicate 'failed 
exactly three Frenchmen' in the first sentence of (17), then the result of 
copying or reconstructing it in the logical form of the second sentence will also 
not contain a bindable variable, in which case there will be no way to derive its 
natural reading... Therefore, on the assumption that standard theories of 
syntactic ellipsis are correct, there is a bindable variable for quantifier domains 
present even in sentences such as (16). (Stanley and Szabo 2000: 244-5.) 
 
In this passage, however, Stanley and Szabo commit the Binding Fallacy once again. 
Let us see why. 
I suggested that the quantified prepositional phrase ‗everywhere I go‘ in 
‗Everywhere I go, it rains‘ has a dual role. It does not merely contribute what binds 
the variable, it also contributes the variable itself, i.e. the extra argument-role for a 
location.  From this point of view the proper representation of ‗Everywhere I go it 
rains‘ is: 
 
[For every place l such that I go to l ] (in l  (it rains)) 
 
What the quantifier operates on here is the subformula ‗in l (it rains)‘, whose free 
variable it binds. The simple sentence ‗It rains‘ does not correspond to that 
subformula, but to the sub-subformula ‗it rains‘, which does not contain a free 
variable for a location.  
The same analysis can be applied to the case of quantifier domain restriction. 
On this analysis the second sentence of (17) will be represented as: 
 
[For most classes x such that John has taught x] (in x (John has failed exactly three 
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Frenchmen)) 
 
What the quantifier operates on here is the subformula 'in x (John has failed exactly 
three Frenchmen)', whose free variable it binds. The first sentence of (17) does not 
correspond to that subformula, however, but to the sub-subformula occurring within 
the rightmost parentheses. In other words, the quantified prepositional phrase 'In 
most classes he has taught' contributes not only the quantifier 'for most classes x 
such that John has taught x', it also contributes the variadic function 'in x' with its free 
variable. All the material that is underlined in the above formula, including the domain 
variable, corresponds to what the QPP contributes. So it is a fallacy to conclude, as 
Stanley and Szabo do, that "if there is no quantifier domain variable present in the 
initial sentence in (17), then there is no way of deriving the natural reading of the 
second sentence." There is an easy way of deriving that reading: one has merely to 
assume that the QPP contributes the variable as well as the quantifier which binds it. 
On this analysis, the result of copying or reconstructing the first sentence of (17) in 
the logical form of the second sentence will not contain a bindable variable, but that's 
fine since the bindable variable is contributed independently by the QPP. 
 Of course, it does not follow that quantifier domain restriction is not an 
instance of saturation. The only thing that follows is that Stanley's and Szabo's 
argument in favour of an indexicalist treatment in terms of saturation is fallacious and 
must be disregarded. Contrary to what they claim, they have not "demonstrated the 
existence of quantifier domain variables" (Stanley and Szabo 2000: 245). It remains 
an open question whether quantifier domain restriction is best treated as an instance 
of enrichment or as an instance of saturation. The Optionality Criterion does not 
settle the issue because, as we have seen, it gives no clear result in that sort of case. 
In other cases, however, the Optionality Criterion works reasonably well; well enough 
for us to conclude (pace Stanley) that there are cases in which some ingredient of 
truth-conditional content results from a pragmatic process of the optional variety. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Circumstances of evaluation 
 
 
In this book we have been concerned with the contribution context makes to truth-
conditional content. How essential is that contribution, and how much controlled by 
linguistic conventions? Those are two of the main questions we have dealt with, in an 
attempt to revive the debate between Literalism and Contextualism. In this chapter 
we will consider a fundamental dimension under which context contributes to truth-
conditional content: the so-called 'circumstance of evaluation'. 
Truth-evaluation (or semantic evaluation more generally) requires not merely a 
content to evaluate, but also a 'circumstance' against which to evaluate that content. 
As Austin once put it, "it takes two to make a truth". The circumstance of evaluation is 
not an aspect of the content to be evaluated, but an entity with respect to which that 
content is evaluated. Still, according to the theory of situations to be introduced in this 
chapter, the circumstance of evaluation is an aspect of content in a broader sense of 
'content'. And that aspect of content is irreducibly contextual. 
 
8.1 Modality 
 
The notion of circumstance of evaluation is familiar from modal logic. In modal logic, 
propositions are evaluated relative to 'possible worlds'. The possible worlds are 
necessary to truth-evaluation, but they are not themselves represented in the 
propositions that we evaluate. Thus 'I am French' is true, with respect to a world w, iff 
I am French in w; but the sentence 'I am French' only talks about me and the property 
of being French. The world of evaluation is not a constituent of the content to be 
evaluated. 
One can bring the world into the content by making the statement more 
complex. The complex sentence 'Possibly, I am French' tells us that in some possible 
world I am French. The modal statement I make by uttering that sentence is about 
possible worlds, not merely about me and the property of being French. In hybrid 
logic (a variety of modal logic), one can even make statements 'referring' to specific 
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possible worlds: 'In w, I am French'.56 But the worlds that are thus introduced into 
the content of the complex statement (via modal operators such as 'Possibly' or 'in 
w') are used in evaluating the simple statement 'I am French', i.e. the statement that 
is embedded within the modal statement. The modal statement itself is evaluated 
with respect to possible worlds, and it shares with the simple statement the property 
that the world with respect to which it is evaluated is not itself represented in the 
statement under evaluation.57 
To appreciate the unarticulated character of the circumstance of evaluation in 
the modal framework, it is worth looking at what happens when we (standardly) 
translate a modal statement into first-order logic, by explicitly quantifying over 
possible worlds. Thus translated 'Necessarily p' becomes 'w p(w)', 'Possibly p' 
becomes w p(w), etc. All complete sentences are transformed into predicates (of 
worlds). A simple categoric statement such as 'Rain is wet' will be represented as 
'p(w)', where 'p' is the proposition that rain is wet transformed into a predicate of 
worlds, and 'w' is a free variable to which the actual world is contextually assigned as 
default value. 
The big difference between the modal statement and its standard extensional 
translation is that, in the extensional framework, the circumstance of evaluation (the 
world) becomes a constituent of content. The contrast between content and 
circumstance is lost. This is too bad, for that contrast makes a lot of sense. To 
evaluate a sentence, we determine whether the state of affairs it describes obtains in 
some 'reality' which serves as circumstance of evaluation. But that reality — the 
actual world, say — is not itself, or at least doesn't have to be, among the 
constituents of the state of affairs in question, i.e. among the entities that are talked 
about and articulated in the content of the proposition. The world comes into the 
picture for purposes of evaluation, but the thoughts that are evaluated need not be 
metaphysically elaborated thoughts about the world. Indeed the users of the 
language need not even have the ability to entertain such thoughts. Only the theorist 
needs to be able to talk about the world of evaluation, in her metalanguage. The 
                                            
56  See P. Blackburn, 'Hybrid Logic Manifesto', 
57 The possible worlds which the modal statement talks about are themselves possible with 
respect to the world relative to which the modal statement happens to be evaluated. 
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thoughts that are evaluated 'concern' the world, but they need not be 'about' it in the 
sense in which they are about the entities which they represent. (See Perry 1986 for 
the distinction between 'concerning' and 'being about'.) 
Let us consider a simple language without modal operators or other means of 
talking about worlds; let us go further and assume that the users of the language 
don't possess the reflective abilities necessary for thinking about modal issues. They 
entertain only nonmodal thoughts such as 'Rain is wet'. The possible-worlds 
semanticist who studies their language will still need to think and talk about the 
possible worlds relative to which the sentences of the language are evaluated; but, 
contrary to what the standard extensional translation suggests, mention of the 
possible worlds in question will be confined to the theorist's metalanguage. 
Now suppose the users of the object-language become sophisticated and start 
thinking about metaphysical issues. Suppose they come to talk and think about what 
is actually the case as opposed to what might be the case. Such modal talk can be 
formally represented in two ways, as we have seen: by using sentence operators, or 
by explicitly quantifying world variables in the object-language. If we use the modal 
framework and introduce modal operators such as 'actually' or 'possibly', nothing will 
be changed for the fragment of the language that does not involve those operators. 
The sentence 'Rain is wet' will still be a simple, modally innocent sentence. The 
language will simply have been enriched by the introduction of new resources 
enabling us to construct more complex sentences. But if we use the standard 
extensional framework and represent modal sentences ('It might be that...', 
'Actually...') by means of explicit quantification over possible worlds, as suggested 
above, then, unless special precaution is taken to avoid that consequence, a change 
of language takes place, not merely an enrichment. In the new language, all 
sentences (including simple sentences) now contain a hidden argument-place for a 
world. Modal innocence is lost forever. 
 I think this move is (almost) as damaging as the previous one — the ascription 
of thought and talk about possible worlds to modally innocent subjects. Even if the 
users of the language are sophisticated enough and can think about modal issues, it 
is misleading to suggest that they always think and talk about such issues even when 
they entertain simple thoughts or utter simple sentences such as 'Rain is wet'. By 
forcing us to construe e.g. the assertion that rain is wet as involving a covert 
argument-place which the actual world fills, the extensional translation blurs the 
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cognitively important distinction between the simple, modally innocent assertion 'Rain 
is wet' and the modal assertion 'Actually, rain is wet'. To maintain that distinction, we 
have to see modal sentences as constructed from simple sentences by the 
application of modal operators to them. In this way we can analyse the ability to use 
and understand modal sentences as resting on two distinct abilities: the ability to use 
and understand simple sentences; and the ability to imagine other possible worlds 
and to contrast the actual world with them. The first ability is independent from the 
second: we can use and understand simple sentences (e.g. 'Rain is wet') even if we 
lack the ability to think thoughts about the actual world (in Perry's sense of 'about'). 
 The important thing, I said, is to see modal sentences as constructed from 
simple sentences by means of operators. Now this is something we can do even if 
we want to represent modal talk extensionally. The apparatus of variadic functions 
enables us to do just that. In §7.6 I analysed 'Everywhere I go it rains' as resulting 
from the application of a locative variadic operator to the sentence 'It rains'. That 
operator does two things. First, it modifies the adicity of the predicate in the sentence 
it applies to: it adds an extra argument-place for a location, which can be represented 
by a free variable. Second, it introduces a restricted quantifier which binds that 
variable. The operator can be paraphrased as 'for every location l such that I go to l, 
in l it is the case that'. 'Necessarily it rains' can be represented in the same hybrid 
way, by applying to the sentence 'It rains' a sentence operator which can be rendered 
as: 'for every world w, in w it is the case that'. Since the variable 'w' is introduced by 
the variadic operator, we don't have to treat the emergence of modalities as a radical 
change in the language, but simply as an enrichment of it; an enrichment which does 
not affect the simple (nonmodal) sentences, hence preserves modal Innocence. 
 
8.2. Time and tense 
 
The difference we have found between two ways of representing modality can be 
found also between two ways of representing tense, one which preserves temporal 
innocence in simple sentences and one which does not. 
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In tense logic, tense is represented by means of sentence operators.58 
Alternatively, tenses can be represented by adding extra argument-places for 
times.59 If we choose the latter course, it is no longer possible to consider adjectives 
such as 'warm' or 'yellow' as denoting properties; they have to be considered as 
denoting relations — relations between the objects which have the alleged properties 
and the times at which they have them. As Michael Dummett has pointed out, this 
relational approach significantly departs from our habitual way of thinking: 
 
We think of adjectives such as "warm", "smooth", "slender" and so on as 
denoting properties; properties that a thing may have at one time, and not at 
another, but nevertheless properties rather than relations between objects and 
times. And this goes with the way in which we come to understand such 
adjectives. To know what it is for someone to be my nephew, I have first to 
learn what it is for anyone to be the nephew of any given person. But we do not 
begin by learning in what relation an object must stand to an arbitrary time for it 
to be warm or wet at that time, and then, having learned what time is referred to 
by the adverb "now", derive from this a grasp of what it is for it to be warm now. 
Rather, we first learn what it is for something to be warm, wet, smooth or 
slender, that is to say, for the predicate "is warm (wet, smooth, slender)" to be 
applicable to it, where the verb "is" is in the true present tense. From this we 
advance to an understanding of what is meant by saying of an object that it was 
                                            
58 Barbara Partee (1973) says that examples like 'I did not turn off the stove' (in which 
reference is made to a specific time) speak against a treatment in terms of operators, because 
modal operators can't capture the referential nature of (some uses of) tenses. But the 
referential/quantificational issue is orthogonal to the question, whether or not we should use 
operators. Even if standard modal operators are quantificational rather than referential, 
nothing prevents the introduction of 'referential' operators in the modal framework. See Prior 
19xx, Cresswell 19xx, Blackburn 19xx. 
59 There is a third option: tenses can be represented as temporal predicates of events. If we 
choose Davidson's analysis of adverbial modification instead of the variadic analysis, this is a 
natural move to make. 
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or will be warm, etc., at some other time. The advance is made by our acquiring 
a general grasp of the past and future tenses. That is to say, to understand 
"was warm" or "will be warm", we apply to our prior understanding of what is 
meant by saying that something is warm our general comprehension of what it 
is to speak of how things were or will be at another time. In so doing, we are in 
effect treating the tenses (and other indications of time) as operators applied to 
sentences in the present tense of which we have previously acquired an 
understanding, just as the tense-logical semantics treats them. We could not 
learn the language in  any other way. (Existence, Possibility, and Time, ms pp. 
16-17) 
 
Dummett's complaint about the relational treatment of tenses parallels my complaint 
about the extensional rendering of modal talk. The relational treatment threatens 
temporal innocence, just as overt quantification over world variables (without variadic 
functions) threatens modal innocence. 
 In the temporal case there is a possible objection, due to the fact that tense is 
(to put it crudely) obligatory in English. Since it is, one might argue that there is no 
such thing as nontemporal talk, hence no such thing as temporal innocence. 
According to that line of argument, there is a contrast between time and modality: 
there are simple, nonmodal sentences, whose characteristics must admittedly be 
preserved and captured; but there are no simple, nontemporal sentences in our 
language. 
 From the tense-logical point of view, that objection is misguided. The present 
tense is not a tense like the past or the future. It is more primitive and, in a sense, 
temporally neutral. Someone can think 'It is hot in here' even if she has no notion of 
time whatsoever, hence no mastery of the past and the future. If this is right, mastery 
of genuine temporal talk rests on two distinct abilities: the ability to use and 
understand simple sentences (i.e. sentences in the present) and the ability to think 
about times and to constrast the past and the future with the present. As in the case 
of modality, the first ability is independent from the second. 
 It is true that, when we say or think 'It is hot in here', we talk (or think) about 
what is presently the case; we characterize the situation at the time of utterance. Yet 
this is not part of what the sentence itself expresses. The content of the sentence, 
from the tense-logical point of view, is a function from times to truth-values. When the 
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sentence is uttered, the function is applied to the time of utterance. That is so 
whether the sentence is in the present or any other tense. Even if I say 'It has been 
hot' or 'It will be hot', I characterize the time of utterance (and, in relation to it, some 
earlier or later time). The time of utterance, which the sentence is used to 
characterise, is the time with respect to which we evaluate the sentence. The best 
thing I can do here it to quote Prior, the founder of tense logic: 
 
If tenses are formed by attaching prefixes like 'It has been the case that' to the 
present tense, or to a complex with a present tense 'kernel', it is not always 
true to say that what is in the present tense is understood as a 
characterisation of the time of utterance; rather, it characterises whatever time 
we are taken to by the series of prefixes. The presentness of an event, we 
may say, is simply the occurrence of the event, and that is simply the event 
itself. But every complete tensed sentence characterises the time of utterance 
in some way or other, and other times only through their relation to that one. 
(A. Prior, Worlds, Times and Selves, p. 30)  
 
To sum up, the time of utterance is not represented, it does not feature in the content 
of tensed sentences; it only comes into the picture as the circumstance with respect 
to which the content of a tensed sentence is evaluated. 
Another objection, voiced by Evans, concerns the fact that a tensed sentence 
like 'It is hot', 'It has been hot' or 'It will be hot' is not evaluable as true or false, unless 
we are given a particular time. In the absence of a time specification, the sentence is 
only 'true-at' certain times and 'false-at' others. Such a sentence, therefore, is 
semantically incomplete by Frege's lights: 
 
A thought is not true at one time and false at another, but it is either true or 
false, tertium non datur. The false appearance that a thought can be true at one 
time and false at another arises from an incomplete expression. A complete 
proposition or expression of a thought must also contain a time datum. (quoted 
in Evans, Coll. Papers, p. 350) 
 
As Evans points out, the problem of semantic incompleteness does not arise in the 
modal case. Even if a thought is said to be 'true at' one world and 'false at' another, 
 139 
as in modal logic, this does not prevent it from being true (or false) tout court. It is 
true tout court iff it is true-at the actual world. But the 'thought' that it is hot cannot be 
evaluated as true or false tout court. In the absence of a contextually supplied time it 
can only be ascribed relative, 'truth-at'-conditions. Only a particular, dated utterance 
of such a sentence can be endowed with genuine truth-conditions. What this shows 
is that the time of utterance is part of the (complete) content of the utterance;60 
hence it cannot be expelled out of the content and treated like the world of 
evaluation. So the objection goes. 
According to Dummett, Evans's objection to Prior is based on a 
misunderstanding. Prior was concerned only with sentence-types and their contents. 
The content of a sentence-type is a function from times to truth-values, hence a 
sentence-type has only relative truth-conditions: it is true at some times and false at 
other times. To introduce a notion of absolute truth, one thing we can say (though 
not, according to Dummett, what Prior himself would say)61 is that, when a sentence 
is uttered, the function which is its content is applied to some contextually provided 
time (typically, the time of utterance). The time in question serves as circumstance of 
evaluation for the utterance: the utterance is true tout court iff the sentence is 'true-at' 
the contextually provided time. As Dummett points out, 
 
The variable truth-value and the absolute truth-value attach to different things; 
it is the type sentence that is true at one time, false at another, but the 
utterance that is true or false simpliciter (Dummett, p. 44) 
 
 Since there are two distinct levels, corresponding to the sentence-type and 
the utterance, there is no harm in taking the utterance to possess a 'content' also 
(contentu), distinct from that of the sentence (contents). For example, we can treat 
                                            
60 Or, in a Fregean framework, part of the expression of such a content. 
61 "The simplest way to introduce a notion of absolute truth", Dummett writes in the same 
manuscript, "is to follow the analogy with possible words semantics and stipulate a type 
sentence to be true simpliciter just in case it is true-now. Tense-logic, in the hands of its 
inventor, could be regarded, without violation of its principles, as a semantics exclusively of 
statements uttered at one particular time". 
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the utterance as expressing a structured proposition consisting of (i) the contextually 
provided time as subject, and (ii) the content of the sentence-type, predicated of that 
time. But if we do so, we must acknowledge the unarticulated nature of the 'subject' 
in the contentu of tensed utterances. As Prior says, "tensed propositions are 
understood as directly or indirectly characterising the unmentioned time of utterance" 
(Worlds, times and selves, p. 30). Hence there is a trade-off: if we want to restrict 
ourselves to what is linguistically articulated, we must focus on the contents, which is 
'semantically incomplete' by Frege's lights — it corresponds to the content of a 
predicate rather than to that of a complete sentence in a logically perfect language. If, 
following Frege, we want to focus on the complete content of the utterance, that 
which makes it truth-evaluable in absolute terms, we must acknowledge the role 
played in that content (contentu) by unarticulated constituents corresponding to the 
circumstances in which the contents is evaluated. 
 
8.3. Situations 
 
Let us take stock. For purposes of semantic evaluation we need a circumstance as 
well as a content. Even Frege, who was unconcerned by modalities and thought of 
the actual world as the only world there is, was aware of that fact. He took fictional 
sentences to be unevaluable, for the following reason: since the author of a fictional 
statement does not attempt to characterize the actual world, we are given a content 
without any circumstance of evaluation for it. The obvious conclusion to draw from 
Frege's remarks on fiction is that, to get a truth-value, a content is not sufficient; we 
need to connect that content with the actual world, via the assertive force of the 
utterance, in virtue of which the content is presented as characterizing that world. 
Frege was aware not only that we need a circumstance in addition to a content, but 
also that the circumstance is not, and cannot be, an aspect of the content articulated 
in the sentence. If a sentence lacks the force of a serious assertion, because the 
speaker does not attempt to characterize the actual world but is engaged in a 
different enterprise (e.g. poetry), making the content of the sentence more complex 
by means of operators such as 'it is true that' will not change the situation. Whether 
or not an utterance is serious and characterizes the actual world is a pragmatic 
matter — a matter of 'force', not a matter of content (in the narrow sense of 'content'). 
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 Once it is admitted that we need a circumstance over and above the content to 
be evaluated, we can part from Frege and, following Prior, tolerate contents that are 
not 'semantically complete' in Frege's sense, i.e. endowed with absolute truth-
conditions. We can, because the circumstance is there which enables the content to 
be suitably completed. Thus the content of tensed sentences is semantically 
incomplete, yet the circumstance (the time) relative to which such a sentence is 
evaluated is sufficient to complete it. It follows that we must distinguish two levels of 
content. The content we evaluate with respect to the circumstance is the contents; it 
may, but need not be, semantically complete by Frege's lights. What is semantically 
complete in any case is the contentu. It consists of the contents and the circumstance 
with respect to which the contents is evaluated. 
 Situation theory as I understand it62 follows those ideas to their 
consequences. It generalizes and systematizes them, in two main directions: 
 
1. There is no reason why only times and worlds should be accepted as features of 
the circumstance of evaluation. Why not also, for example, locations? If I say 'It's 
raining', the location is unarticulated, but it is relevant qua feature of the circumstance 
of evaluation: what I say (or think) is true iff it's raining at the contextually provided 
location. Why not also consider the agent of the speech act (the speaker) or the 
thought act (the thinker) as (part of) the circumstance of evaluation, to handle the 
cases in which the content to be evaluated is a property of agents which the speaker 
or thinker self-attributes (see Lewis, "Attitudes de dicto and de se", 1979)? Why not 
extend the notion also to ordinary objects? If, talking about my car, the mechanics 
tells me, 'The carburettor is in good condition but there is a problem with the front 
wheels', my car is a crucial feature of the circumstance of evaluation. It is true (or 
false) of my car that the carburettor is in good condition, etc. The same thing could 
have been said of another car, but as things turn out it is my car which figures in the 
                                            
62  By 'situation theory' here I do not mean the official doctrine expounded in Barwise and 
Perry's Situations and Attitudes (1983), but a body of ideas centered around the notion of 
'Austinian proposition' (Barwise 1989, Barwise and Etchemendy 1987, Recanati 1997b, 1999, 
2000; see also Perry 1986 where some of these ideas originate). My version is, I admit, fairly 
idiosyncratic. 
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contentu of the mechanics's utterance. 
 Rather than list all the features which may figure in a circumstance of 
evaluation, let us follow Barwise, Perry and others and use the word 'situation' to 
denote any entity or complex of entities which can play that role. Anything counts as 
a situation provided, for some sentence S, it makes sense to ask whether or not what 
S expresses is true in it (or 'of it' or 'at it' or 'with respect to it'). Ordinary situations — 
restricted portions of the actual world — are, of course, the paradigmatic case of a 
situation in this generalized sense. 
 
2. When the content of the sentence is semantically incomplete, it is the utterance 
which is the proper bearer of (absolute) truth-value. Thus tensed sentences only 
have relative truth-values, they express 'relativized propositions' (Perry 1979), and 
we need to shift to utterances to get absolute truth-values and absolute propositions. 
Traditional theorists think that with sentences that are not relevantly context-sensitive 
and whose content is not semantically incomplete, there is no need to invoke a 
double layer of content. The content of the sentence, insofar as it has an absolute 
truth-value, is the only thing we need. 
Situation theory rejects that viewpoint. In situation theory, the content of a 
sentence (whatever the sentence) is a function from situations to truth-values. Hence 
the relativity of truth, construed as a property of sentences: the same sentence may 
be true relative to a situation and false relative to another one. That is so even if the 
sentence itself is not relevantly context-sensitive or semantically incomplete. Even 
when the sentence is truth-evaluable in the absolute sense — when it is 'semantically 
complete' by Frege's lights — situation theory says there is a principled distinction 
between the contents of the sentence and the contentu of the utterance. In such a 
case, the contents will be a 'classical' proposition (a function from possible worlds to 
truth-values), and the contentu will contain a situation in addition to that proposition. 
What the utterance 'says' is that the situation in question supports the proposition in 
question. It follows that two distinct evaluations are possible, in such cases. We can 
evaluate the sentence itself (i.e. evaluate the proposition with respect to the actual 
world), or we can evaluate the utterance, that is, evaluate the proposition with respect 
to the situation figuring in the contentu.  
 I can't refrain from quoting my favourite example here (from Barwise and 
 143 
Etchemendy 1987). Commenting upon a poker game I am watching, I say: 'Claire 
has a good hand'. What I say is true, iff Claire has a good hand in the poker game I 
am watching (at the time of utterance). But suppose I made a mistake and Claire is 
not among the players in that game. Suppose further that, by coincidence, she 
happens to be playing poker in some other part of town and has a good hand there. 
Still, my utterance is not intuitively true, because the situation it concerns (the poker 
game I am watching) is not one in which Claire has a good hand. But we can say that 
the sentence is true, or at least true at the time of utterance: for it says that Claire has 
a good hand, and Claire has a good hand (somewhere). The unarticulated 
constituent which distinguishes the contentu from the contents makes all the 
difference here, and it accounts for our intuitive classification of the utterance as non-
true. 
 
8.4. Saturation or enrichment? 
 
The situation-theoretic framework I have sketched can, hopefully, be used to handle 
some of the examples of enrichment discussed in previous chapters: 
 
(1) I've had breakfast <this morning> 
(2) You're not going to die <from that cut> 
(3) It's raining <here> 
 
We may construe the contentu of (2) as involving as unarticulated subject the cut-
finger situation in which the child finds himself. The utterance is true, because that 
situation is not one in which the child is going to die. (That is: it is not the case that, in 
that situation, there is a time t posterior to the time of utterance t* such that the 
addressee dies at t. There is bound to be a time t posterior to t* at which the 
addressee dies, but it is presumably not to be found in that particular, temporally 
restricted situation, corresponding to the cutting event and its immediate 
consequences.) Similarly, (1) posits the past existence of a breakfast event, and is 
evaluated with respect to a certain day. It is therefore true iff, on that day, there is a 
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time t anterior to the time of utterance t* such that the speaker has breakfast at t.63 
 I keep assuming that the above examples are instances of free enrichment 
(rather than instances of saturation), but this still is an open question. Contrary to 
what one might think, the situation-theoretic framework can accommodate both 
options. It all depends on whether we think that the relevant circumstantial 
constituent is necessary for the utterance to express a complete proposition, i.e. a 
function from possible worlds to truth-values. 
Consider (3). If we take the sentence 'It is raining' to express a complete 
proposition once a time has been contextually provided, then the provision of the 
unarticulated location is an instance of enrichment. The sentence expresses the 
proposition that there is rain (at the relevant time) and this is evaluated relative to a 
specific location. Insofar as the sentence expresses a complete proposition (with 
respect to a given time), that proposition can also be evaluated 'directly', that is, it can 
be evaluated with respect to the actual world. Thus evaluated the proposition comes 
out true, since there is rain (at the present time) in the actual world. So we find the 
two levels of truth-conditions talked about earlier, corresponding to the contentu and 
the contents. On the other hand, if we think that we need to be contextually given a 
place and not merely a time in order to get a function from possible worlds to truth-
values, then we hold that the contextual provision of a location is a matter of 
saturation. The contents is now taken to be semantically incomplete even after a time 
has been contextually provided: with respect to a given world-time pair, 'It's raining' 
only expresses a function from places to truth-values. This is like the case of tensed 
sentences, whose contents, as we have seen, are semantically incomplete. The 
distinction between the two levels of content — the contents and the contentu — still 
holds, whether or not the contents is semantically complete. The provision of the 
relevant circumstantial constituent is an instance of saturation when the contents is 
incomplete, and it is an instance of enrichment when it is complete. The same two 
options are presumably available for (1) and (2), in the situation-theoretic framework. 
                                            
63  Admittedly, that is not even a sketch of an analysis. Detailed work is needed to 
substantiate the claim that (1) and (2) can be appropriately handled in this sort of way. In 
particular, the relations between the various 'coordinates' of the circumstance of evaluation 
must be exactly specified. 
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The contextual restriction of the domain of quantification can also be handled 
as the provision of a circumstance of evaluation, without begging the question 
whether this is an instance of enrichment or saturation. First option: We take a 
sentence such as 'Everybody is tired' to determine a function from possible worlds to 
truth-values (again, once a time has been contextually provided) — a function that 
yields truth with respect to all worlds in which everybody is tired. That function can 
then be evaluated with respect to a particular situation, in which case it will yield truth 
iff everybody in that situation is tired. Second option: we decide that the contextual 
provision of a time is not sufficient — an appropriate domain for the quantifier, that is, 
a particular set of people, must also be contextually provided for the sentence to 
express a complete proposition. Whether we take the first or the second option, in 
both cases a particular set of people can be contextually provided via the situation of 
evaluation and serve as domain for the quantifier. But its contextual provision will  be 
considered as an instance of enrichment if we take the first option, and as an 
instance of saturation if we take the second option. 
 
8.5. Sub-sentential circumstances 
 
A well-known objection to the situation-theoretic treatment of quantifier domain 
restriction concerns cases in which there are more than one quantifier, and possibly 
more than one contextual domain, in a given sentence. The sentence 'Every sailor 
waved to every sailor' can be used to mean that every sailor on the ship waved to 
every sailor on the shore (Stanley and Williamson 1995). Since we can have only one 
circumstance of evaluation for that sentence, how can we deal with this multiplicity of 
contextual domains? This is also the objection raised by Scott Soames to the 
situation-theoretic treatment of incomplete definite descriptions (Soames 1986).64 
As I pointed out in 'Domains of Discourse' (Recanati 1996), the answer to this 
difficulty consists in multiplying situations of evaluation. This can be done by 
extending to sub-sentential expressions the notion of a circumstance of evaluation. 
Thus, following Kuroda (1982), I have argued that every predicate requires a situation 
of evaluation (Recanati 1987, forthcoming). Let me briefly sketch a treatment of 
                                            
64 Soames, S. (1986), Incomplete Definite Descriptions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal 
Logic 27: 349-75. 
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quantifier domain restriction within that framework. 
In a standard conception, predicates denote sets of objects, and quantifiers 
denote relations between sets of objects. In 'Every F is G', 'every' denotes that 
relation which holds between the set of Fs and the set of Gs just in case the former is 
included in the latter. Now predicates denote sets of objects only relative to 
situations. It follows that, before we can evaluate a quantificational statement, we 
must evaluate the predicates with respect to situations so as to determine the sets of 
objects which serve as arguments to the quantifier.  
 When I say that predicates denote sets of objects only relative to situations, I 
intend this as a rather trivial point. Some objects are red in a given situation, which 
may no longer be red in a different (say, temporally posterior) situation. So the set of 
red objects is variable and depends upon the situation at stake, even if we do not 
vary the domain from one situation to the next. There may be properties which stick 
to their objects in the sense that, if an object has them in a situation, it must have 
them in any situation to the domain of which that object belongs. Even if there are 
such sticking properties, still the predicates which correspond to them will possibly 
denote different sets of objects in different situations because the domain of objects 
itself can vary from one situation to another. 
 So predicates require situations for their evaluation. The same thing holds for 
sentences, as we have seen. Whether a sentence is true or false depends upon how 
things are in the relevant situation of evaluation. Now the main predicate in that 
sentence — the predicate which corresponds to the topmost verb-phrase — will 
always be evaluated with respect to the situation of evaluation for the sentence in 
question. But the other predicates in the sentence will possibly involve distinct 
situations of evaluation ('resource situations', in the terminology of Barwise and Perry 
1983). 
Consider the simple sentence: 'Every student laughs'. There is simply no 
possibility of a divergence between the situation with respect to which the sentence is 
evaluated and the situation with respect to which the main predicate, 'laughs', is 
evaluated. That means that, if the sentence is evaluated with respect to some 
situation s, the set of laughers which serves as second argument to the quantifier 
'every' will be the set of laughers-in-s. In contrast, the predicate which occurs as part 
of the noun-phrase, 'student', can be evaluated with respect to any situation: it may 
be the situation of evaluation s (in which case every student-in-s is said to be among 
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the laughers-in-s), it may be the situation of utterance c (in which case every student-
in-c is said to be among the laughers-in-s), or it may be any auxiliary situation which 
happens to be sufficiently salient for either linguistic or extralinguistic reasons. 
In this framework, we can handle the problem of quantifier domain restriction 
(and the analogous problem of incomplete definite descriptions) via the provision of a 
situation of evaluation, or of a sequence of such situations. Again, this does not beg 
the question whether the provision of a situation for the evaluation of a given 
predicate is an instance of enrichment or of saturation. It's an instance of saturation 
if, like Stanley and Szabo, we take a situation variable (or something like that) to be 
associated with every common noun in logical form. But we may also consider that 
the provision of a situation of evaluation is not the assignment of a value to a variable 
in logical form, but an optional process which may or may not take place. Whenever 
that process does not take place, the situation of evaluation for the predicate can 
only be the situation of evaluation for the sentence. That means that if the sentence 
is semantically complete and we evaluate it directly relative to the actual world, the 
set of objects denoted by the predicate will be the set of objects which satisfy the 
predicate in the actual world.  
 
8.6. Conclusion 
 
As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, the possible worlds relative to 
which, in modal logic, sentences are evaluated are not aspects of the contents to be 
evaluated, but remain external to those contents. The same thing holds when time is 
the relevant circumstance of evaluation. Yet there is a difference between time and 
modality: the type of content that is evaluated with respect to a time in tense logic is 
not semantically complete in the sense in which the content which is evaluated with 
respect to a possible world is. This difference was emphasized by Evans in his attack 
on tense logic. But the proper response to make, on behalf of tense logic, is the 
drawing of a distinction between two levels of content. The content which a sentence 
articulates is one thing; the content of an utterance of that sentence, with respect to a 
given circumstance of evaluation, is another thing. Only the second, richer type of 
content is a legitimate bearer of truth-value, by Fregean lights. It follows that the 
truth-conditions of a tensed utterance crucially involves the circumstance of 
evaluation, which is not an aspect of the content articulated in the sentence. Hence 
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there is a fundamental aspect of truth-conditional content that is not articulated in the 
uttered sentence. 
The theory of situations I briefly introduced generalizes the lessons from tense 
logic. In this theory every utterance articulates a certain content and expresses a 
richer type of content (an 'Austinian proposition') consisting of the articulated content 
and the situation with respect to which that content is (intended to be) evaluated. The 
complete, Austinian proposition expressed by an utterance is true iff the situation of 
evaluation supports the articulated content. That content is typically not a classical 
proposition but a relativized proposition — a function from rich circumstances to truth-
values. 
In this framework there is an 'unarticulated constituent' in the (complete) 
content of every utterance, namely the circumstance of evaluation. Admittedly, there 
are different types of unarticulated constituent. 65 In many cases a circumstantial 
constituent counts as 'unarticulated' only in a weak sense. That is so whenever the 
constituent, without being explicitly represented in the articulated content, is 
nevertheless mandatory because that content is not semantically complete by 
Frege's lights. So the time of evaluation (i.e. the time relative to which an utterance is 
evaluated) is unarticulated because, as Prior says, it is 'unmentioned' in the 
utterance, yet its contextual provision results from a form of saturation: such a 
constituent must be provided in order to get a complete proposition, i.e. a function 
from possible-worlds to truth-values. In situation theory, however, the necessity to 
provide the relevant circumstantial constituent is exactly like the necessity to provide 
a possible world in order to determine a truth-value. In general, contents need 
circumstances for their evaluation. Once this is acknowledged, the door is open to 
relativized contents of all sorts, and the privilege given to classical propositions 
(functions from possible worlds to truth-values) over relativized propositions 
(functions from rich circumstances to truth-values) looks somewhat arbitrary.66 Be 
                                            
65  See footnote 47. 
66 Classical propositions fulfill two functions: they are the bearers of absolute truth-values, 
and they are the object of the attitudes. In the situation theoretic framework, the Austinian 
proposition fulfils the first function, and the articulated content (relativized proposition) fulfils 
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that as it may, a distinction must be drawn in all cases between the articulated 
content (contents) and the complete content of the utterance (contentu); and the 
irreducibly contextual nature of the circumstance that features in the contentu must be 
acknowledged. Insofar as this position generalizes the context-dependence of truth-
conditional content, it can be categorized as 'contextualist'. 
 Still, one might argue, the theory I have sketched posits a level of content that 
is very close to the linguistic meaning of the sentence: the contents. Insofar as it 
posits such a level, the theory of situations sounds more similar to the Syncretic View 
than to Contextualism or even Quasi-Contextualism. — I find this reaction natural, yet 
I maintain that the theory of situations is on the side of Contextualism. I concede that 
there are similarities with the Syncretic View, but they are more superficial than it 
looks. 
The main analogy consists in the fact that, in both cases, we find two levels of 
content: the proposition expressed by the sentence, and a richer proposition 
containing unarticulated constituents.67 Taken literally, 'You're not going to die' is 
                                                                                                                                        
the second function, for which classical propositions are in any case ill-suited. So it is unclear 
that we need classical propositions. 
67 In 'Situations and the structure of content' (Recanati 1999) I emphasized that analogy: 
[In situation theory] an utterance is true iff the situation s it refers to supports the fact 
 it expresses. The complete truth-conditional content of an utterance therefore is: 
s |= 
This complete content, or Austinian proposition, is distinct from the proposition  on 
the right hand side of the support sign '|='. So there are two levels of content, two 
propositions which every utterance expresses: the fact  which is stated, and the 
Austinian proposition to the effect that the situation of reference supports that fact. 
There is much in common between the right hand side in the Austinian proposition 
(I call it the 'nucleus') and minimalist content. (...) The Austinian framework, 
therefore, helps us to implement the compromise view imagined by Salmon and Bach. 
As in the latter we have four levels, with the notion of 'what is said' split in two: 
• sentence meaning 
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true iff the addressee is not going to die. This corresponds to the minimal proposition 
of the Syncretic View (what is strictly and literally said), and to the contents of 
situation theory. That content yields falsity in all possible worlds in which the 
addressee is not immortal. So the utterance counts as false ('literally false') if we 
evaluate the contents directly with respect to the actual world. If we take the intended 
situation of evaluation into account and evaluate the complete Austinian proposition 
(contentu), the utterance counts as true iff the addressee is not going to die in that 
particular situation (resulting from the cut). This truth-condition corresponds to the 
intuitive truth-conditions of the Syncretic View. 
 Despite this convergence between the two views, there are important 
differences. The articulated content (right-hand-side of the Austinian proposition) is 
unlike the minimal proposition of the syncretist in two respects: 
 
1. As we have seen, the articulated content of the situation theorist need not be 
a complete proposition; it may be a relativized proposition. In contrast, the 
minimal proposition must be a complete proposition, because the 'minimalist' 
criterion that is used in individuating it involves truth-evaluability.68 
2. More important in the context of the present discussion, there is absolutely no 
reason why the articulated content (contents) of the situation theorist should 
not be affected by primary pragmatic processes of the optional variety.69 
                                                                                                                                        
• what is said1: nucleus 
• what is said2: Austinian proposition 
• what is implicated 
(Recanati 1999: xx) 
68  Note, however, that some syncretists use a different criterion, and can therefore 
accommodate relativized propositions. Thus for Bach (who uses the 'IQ test' as criterion), 
what is literally said need not be a complete proposition, it may be a 'propositional radical'. 
Soames has recently come to endorse a similar view (see his "Naming and Asserting", in Z. 
Szabo ed., Semantics and Pragmatics, Oxford University Press). 
69  Hence it would be misleading to keep describing this content as 'the content of the type 
sentence', to use Dummett's words. The contents is as much a property of the utterance as the 
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Typically, the situation that is contextually provided for the evaluation of an 
utterance will contribute to shaping the content that is evaluated with respect 
to that situation: the meaning of words will naturally be enriched and adjusted 
to fit the intended situation of evaluation. So the articulated content of the 
situation theorist is definitely not the minimal proposition posited by the 
Syncretic View. 
                                                                                                                                        
contentu. The contents is the articulated content of the utterance, while the contentu is the 
complete content of the utterance (including the intended circumstance of evaluation). 
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Chapter 9 
 
Contextualism: How far can we go? 
 
 
 
9.1. The modulation of sense 
 
In context the meaning of words is adjusted or 'modulated' (Cruse 1986: 50-53) so as 
to fit what is being talked about. Sense modulation is essential to speech, because 
we use a (more or less) fixed stock of lexemes to talk about an indefinite variety of 
things, situations and experiences.70 Through the interaction between the context-
independent meanings of our words and the particulars of the situation talked about, 
contextualised, modulated senses emerge, appropriate to the situation at hand. The 
meaning of a word can thus be made contextually more specific, or it may, on the 
contrary, be loosened and suitably extended, as in metaphor. It may also  undergo 
'semantic transfer', etc. 
 According to many authors among those who have studied the phenomenon 
(e.g. Cohen 1986, Lahav 1989, Pustejovsky 1995), modulation is the process 
whereby the meaning of a given word is affected by the meanings of other words in 
the same sentence. Thus the meaning of the adjective 'light' is affected by the 
meaning of the noun it modifies: a light lunch is not light in quite the same sense in 
which a piece of luggage is said to be light (on this example, see Michael Pelczar, 
"Wittgensteinian Semantics", Nous 2000). According to Jonathan Cohen, this is one 
of the big differences between natural language and formal languages: "artificial 
languages satisfy an insulationist account whereas natural languages require an 
interactionist one" (1986, p.224). Cohen characterizes insulationalist and 
interactionist accounts as follows: 
 
According to the insulationist account the meaning of any one word that 
occurs in a particular sentence is insulated against interference from the 
                                            
70  "Since the universe never repeats itself exactly, everytime we speak we metaphorize" 
(Bolinger, Aspects of Language, p. xx). 
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meaning of any other word in the same sentence. On this view the 
composition of a sentence resembles the construction of a wall from bricks of 
different shapes. The result depends on the properties of the parts and the 
pattern of their combination. But just as each brick has exactly the same 
shape in every wall or part of a wall to which it is moved, so too each standard 
sense of a word or phrase is exactly the same in every sentence or part of a 
sentence in which it occurs... 
Interactionism makes the contradictory assertion: in some sentences in 
some languages the meaning of a word in a sentence may be determined in 
part by the word's verbal context in that sentence... On this view the 
composition of a sentence is more like the construction of a wall from sand-
bags of different kinds. Though the size, structure, texture and contents of a 
sand-bag restrict the range of shapes it can take on, the actual shape it adopts 
in a particular situation depends to a greater or lesser extent on the shapes 
adopted by other sand-bags in the wall, and the same sand-bag might take on 
a somewhat different shape in another wall or in a different position in the 
same wall. By exploiting local context in this way a language can be much 
more prolific of semantic variety than insulationalism can give it credit for 
being. ('How is conceptual Innovation Possible', Erkenntnis 25-2, 1986, pp. 
223-4). 
 
I agree with Cohen that the semantics of natural language is not insulationist. 
As I have been at pains to emphasize, the meaning of the whole is not constructed in 
a purely bottom up manner from the meanings of the parts. The meaning of the 
whole is influenced by top-down, pragmatic factors, and through the meaning of the 
whole the meanings of the parts are also affected. So we need a more 'interactionist' 
or even 'Gestaltist' approach to compositionality.71 But I think Cohen takes too 
narrow a view of the sort of interaction that sense modulation results from. 
Let us go back to the example discussed by Michael Pelczar: 
 
In these sentences: 
 
                                            
71  The idea of 'Gestaltist compositionality' comes from Victorri 1999. 
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'There was a light breeze from the south.' 
'This is a light package.' 
'The fire won't last with such light fuel.' 
 
— 'light' expresses a content having to do with intensity, weight, and density, 
respectively. And this clearly results from the fact that in the first sentence 
'light' is used to speak of a breeze, whereas in the second it is applied to 
describe a package, and in the third, to some fuel for a fire. (Pelczar 2000: 
488) 
 
According to Cohen, the sense of 'light' is modulated through its interaction with the 
meaning of the head noun ('breeze', 'package', 'fuel').72 I think this is not quite right. 
The meaning of the head-noun is not what matters most. It is, as Pelczar 
emphasizes, what the word "is used to speak of", what it "is applied to describe", that 
matters. Nothing prevents us from using 'light', in the same phrase 'light fuel', to 
characterize the weight of the fuel rather than its density, if this is what is relevant to 
us in the context at hand. We can even imagine a context in which 'light', as applied 
to a package, would characterize the intensity of the sound it emits. 
To take another example from Pelczar's study, the word 'get' takes on different 
senses — denotes different relations — depending on what fills the second 
argument-place of the relation. Thus 'Smith has gotten the virus' means that he has 
contracted the virus, while in 'I need to get some eggs' 'get' has what Pelczar calls 
the acquisitional sense. Yet, as Pelczar points out, we can easily imagine a context in 
which 'Smith has gotten the virus' means that Smith has acquired, i.e. successfully 
collected a sample of, the virus. The same remarks can be made with respect to the 
word 'cut', whose meaning is modulated differently in 'John cut the grass' and 'John 
cut the cake'. As Searle points out, if I ask John to cut the grass, and he cuts it the 
way one cuts a cake (or if I aks him to cut the cake, and he cuts it the way one cuts 
grass), he has not complied with my request; he has not done what I asked him to 
do. Still, we can imagine a context in which in asking John to cut the grass, I would 
                                            
72  This is what Lahav calls the 'noun-dependence' of adjectives (and verbs), a feature that, 
according to him, threatens the Principle of Compositionality. See his 'Against  
Compositionality: the Case of Adjectives', Philosophical Studies 57: 261-79, 1989. 
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mean that he is to cut it the way one cuts a cake: 
 
Suppose you and I run a sod farm where we sell strips of grass turf to people 
who want a lawn in a hurry... Suppose I say to you, "Cut half an acre of grass 
for this customer"; I might mean not that you should mow it, but that you 
should slice it into strips as you could cut a cake or a loaf of bread. (Searle 
1980: 224-5). 
 
So it's not just the interaction of the meaning of the word with the linguistic 
context that is relevant. The really important factor is the discourse topic. The 
'internal' interaction of word-meanings within the same sentence or discourse is only 
a reflection of the more general phenomenon: the interaction between word meaning 
and the situation the words are used to talk about. 
 
9.2. The semantic relevance of modulation 
 
As the virus examples shows, modulation is not just the post-semantic addition of a 
truth-conditionally irrelevant 'shade of meaning' to the core meaning of words. 
Modulation is truth-conditionally relevant, because the words' contribution to truth-
conditional content (or to satisfaction-conditions more generally) is not their pre-
modulation meaning but their modulated senses. Thus different truth-conditions 
correspond to the two senses which 'get' may take on through modulation: the sense 
of 'acquire' or that of 'contract'. In the acquisitional sense 'Smith has gotten the virus' 
will be true if Smith has collected a sample of the virus, even if Smith has not thereby 
contracted the virus in question. But unless he has contracted the virus, it will be 
false that he has 'gotten the virus', in the other sense. So modulation results in a 
truth-conditional difference. Thanks to that difference, it is possible to say 'He has 
gotten the virus, without getting the virus', consistently — provided the sense of 'get' 
is modulated differently on its two occurrences. 
Since modulation has an impact on truth-conditions, it cannot be relegated to 
the 'post-semantic' periphery. But there is another way of denying modulation 
semantic relevance: we can relegate it to the 'pre-semantic' limbo by construing it as 
a variety of disambiguation. The word 'get', one might argue, has several senses, one 
of which must be contextually selected on any particular use. Since disambiguation is 
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not a semantic but a pragmatic process, there is no reason why modulation (a variety 
of disambiguation) should matter to semantics. 
Like the post-semantic dismissal, this strategy fails. For there to be the sort of 
disambiguation that would support the pre-semantic dismissal, a pre-established list 
of discrete senses for 'get' must be somehow given, from which the contextually 
relevant sense can be selected. But, as Herb Clark and many others following him 
have stressed, modulated senses result from a process of 'generation' or 'creation' 
rather than of selection (Clark 1992, chapters 10 and 11; Pustejovsky 1995). The 
fundamental difference between sense generation and sense selection is that 
generation is productive: new senses can be generated, in a creative manner. As a 
result words can take on an indefinite variety of possible senses. (Another important 
difference between straigthforward ambiguity and modulation is the non-discrete 
nature of the senses generated through modulation: as several authors point out, 
there is a continuum of possible semantic values for a polysemous word such as 
'get'.73) 
Can we say at least that the phenomenon of modulation only concerns a 
restricted class of words, namely those that are 'polysemous' and possess a family of 
related senses? No. First, as Cohen points out, polysemy is the norm rather than the 
exception ('Ambiguity in truth-theoretic semantics', 1985, p. 131). To be sure, not all 
polysemous words are as polysemous as ultrafrequent words such as 'get'. Polysemy 
comes in grades, and it could be argued that modulation is associated with a high 
degree of polysemy: highly polysemous words, it may be said, have an abstract core 
meaning which calls for elaboration or modulation, and from which the various 
senses of the polysemous expression are generated.74 This does not entail that 
non-polysemous words are not subject to modulation, however. Polysemy arguably 
proceeds from modulation (since the array of senses of a polysemous expression 
                                            
73 See Fuchs (1991) on French 'pouvoir', Atkins (1993) on 'safety', and Grandy 1990 (pp. 
570-571) on 'prime'. 
74  See Alfonso Caramazza and Ellen Grober, 'Polysemy and the structure of the subjective 
lexicon', in C. Rameh (ed.), Semantics: Theory and Application. Georgetown University 
Round Table on Language and Linguistics, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 
1977?, pp. 181-207 
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reflects conventionalized patterns of modulation), not the other way round. So the 
proper response to make is that modulation can affect any ordinary word, whether or 
not it is (highly) polysemous. 
A paradigm example of modulation is the use of colour terms such as 'red' 
(Travis 1981: 16; Lahav 1989: 264). The conditions of application for 'red' depend 
upon (inter alia) what sort of thing the colour adjective is applied to. As Lahav puts it, 
the conditions that a table has to meet in order to be describable by 'red table' are not 
the same conditions that a house or a book or a bird has to meet in order to be 
describable by 'red house' or 'red book' or 'red bird' (1989 262-4).75 Yet 'red' is not 
especially polysemous; it is just an ordinary adjective, whose conditions of application 
can be varied or modulated in context, like that of any ordinary adjective. Or take the 
verb 'to like' which we find both in 'He likes John's sister' and in 'He likes the food 
John cooks'. It's not the same sort of 'liking' that is involved in both cases, and we 
                                            
75  "For a bird to be red (in the normal case), it should have most of the surface of its bodly 
red, though not its beak, legs, eyes, and of course its inner organs. Furthermore, the red color 
should be the bird's natural color, since we normally regard abird as being 'really' red even if 
it is painted white all over. A kitchen table, on the other hand, is red even if it is only painted 
red, and even if its 'natural' color underneath the paint is, say, white. Morever, for a table to be 
red only its upper surface needs to be red, but not necessarily its legs and its bottom surface. 
Similarly, a red apple, as Quine pointed out, needs to be red only on the outside, but a red hat 
needs to be red only in its external upper surface, a red crystal is red both inside and outside, 
and a red watermelon is red only inside. For a book to be red is for its cover but not 
necessarily for its inner pages to be mostly red, while for a newspaper to be red is for all of its 
pages to be red. For a house to be red is for its outside walls, but not necessarily its roof (and 
windows and door) to be mostly red, while a red car must be red in its external surface 
including its roof (but not its windows, wheels, bumper, etc.). A red star only needs to appear 
red from the earth, a red glaze needs to be red only after it is fired, and a red mist or a red 
powder are red not simply inside or ouside. A red pen need not even have any red part (the 
ink may turn red only when in contact with the paper). In short, what counts for one type of 
thing to be red is not what counts for another." (Lahav 1989: 264) 
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can imagine that someone who likes John's sister in one sense (say, the culinary 
sense — for that you have to imagine a weird context) does not like her in the other 
sense. Yet 'like' is just like any other verb. So the phenomenon of modulation is not a 
special feature of a restricted class of expressions. In general, the conditions of 
application for words can be varied or modulated in context. That is the phenomenon 
a proper theory of language and communication must account for. 
 
9.3. Four approaches 
 
Insofar as it takes as input the conventional, linguistic meaning of an expression, and 
delivers as output the modulated sense that is the expression's contribution to truth-
conditional content, modulation is in the same ballpark as indexicality. Cohen 
stresses the similarity between the two phenomena: 
 
It is an enormous convenience that the same word can often be uttered in one 
or other of several different though related senses. Instead of having to learn a 
very much larger number of words, each with fixed and context-independent 
meanings, we can learn a relatively small number of words with variable 
meanings... The economy of resources that is thus achieved by natural 
language is obviously comparable with the economies that are achieved by 
variability of reference in the case of proper nouns and other indexical 
expressions as an alternative to the fixed references available with the use of 
co-ordinate systems, individual constants, etc. (Cohen 1985: 132) 
 
There is a fundamental difference between indexicality and modulation, however. 
Despite its semantic relevance, modulation is a pragmatic process in the fullest 
possible sense: it is a pragmatically controlled pragmatic process, rather than a 
linguistically controlled pragmatic process (like saturation). Neither enrichment, nor 
loosening, nor transfer, nor any other of the mechanisms at work in modulation 
seems to require, on the side of the input, a 'slot' or gap in semantic structure 
demanding to be filled and triggering the search for an appropriate filler. In contrast to 
saturation, which proceeds from the bottom up, modulation seems to be 
fundamentally top-down. 
In this section I will introduce four types of approach to modulation, which may 
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be placed on the scale from Literalism to Contextualism (Chapter 6). Insofar as 
modulation is a cover term for what, in this book, I have called 'primary pragmatic 
processes of the optional variety', there is no account of modulation that is literalist, 
since the very phenomenon of modulation tells against Literalism. Still, among the 
possible accounts of the phenomenon, some are closer than others to the literalist 
pole, and some are closer than others to the contextualist pole. 
The first view to be discussed is the natural view to hold for a syncretist or a 
quasi-contextualist. I call it the Strong Optionality view (SO). It takes the primary 
pragmatic processes that are involved in modulation to be optional in a strong and 
straightforward sense. They take place, for contingent reasons, but they might as well 
not take place. In a suitable context, the senses expressed by the words would be, 
simply, the senses they possess in virtue of the rules of the language. 
Consider standard examples such as: 
 
She took out her key and opened the door 
There is a big lion in the middle of the piazza 
 
The pragmatic process that enriches the meaning of the first utterance so as to 
convey both a sense of temporal order (giving to 'and' the sense of 'and then') and a 
notion of the intrument used in opening the door (giving to 'opened the door' the 
sense of 'opened the door with the key') — that process might also not take place. As 
Grice emphasized, such pragmatic suggestions are always cancellable, explicitly or 
contextually (Grice 1989: 39).76 Once the pragmatic suggestion has been cancelled, 
what the words contribute to truth-conditional content is their bare linguistic senses. 
The same thing can be said about the second example. 'Lion' can be understood in 
the representational sense: the 'lion' that is talked about can be a representation (e.g. 
a statue) of a lion, not a real lion. That reading results from a primary pragmatic 
                                            
76 The speaker could cancel the suggestion explicitly by saying: 'She took out her key and 
opened the door – not with the key, though, and not in that order. She took out her key while 
opening the door (which was unlocked) with the other hand'. 
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process that can be variously described.77 However we describe it, its optional 
character is obvious: nothing prevents that sentence from being understood literally, 
as talking about a real lion. 
The three other views I want to discuss are all contextualist. They all ascribe to 
modulation a form of necessity or ineliminability, to the point of blurring the 
mandatory/optional contrast. Discussing them will enable us to distinguish more or 
less radical varieties of Contextualism. The last view I shall consider corresponds to 
the most radical form: Meaning Eliminativism 
Like SO, the Pragmatic Composition view (PC) accepts that the literal, input 
sense undergoing modulation could, in a suitable context, be the expressed sense. 
So it construes the pragmatic process of modulation as optional. But it construes it as 
optional only with respect to the word whose sense is modulated. If we consider not 
words in isolation, but the complex expressions in which they occur, we see that the 
primary pragmatic processes of modulation are not always contingent and 
dispensable, but often essential. Even though the linguistic meaning of a given word 
(or the semantic value that results from saturation) could be the expressed sense, 
still the process of semantic composition, i.e. the putting together of that sense with 
the semantic values for other expressions, cannot proceed unless appropriate 
adjustments take place so as to make the parts fit together within an appropriate 
whole. On this view words have meanings which could go directly into the 
interpretation, without modulation, but it is the composition process that forces 
modulation to take place, or at least invites it: often the meanings of individual words 
do not cohere by themselves, and can be fitted together only by undergoing a 
process of mutual adjustment. 
Remember the examples I gave in chapter 2. If we take it as axiomatic that 
only sounds can be heard, then, in 'I hear the piano', either the sense of  'hear' or 
                                            
77  According to Cohen (1978, 1985), the representational sense is generated by 'cancelling' 
the feature +animate from the rich lexical meaning of 'lion'; according to Grandy (1990), it is 
generated by enriching the structured character of the utterance with an unarticulated function 
from objects to their representations; according to Walton (1990), the circumstance of 
evaluation for the predicate 'lion' is shifted from the actual world to the world of the pretense. 
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that of 'the piano' must be modulated for the sentence to make sense (§2.6).78 Or 
remember the Gary Cooper example, 'disarm the fricassee', or Searle's example, 
'Cut the sun', from §6.3. To make sense of such sentences we must imagine (or 
retrieve from memory) a possible scenario in which the semantic values of the words 
fit together.79 That imaginative exercise involves elaborating what the meaning of 
the words give us — going beyond that linguistic meaning and, for example, 
interpreting 'disarm' in the specific sense of: 'take the gun out of' or 'remove the gun 
from'. 
Or consider the paradigmatic example I gave in the last section: the adjective 
'red'. There is no particular incompleteness in the linguistic meaning of that word — it 
means something like 'being of the colour red' or 'having the colour red'. Insofar as 
'red' refers to a specific colour (and it does) this, it seems, expresses a definite 
property — a property that could, in principle, go into the interpretation of a sentence 
in which the adjective 'red' occurs. (For example: 'Imagine a red surface.') But in most 
cases the following question will arise: what is it for the thing talked about to count as 
having that colour? Unless that question is answered, the utterance ascribing 
redness to the thing talked about (John's car, say) will not be truth-evaluable. It is not 
enough to know the colour that is in question (red) and the thing to which that colour 
is ascribed (John's car). To fix the utterance's truth-conditions, we need to know 
something more — something which the meanings of the words do not and cannot 
give us: we need to know what it is for that thing (or for that sort of thing) to count as 
being that color. What is it for a car, a bird, a house, a pen, or a pair of shoes to count 
as red? To answer such questions, we need to appeal to background assumptions 
and world knowledge. Linguistic competence does not suffice: pragmatic fine-tuning 
is called for. 
To sum up, on the view (PC) under discussion, even if the semantic value of a 
                                            
78 Note that there may be no fact of the matter as to which particular word or word-meaning 
undergoes modulation, in examples like those of Chapter 2. This is due to the holistic 
character of modulation. 
79 See A. Sandford and S. Garrod, 'The role of Scenario Mapping in Text Comprehension', 
Discourse Processes 26, 1998, pp. 159-90; D. Rumelhart, 'Some problems with the notion of 
literal meanings'. 
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word is fixed by language (and context, if saturation is necessary), composing it with 
the semantic values for other words often requires help from above. It is semantic 
composition which has a fundamentally pragmatic character.80 So there is a sense 
in which modulation is necessary, but that is not quite the sense in which saturation 
is. With saturation there is a semantic gap and an instruction to fill the gap — both 
the gap and the instruction being part of the linguistic meaning of the expression. 
With modulation, there need be no gap and there is no instruction to search for some 
contextual filler. The expression means something, and that meaning could go into 
the interpretation — so modulation is optional — but to determine a suitable sense for 
complex expressions, we need to go beyond the meaning of individual words and 
creatively enrich or otherwise adjust what we are given in virtue purely of linguistic 
meaning. We must go beyond linguistic meaning, without being linguistically 
instructed to do so, if we are to make sense of the utterance. As Rumelhart writes, 
utterance understanding involves "searching memory for a schema to account for the 
described event" (p. 85). I can't resist quoting Rumelhart's methodological comment 
here: 
 
This approach is, I believe, quite different from the 'standard' appraoch. The 
standard view emphasizes the 'bottom up' process of constructing meaning 
from smaller component meanings. Nonlinguistic knowledge comes into play 
after the set of possible meanings has been selected. My approach suggests 
that comprehension, like perception, should be likened to Hebb's 
paleontologist (Hebb 1949) who uses his beliefs and knowledge about 
dinosaurs in conjunction with the clues provided by the bone fragments 
available to construct a full-fledged model of the original. In this case the 
words spoken and the actions taken by the speaker are likened to the clues of 
the paleontologist, and the dinosaur, to the meaning conveyed through those 
clues. On this view the processing is much more 'top down' in that internal 
                                            
80   See Benveniste 1958 for a clear statement of that idea. See also Rumelhart, 'Some 
problems with the notion of literal meaning', p. 83. 
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hypotheses are actively imposed on the observed utterances. (p. 85)81 
 
On the third type of view — the Wrong Format view (WF) — modulation is 
ineliminable for deeper reasons. It's not just semantic composition which requires 
adjustment and modulation of word meaning. Individual word meanings themselves 
are such that they could not go directly into the interpretation. They don't have the 
proper format for that. They are either too abstract and schematic, in such a way that 
elaboration or fleshing out is needed to reach a determinate content (Guillaume 
1929 :132-134, Ruhl 1989); or they are too rich and must undergo 'feature-
cancellation' (Cohen 1971, 1977, 1978), or some other screening process through 
which some aspects will be backgrounded and others focussed on. Note that there 
are versions of this view which take the meaning of a word to consist both in some 
abstract schema in need of elaboration and a large store of encyclopedic 
representations most of which must be screened off as irrelevant, on any particular 
use (Langacker 1987). 
According to WF modulation is mandatory, hence it becomes harder to 
distinguish it from saturation. This is the point where Indexicalism and Contextualism 
meet (§6.6). An Indexicalist will argue that the schematicity of word meaning invoked 
by (some versions of) WF just is the presence in that meaning of free variables or 
parameters. So there is no modulation really, only saturation. A contextualist will 
reply, as I did in §6.4, that the alleged parameters do not behave like standard 
indexical variables.82 
                                            
81 I am not suggesting that Rumelhart himself advocated the Pragmatic Composition view. I 
think his contextualism was more radical than that. As the above passage shows, he held that 
semantic composition is, to a large extent, a top down process. But he would presumably not 
have accepted the claim that the meaning of a linguistic expression could go directly into the 
interpretation, without modulation. 
82  In his contextualist manifesto, 'Is Snow White?', Julius Moravcsik points out that 
contextual indices of the sort used to deal with indexicals have two important properties. First, 
they "simply limit or relativize truth to a frame of application within which variations in 
extension and truth do not arise". Second, "for most of the standard indices we can find 
 164 
The last view of interest to us, Meaning Eliminativism (ME), is a sort of WF 
pushed to the extremes. According to WF, words have meanings, but those 
meanings don't have the proper format for being recruited into the interpretation of 
utterances; they are not determinate senses but overly rich or overly abstract 
'semantic potentials' out of which determinate senses can be constructed. ME goes 
farther in the same direction. It denies that words (qua linguistic types) have 
'meanings' in anything like the traditional sense — not even abstract or knowledge-
rich meanings, as in WF. Meanings for types undergo wholesale elimination, in 
favour of the senses contextually expressed by particular tokens. ME is implicit in the 
writings of some of the early contextualists (Austin, Wittgenstein, etc.), and before 
comparing it to WF, it is worth taking a look at their view. 
 
9.4. Truth-conditional unstability: from Waismann's 'open texture' to Searle's 
'background' 
 
A good place to start is Waismann's classic paper 'Verifiability', and more specifically 
the passage where he introduces the notion of 'open texture'.83 That passage is 
representative of a view (and a type of example) which Waismann shared with Austin 
and Wittgenstein, and which has been revived recently by contemporary 
contextualists such as Travis and Searle. According to this view, truth-conditional 
                                                                                                                                        
individual lexical items to which these are linked". Neither of these conditions holds in the 
case of modulation. The phenomenon "is not linked to a specific sub-vocabulary of English. 
Practically the whole descriptive vocabulary is affected". Moroever, "the various practical 
contexts create rather than restrict extension. It is not as if we could survey all of the possible 
future extension-creating contexts that our future and possible interactions with the world can 
create. Thus the intuitive idea that underlies the practice of relativizing truth is missing in our 
type of case. The expanding ranges of application and contexts cannot be described in  a 
rigorous way, while this is possible in the cases in which the introduction of indices is 
legitimate" (p. 9-10). 
83 Friedrich Waismann, 'Verifiability', in A. Flew (ed.), Logic and Language, 1st series, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1951, pp. 119-123. 
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content is essentially unstable and context-dependent. 
What Waismann says in introducing open texture can be paraphrased as 
follows. It seems that we have no problem assigning truth-conditions to ordinary 
sentences. To do so we describe a state of affairs, i.e. a type of situation, the 
obtaining of which is necessary and sufficient for the sentence to be true. That seems 
easy enough to do. Thus we think we know the truth-conditions of 'There is a cat next 
door', or 'This is gold' (or 'This is a man'): we can specify a state of affairs s such that 
the utterance is true if and only if s obtains. But this is an illusion — we can't really. 
Given an utterance u and the state of affairs s which is its alleged truth-maker, it is 
always possible to imagine a world in which s obtains, yet it is not the case that u is 
true (with respect to that world). 
To show that, one has only to embed the state of affairs s within a larger 
situation, by providing further details about an imagined world in which s obtains. If 
the world in question is sufficiently unlike our world (for example, if the 'cat' talked 
about turns out to speak Latin, or grows to a fantastic size, or changes into a fish), we 
shall be at a loss when it comes to deciding whether the statement 'There is a cat 
next door' is actually true, with respect to that world, even though the state of affairs 
we initially specified obtains. Is a world in which there is an animal next door exactly 
like a cat in all respects except that it speaks Latin a world in which there is a cat next 
door? We don't know, because "most of our empirical concepts are not delimited in 
all possible directions" (120). Or, to take another classic example: 
 
The notion of gold seems to be defined with absolute precision, say by the 
spectrum of gold with its characteristic lines. Now what would you say if a 
substance was discovered that looked like gold, satisfied all the chemical tests 
for gold, whilst it emitted a new sort of radiation? 'But such things do not 
happen'. Quite so; but they might happen, and that is enough to show that we 
can never exclude altogether the possibility of some unforeseen situation 
arising in which we shall have to modify our definition. Try as we may, no 
concept is limited in such a way that there is no room for any doubt. We 
introduce a concept and limit it in some directions; for instance, we define gold 
in contrast to some other metals such as alloys. This suffices for our present 
needs, and we do not probe any farther. We tend to overlook the fact that 
there are always other directions in which the concept has not been defined. 
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And if we did, we could easily imagine conditions which would necessitate new 
limitations. In short, it is not possible to define a concept like gold with absolute 
precision, i.e. in such a way that every nook and cranny is blocked against 
entry of doubt. That is what is meant by the open texture of a concept. 
(Waismann 1951: 120) 
 
We find something analogous to Waismann's embeddings in Searle's writings 
on the 'background' (e.g. Searle 1978, 1980). Searle (1978) enquires into the truth-
conditions of 'the cat is on the mat'. It's easy to describe the sort of state of affairs 
that would make the sentence true (with respect to a particular assignment of values 
to indexical expressions). But once we have described such a state of affairs, we can 
embed it within an extraordinary situation: 
 
Suppose that the cat and the mat are in exactly the relations depicted only they 
are both floating freely in outer space, perhaps outside the Milky Way galaxy 
altogether... Is the cat still on the mat? And was the earth's gravitational field 
one of the things depicted...? 
What I think is correct to say as a first approximation in answer to these 
questions is that the notion of the literal meaning of the sentence "The cat is on 
the mat" does not have a clear application, unless we make some further 
assumptions, in the case of cats and mats floating freely in outer space. (Searle 
1978: 211.)  
 
Now Waismann has an explanation for the fact that, in extraordinary situations, 
'words fail us', as Austin puts it. Here it goes:  
 
If I had to describe the right hand of mine which I am now holding up, I may 
say different things of it: I may state its size, its shape, its colour, its tissue, the 
chemical compound of its bones, its cells, and perhaps add some more 
particulars; but however far I go, I shall never reach a point where my 
description will be completed: logically speaking, it is always possible to 
extend the description by adding some detail or other. Every description 
stretches, as it were, into a horizon of open possibilities: however far I go, I 
shall always carry this horizon with me. (...) [This] has a direct bearing on the 
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open texture of concepts. A term is defined when the sort of situation is 
described in which it is to be used. Suppose for a moment that we were able 
to describe situations completely without omitting anything (as in chess), then 
we could produce an exhaustive list of all the circumstances in which the term 
is to be used so that nothing is left in doubt; in other words, we could construct 
a complete definition, i.e. a thought model which anticipates and settles once 
and for all every possible question of usage. As, in fact, we can never 
eliminate the possibility of some unforeseen factor emerging, we can never be 
quite sure that we have included in our definition everything that should be 
included, and thus the process of defining and refining an idea will go on 
without ever reaching a final stage. (Waismann 1951: 121-3) 
 
Waismann's point is simple enough. A term is used in, or applies to, situations of a 
certain type — situations with which we are acquainted. (Or at least: our mastery of 
the term is somehow connected to our having experienced the type of situation in 
question.) To define a term is to describe the type of situation in question. The 
problem is that the situations in question, like Waismann's right hand or any aspect of 
empirical reality, cannot be completely described: they possess an indefinite number 
of features, some of which may never have been noticed and perhaps will never be 
noticed by anyone. When we describe an empirical situation, we make certain 
features explicit, but an indefinite number of other features remain implicit and 
constitute a sort of hidden 'background'. (Here I use Searle's term, on purpose.) Now 
the applicability of a term to novel situations depends on their similarity to the source 
situations, i.e. to the situations by association with which the term has acquired the 
meaning it has. For the term to be (clearly) applicable, the target situation must be 
similar to the source situations not only with respect to those features which easily 
come to mind and constitute the 'explicit' definition of the term (the 'tip', to use the 
iceberg metaphor), but also with respect to the hidden background. If the two 
situations considerably diverge with respect to the latter, it's unclear whether or not 
the term will be applicable, even though the explicit conditions of satisfaction are 
satisfied. 
 Other examples can be provided where the divergence between the source 
situation and the target situation affects not only the hidden background but also the 
explicit part (the tip of the iceberg). Thus Searle (1980 p. 230-1) imagines that 'Snow 
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is white' is uttered as a description of the following situation: 
 
Suppose that by some fantastic change in the course of nature the earth is hit 
by an astronomical shower of radiation that affects all existing and future water 
molecules in such a way that in their crystalline form they reflect a different 
wave length when in sunlight from what they did prior to the radiation shower. 
Suppose also that the same shower affects the human visual apparatus and its 
genetic basis so that snow crystals look exactly as they did before. Physicists 
after the shower assure us that if we could see snow the way we did before, it 
would look chartreuse but because of the change in our retinas, which affects 
our observation of snow and nothing else, snow looks the same color as ever 
and will continue to do so to ensuing generations... Would we say that snow 
was still white? (Searle 1980:230). 
 
Putnam's twin-earth thought-experiment has the same structure. It's a case of 
divergence between source situations and target situation, where the divergence 
affects the tip and not merely the the hidden background. For if we are to define 
water, we shall say that it's a liquid with such and such phenomenal properties, and 
that it's chemical structure is H20, in the same way in which the whiteness of snow 
has to to both with its reflecting a certain wavelength AND with its looking to us a 
certain way. We can imagine an extraordinary situation where the two things that go 
together as part of the tip are actually divorced from one another. In such cases we 
don't know what to say because there is some measure of similarity between the 
source situations and the target situation, but we have no contextual clue as to which 
dimension of similarity matters. 
 
9.5 Ostensive definitions 
 
Waismann's argument for the unstability of application conditions can be objected to 
on two grounds. First, it presupposes 'descriptivism', i.e. the idea that the only way to 
define words is to do so descriptively. Second, it confuses the semantic and the 
epistemological. 
(First objection) All that Waismann's argument establishes, arguably, is that 
words can't be defined in purely descriptive terms. But this does not imply that words 
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cannot be defined at all, or that they do not possess definite (stable) conditions of 
application. The reason why words can't be defined in purely descriptive terms is that 
they have an irreducibly referential dimension: they, as it were, point to real situations 
in the world — situations which have an indefinite number of features and cannot be 
exhaustively described. Why not simply incorporate this referential dimension into our 
statements of truth- and application-conditions? Why not follow Putnam and define a 
cat as an animal belonging to the same species as this specimen (or those 
specimens, where the specimens in question are normal cats found in the local 
environment)? Why not define gold as this metal (while pointing to a piece of gold)? 
By explicitly incorporating some ostensive reference to the actual environment into 
the definition of predicates like 'gold' and 'cat', it seems that we can overcome the 
alleged unstability of truth-conditions. 'There is a cat next door' will be true, in the 
imagined situation (where a catlike animal next door speaks Latin), provided the 
catlike animal belongs to the same species as our cats (the cats to  be found in 
ordinary situations). 
(Second objection) Of course, we do not know whether or not the strange 
animal we imagine would be considered a cat by the scientists, just as we don't know 
whether or not a gold-like metal emitting a new sort of radiation would count as gold. 
But our epistemic limitations do not prevent the word 'gold' (or the word 'cat') from 
having a definite content and a definite extension: gold is anything that is the same 
metal as this, and a cat is any animal of the same species as those. Our epistemic 
limitations, so much emphasized by Waismann, have no bearing on the properly 
semantic issue. 
These objections are well-taken but they are not decisive. In particular, they do 
not threaten Waismann's conclusion (or at least, my conclusion) regarding the 
unstability of truth- and application-conditions. They would threaten that conclusion if, 
by appealing to ostensive definitions, we could determine a stable content (i.e. stable 
conditions of application) for the word thus defined. But we cannot. For a stable 
content to be determined by an ostensive definition à la Putnam, the dimension of 
similarity to the demonstrated exemplars must itself be fixed.84 But what fixes the 
                                            
84 As McKay and Stern point out, "to determine the extension of the natural kind term, we 
need, in addition to the sample, at least some indication of the breadth of the term — the 
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dimension of similarity? On Waismann's picture, words are associated with situations 
of use, that is all. To apply the word to or in a novel situation, that situation must be 
similar to the source situations; but we cannot survey in advance all the possible 
dimensions of similarity between the source situations and possible target situations: 
open texture again. 
According to Putnam (1975), the predicate 'water' means something like: 'same-
L as the transparent, odorless, thirst-quenching stuff to be found in lakes and rivers in 
the local environment', or more simply 'same-L as that' (pointing to a sample of 
water). If we change the demonstrated stuff (i.e. the liquid which satisfies the 
stereotype of water in the local environment) we thereby change the extension of 
'water'. 'Water', therefore, has an indexical component, Putnam says. Yet there is 
another form of context-sensitivity in play here, which Putnam's ostensive definitions 
do not properly capture: the dimension of similarity itself is not given, but contextually 
determined. In some contexts the chemical composition of the demonstrated stuff will 
be relevant, in other contexts only functional properties will be relevant.85 
Accordingly XYZ will count as water in some contexts simply because it's that liquid 
which is odorless, colorless, quenches thirst, and can be found in lakes and rivers. If 
the conversation bears on the issue of what currently fills a certain bottle, milk or 
water, then plainly the answer 'it's water' will be true, even if it's XYZ rather than H20 
(Chomsky 2000 : 41,). Putnam himself expresses awareness of this point in the 
Meaning of Meaning (Harnish ed. p.243): 
                                                                                                                                        
respects in which other individuals [in the extension] must be related to the sample' (Thomas 
McKay and Cindy Stern, 'Natural kind terms and standards of membership', Linguistics and 
Philosophy 3, 1979, /27-34;/ p. 27). 
85 A Kripkean/Putnamian might object that we are concerned only with what words mean in 
our language, not with what they mean in other possible situations. Now in our language 
water is H20, and the truth-conditions of 'This is water' is that this stuff is H20. But this 
objection is mistaken. I am talking about OUR language. Our language is such that we can 
imagine contexts in which it would be true to say 'This is water' of some stuff if the stuff in 
question had certain phenomenal/functional properties, whether or not the thing in question 
was H20. 
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x bears the relation same-L to y just in case (1) x and y are both liquids, and (2) 
x and y agree in important physical properties.... Importance is an interest-
relative notion. Normally the 'important' properties of a liquid or solid, etc., are 
the ones that are structurally important; the ones that specify what the liquid or 
solid, etc., is ultimately made out of... From this point of view the important 
characteristic of a typical bit of water is consisting of H20. But it may or may not 
be important that there are impurities... And structure may sometimes be 
unimportant; thus one may sometimes refer to XYZ as water if one is using it as 
water... 
 Even senses that are so far out that they have to be regarded as a bit 'deviant' 
may bear a definite relation to the core sense. For example I might say 'did you 
see the lemon', meaning the plastic lemon. A less deviant case is this: we 
discover 'tigers' on Mars. That is, they look just like tigers, but they have a 
silicon-based chemistry instead of a carbon-based chemistry... Are Martian 
'tigers' tigers? It depends on the context. 
 
We now have in hand all the ingredients necessary to define the theoretical 
position I want to ascribe to the (radical) contextualist: the irreducibly referential 
dimension of meaning; the central role of similarity in determining extension (hence 
truth-conditions); and finally the context-dependence of similarity relations. With 
those ingredients, we can concoct an extreme view very much in the spirit of Austin 
and Wittgenstein: Meaning Eliminativism. 
 
9.6. Meaning Eliminativism 
 
According to WF, the sense expressed by an expression must always be contextually 
constructed on the basis of the (overly rich or overly abstract) meaning, or semantic 
potential, of the word type. Just as the reference of an indexical expression is not 
linguistically given but must be contextually determined, the sense of an ordinary 
expression is not linguistically given but must be constructed. In that framework there 
still is a role for the linguistic meaning of word types: it is the input (or one of the 
inputs) to the construction process. 
The difference between Meaning Eliminativism (ME) and WF is that, according 
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to ME, we don't need linguistic meanings even to serve as input to the construction 
process. The senses that are the words' contributions to contents are constructed, 
but the construction can proceed without the help of conventional, context-
independent word meanings. 
 Note that, according to a trivial extension of WF, the linguistic meaning of a 
word is not merely the input to the process of semantic modulation: it is also the 
output of a process of induction through which the child, or anyone learning the 
language, abstracts the meaning of the word from the specific senses which it 
expresses, or seems to express, on the observed occasions of use. It is a truism that 
the child or language learner starts not with pre-formatted linguistic meanings, but 
with actual uses of words and the contextualised senses that words assume on such 
uses. So both contextualised senses and context-independent linguistic meanings 
are input, and both are output, in some construction process. The linguistic meaning 
of a word type is the output of an abstraction process; that process takes as input the 
contextualised senses used as evidence by the language learner. On the other hand, 
the linguistic meaning of a word type also serves as input to the modulation process 
which yields as output the contextualised sense of the word on a particular occasion 
of use (Figure 9.1). 
 
[Figure 9.1 about here] 
 
ME purports to simplify WF by suppressing the intermediary step (linguistic 
meaning) and computing directly the contextual sense which an expression assumes 
on a particular occasion of use on the basis of the contextual senses which that 
expression had on previous occasions of use — without ever abstracting, or needing 
to abstract, 'the' linguistic meaning of the expression type.86 This amounts to 
merging the two construction processes: the abstraction of meaning from use, and 
the modulation of meaning in use (Figure 9.2). According to ME, there is a single 
                                            
86   For a detailed psychological model supporting ME, see D. Hintzman, '"Schema 
Abstraction" in a Multiple-Trace Memory Model', Psychological Review 93: 411-28, 1986, 
and 'Judgments of Frequency and Recognition Memory in a Multiple-Trace Memory Model', 
Psychological Review 95: 528-51, 1988. 
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process of abstraction-modulation which takes as input previous uses of the 
expression and yields as output the contextual sense assumed by the expression on 
the current use. 
 
[Figure 9.2 about here] 
 
 On the resulting picture, words are not primitively associated with abstract 
'conditions of application', constituting their conventional meaning (as on the Fregean 
picture). The conditions of application for words must be contextually determined, like 
the reference of indexicals. What words, qua linguistic types, are associated with are 
not abstract conditions of application, but rather particular applications. 
 In the spirit of Wittgenstein, consider what it is for someone to learn a 
predicate P. The learner, whom I'll call Tom, observes the application of P in a 
particular situation S; he associates P and S. At this stage, the semantic potential of 
P for Tom is the fact that P is applicable to S. In a new situation S', Tom will judge 
that P applies only if he finds that S' sufficiently resembles S. To be sure, it is 
possible for S' to resemble S in a way that is not pertinent for the application of P. 
The application of P to S' will then be judged faulty by the community, who will 
correct Tom. The learning phase for Tom consists in noting a sufficient number of 
situations which, like S, legitimate the application of P, as opposed to those, like S', 
which do not legitimate it. The semantic potential of P for Tom at the end of his 
learning phase can thus be thought of as a collection of legitimate situations of 
application; that is, a collection of situations such that the members of the community 
agree that P applies in or to those situations. The situations in question are the 
source-situations. The future applications of P will be underpinned, in Tom's usage, 
by the judgement that the situation of application (or target-situation) is similar to the 
source-situations. 
 In this theory the semantic potential of P is a collection of source-situations, 
and the conditions of application of P in a given use, involving a given target-situation 
S'', are a set of features which S'' must possess to be similar to the source-situations. 
The set of features in question, and so the conditions of application for P, will not be 
the same for all uses; it is going to depend, amongst other things, on the target-
situation. One target-situation can be similar to the source-situations in certain 
respects and another target-situation can be similar to them in different respects. But 
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the contextual variability of the conditions of application does not end there. Even 
once the target-situation is fixed, the relevant dimensions for evaluating the similarity 
between that situation and the source-situations remain under-determined: those 
dimensions will vary as a function of the subject of conversation, the concerns of the 
speech participants, etc. 
 One particularly important factor in the contextual variation is the relevant 
'contrast set'. As Tversky has pointed out, judgements of similarity are very much 
affected by variations along that dimension.87 If we ask which country, Sweden or 
Hungary, most resembles Austria (without specifying the relevant dimension of 
similarity), the answer will depend on the set of countries considered. If that set 
includes not just Sweden, Hungary and Austria but also Poland, then Sweden will be 
judged more like Austria than Hungary; but if the last of the four countries considered 
is Norway and not Poland, then it is Hungary which will be judged more like Austria 
than Sweden. The explanation for that fact is simple. Poland and Hungary have 
certain salient geopolitical features in common which can serve as basis for the 
classification: Hungary and Poland are then put together and opposed to Austria and 
Sweden. If we replace Poland by Norway in the contrast set a new principle of 
classification emerges, based on the salient features shared by Norway and Sweden: 
in this new classification Hungary and Austria are back together. Tversky concludes 
that judgements of similarity appeal to features having a high 'diagnostic value' (or 
classificatory significance), and that the diagnostic value of features itself depends on 
the available contrast set. 
So the set of similarity features on which sense depends itself depends upon 
the relevant contrast set, and the relevant contrast set depends upon the current 
interests of the conversational participants. It follows that one can, by simply shifting 
the background interests ascribed to the conversational participants, change the 
truth-conditions of a given utterance, even though the facts (including the target-
situation) don't change, and the semantic values of indexicals remain fixed. Charles 
Travis has produced dozens of examples of this phenomenon of truth-conditional 
shiftiness over the last thirty years, and his examples often involve manipulating the 
                                            
87  See Amos Tversky, ‗Features of Similarity‘, Psychological Review 84, 1977, pp. 327-52. 
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relevant contrast-set.88  
In this framework the background-dependence of truth-conditions emphasized 
by Searle is accounted for by appealing to the global character of the similarity 
between target-situation and source-situations. As Waismann stresses the source-
situations are concrete situations with an indefinite number of features. Some of 
these features are ubiquitous and their diagnostic value in a normal situation is 
vanishing.89 They belong to the most general and immutable aspects of our 
experience of the world: gravity, the fact that food is ingested via the mouth, etc. 
When we specify the truth conditions of a sentence (for example the sentence 'The 
cat is on the mat'), or the conditions of application of a predicate (for example the 
predicate 'on' in that sentence), we only mention a small number of features — the 
'foreground' features — because we take most of the others for granted; so we do not 
mention gravity, we presuppose it. Nevertheless, gravity is one of the features 
possessed by the situations which are at the source of the predicate 'on'; and there is 
                                            
88 The following example (inspired from  Austin) is taken almost at random from a list of 
Travis-examples compiled by a student of mine: 
Fred is walking with his young nephew beside a pond where a decoy duck is floating. 
Pointing to the decoy, he says, "That's a duck". Again we might ask whether what he 
said is true or false. But again, the above description is not enough for us to tell. If 
Fred has just finished laughing at a sportsman who blasted a decoy out of the pond, 
and if he has been trying to show his nephew how to avoid similar mistakes, then what 
he said is false. But suppose that Fred and his nephew are attending the annual 
national decoy exhibition, and the boy has been having trouble distinguishing ducks 
from geese. Then what Fred said may well be true. It would also be true had Fred said 
what he did in pointing out the fact that all the other ducks were poor copies (perhaps 
on the order of Donald Duck). (Travis 1975: 51) 
89  See ‗Features of similarity‘, p. 342: "The feature 'real' has no diagnostic value in the set 
of actual animals since it is shared by all actual animals and hence cannot be used to classify 
them. This feature, however, aquires considerable diagnostic value if the object set is 
extended to include legendary animals, such as a centaur, a mermaid or a phoenix." 
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an indefinite number of such features. These background features of the source-
situations can be ignored inasmuch as they are shared by the situations of which we 
can want to speak when we utter the sentence; but if we imagine a target-situation 
where the normal conditions of experience are suspended, and where certain 
background features of the source-situations are not present, then we shatter the 
global similarity between the target-situation and the source-situations. Even if the 
target-situation has all the foreground features which seem to enter into the 
'definition' of a predicate P, it suffices to suspend a certain number of background 
features in order to jeopardize the application of P to the target-situation. That shows 
that the semantic potential of P is not, as in Fregean semantics, a set of conditions of 
application determined once and for all, but a collection of source-situations such that 
P applies to a target-situation if and only if it is relevantly similar to the source-
situations. 
 A caveat: as Searle himself emphasizes, the fact that the target-situation does 
not possess certain background features of the source-situations does not 
automatically entail the non-applicability of the predicate P. It can be that the 
background features which the target-situation does not possess (for example 
gravity) are contextually irrelevant and do not affect the application conditions of the 
predicate.90 For the same sort of reason, the possession by the target-situation of 
what I have called the foreground features of the source-situations is no more a 
necessary condition for the application of the predicate than it is a sufficient 
condition. For a predicate (or a sentence) to apply to a target-situation that situation 
must resemble the source-situations under the contextually relevant aspects. So a 
predicate can apply even if the target-situation differs markedly from the source-
                                            
90 It is easy to imagine a context with respect to which it would be definitely true to say 'the 
cat is on the mat' of the gravitationless situation described by Searle: 
For example, as we are strapped in the seats of our spaceship in outer space we see a 
series of cat-mat pairs floating past our window. Oddly, they come in only two 
attitudes. From our point of view they are either as depicted in Figure 1 or as would be 
depicted if figure 1 were upside down. "Which is it now?", I ask. "The cat is on the 
mat", you answer. Have you not said exactly and literally what you meant? (Searle 
1978 p.212). 
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situations, as long as, in the context and taking into account the contrast set, the 
similarities are more significant than the differences. Thus, in certain contexts, as 
Putnam notices, the predicate 'lemon' will apply to plastic lemons, or the word 'water' 
to XYZ. 
 
9.7. Conclusion 
 
Meaning Eliminativism gets rid of abstract meanings for types, in favour of particular 
uses. The contextualised sense carried by the word on a particular use depends 
upon similarity relations between that use of the word (as applied to the 'target-
situation') and past uses of the same word (as applied to the 'source-situations'). The 
features of similarity that are perceived are so context-dependent (and in particular, 
contrast-dependent) that the truth-conditional sense of the word is susceptible to 
vary, and to vary more or less indefinitely, even after we have fixed (i) the collection 
of past situations of use, (ii) the target-situation in which or to which the word is 
currently applied, and (iii) the reference of indexicals and the semantic values of all 
expressions in need of saturation. 
Meaning Eliminativism is, as I said, the most extreme form of Contextualism. It 
is probably too extreme, but what strikes me most in that framework is its surprising 
viability. The knock-down objections such an extreme view is supposed to raise (and 
does raise in the classroom) do not look so devastating when explicitly stated. To 
close this chapter, let me briefly consider two standard objections to the elimination of 
linguistic meaning. 
The first objection (which I may have heard about fifty times) runs like this. 
Granted, the senses expressed  by words are affected by contextual factors; they 
are 'modulated'. But we must treat modulation effects as arising from the interaction 
of context with context-independent linguistic meanings. If, instead, we go 
eliminativist and say that the context does everything, while the words themselves 
contribute nothing, then it does not matter any more whether the word one utters is 
'red' or 'rectangle'. But it makes a big difference which word we actually utter. This 
shows that Meaning Eliminativism goes too far: it throws out the baby with the 
bathwater. 
This objection presupposes that, for the eliminativist, "the words themselves 
contribute nothing". But that is not true. There is something which words do 
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contribute, and which is sufficient to account for the difference it makes when we 
substitute a word for another one. That thing is not a 'meaning' in the traditional 
sense: it is what I called the 'semantic potential' of words. 'Red' and 'rectangle' have 
very different semantic potentials. The semantic potential of a word is the collection 
of past uses on the basis of which similarities can be established between the source 
situations (i.e. the situations such uses concerned) and the target situation (the 
situation of current concern). So there is, indeed, interaction between the 'context' 
and what words themselves contribute. Context does not do everything, even on the 
most extreme form of Contextualism. 
According to the second objection, there is actually more stability in semantic 
content than ME suggests. Not only do words have relatively stable conditions of 
application, across uses; there is also interpersonal stability: language users 
converge in their judgments regarding conditions of application or truth-conditions. 
How will that stability be accounted for? 
With regard to the first part of the objection the contextualist pleads guilty: the 
unstability and shiftiness of truth-conditional content across uses he takes to be an 
empirical fact, sufficiently established by the wealth of examples and thought-
experiments provided by the authors I have mentioned. Still, according to the 
objection, the contextualist goes too far in that direction. But the contextualist will 
deny that that is so. The degree of unstability achieved will depend upon details of 
the model, and can be varied so as to fit experimental data. (See Hintzman 1986, 
1988 for suggestions.) — As for the second part of the objection, the contextualist will 
be happy to grant the interpersonal stability of truth-conditional content. That stability 
can be accounted for on psychological rather than linguistic grounds. Thus Bolinger 
notes that 
 
speakers not only share the same code but also share the ability to see the 
same resemblances between what their code already designates and what 
they would like it to designate, and so to make the old forms reach out to new 
meanings. That is how language breaks free of its rigidity. (D. Bolinger, 
Aspects of Language). 
 
In any event, there are all sorts of versions of the contextualist position which 
are intermediate between WF and ME. Like Rumelhart and most lexical semanticists, 
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we may consider that words are associated not so much with (a collection of) 
particular, episodic situations of use, but with more abstract schemata corresponding 
to types of situations. Insofar as there still is a referential or quasi-referential 
dimension in virtue of which, through these schemata, words point to actual situations 
of use, the basic mechanisms posited by ME remain in play. Or we may favour a 
model in which both episodic traces of situations of use and abstract schemata are 
stored and exploited in contextually determining truth-conditional content. Whichever 
option we take the important contextualist idea should not be misconstrued. How 
much abstraction takes place is not the issue, for the contextualist. The important 
idea — which forms the core of Austin's theory of truth — is twofold: first, words are 
associated with worldly situations (at whatever level of abstractness and fine-
grainedness), i.e. entities at the level of reference rather than the level of sense; 
second, the content (sense) of words depends upon context-sensitive similarities 
between those situations and the target-situation in which or to which the word is 
applied. 
